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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this doctoral research has been to analyse the integration of 
humanitarian and development action during the 2011-12 food crisis in Ethiopia. 
Historically, the two types of action have evolved as two different, yet intertwined, 
domains, with separate objectives and guiding principles. Yet, particularly since the 
1990s, there have been debates on how to better integrate them, in consideration of the 
fact that they often operate in the same context, as was the case in the Ethiopian case-
study. Following a neo-institutionalist approach, this study has analysed what hinders 
the bridging of the humanitarian-development divide, and what supports it, by 
analysing the interplay of institutional forces in the regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive domains in the Ethiopian case.  
Grounded in critical realism and in neo-institutional theory, this research has adopted 
a novel theoretical approach to the issue of linking humanitarian and development 
action, and has been based on original empirical material. A key finding of this study is 
that, in the context of Ethiopia, integrating the two modes of action is possible and 
even encouraged at some levels, despite a broader funding architecture that hinders 
such linkages. By shedding light on practices of humanitarian relief and development 
in Ethiopia, this study contributes to scholarship in the broader fields of International 
Development and African Studies. 
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Italian summary 
 
Questa tesi di dottorato affronta la questione dell’integrazione tra azioni di soccorso 
umanitario e cooperazione allo sviluppo, prendendo in esame il caso della risposta alla 
crisi alimentare del 2011-2012 in Etiopia. 
Nel corso della storia recente, le tipologie di intervento umanitario e di sviluppo si sono 
consolidate come due modalità diverse di occuparsi delle sofferenze altrui, la prima 
volta a trattare o quantomeno alleviare le sofferenze in tempo di crisi (la 
malnutrizione, le epidemie, le ferite di guerra, l’assenza di un riparo sicuro, e via 
dicendo), e la seconda al cambiamento delle condizioni strutturali che provocano 
malessere e crisi, per quanto spesso con un approccio limitato alla promozione della 
sola crescita economica. 
L’Etiopia, con la sua storia di crisi alimentari ricorrenti, è un caso di studio 
particolarmente rilevante, in quanto i soccorsi umanitari sono spesso prestati in un 
contesto dove attività di cooperazione allo sviluppo sono già in corso. In aggiunta, la 
frequenza delle crisi ha portato ad una situazione in cui anche gli attori umanitari – 
teoricamente presenti solo per un breve periodo – rimangono attivi nel paese anche 
per decenni. Per di più, non è raro che una singola organizzazione si trovi a svolgere sia 
progetti umanitari che di sviluppo, anche se non necessariamente entrambi 
contemporaneamente.  
Da almeno due decenni è in corso un dibattito relativo alla necessità o meno di 
integrare i due tipi di azione. Le voci a favore argomentano che solo attraverso 
un’azione congiunta che contrasti le cause delle crisi oltre a trattarne gli effetti sarà 
possibile prevenire ulteriori disastri. Dal canto loro, i contrari paventano il rischio che 
anche l’aiuto umanitario finisca per diventare uno strumento di politica estera come è 
già il caso degli aiuti allo sviluppo. Si configurerebbe pertanto una violazione dei 
principi fondamentali che impongono di prestare soccorso a chiunque ne abbia 
necessità, indipendentemente da qualsiasi considerazione relativa alla nazionalità o 
all’appartenenza politica.  
In questa tesi di dottorato la questione viene affrontata da un punto di vista diverso, 
ovverosia, invece di assumere una posizione normativa pro o contro l’integrazione, si 
cerca di comprendere quali forze istituzionali spingano verso una maggiore 
complementarità dei due tipi d’azione, e quali invece favoriscano un mantenimento 
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della dicotomia umanitario/sviluppo. Nello specifico, si sono presi in esame tre 
“pilastri” (Scott 2008b) dell’analisi istituzionale, ovverosia: i) la cornice legislativa, per 
quanto limitata in un settore poco regolato come quello degli aiuti; ii) gli aspetti 
normativi, ed in particolare il ruolo dei discorsi nel definire l’appropriatezza o meno di 
un certo corso d’azione; iii) gli aspetti cognitivi e culturali che guidano le azioni di 
persone e organizzazioni operanti nel settore umanitario in Etiopia.  
Questo lavoro si basa principalmente sulla ricerca sul campo svolta in Etiopia nel 2012 
e nel 2013. I metodi di ricerca utilizzati sono stati l’osservazione partecipante alle 
attività di una Organizzazione Non Governativa umanitaria, combinata con interviste 
semi-strutturate a operatori dell’aiuto umanitario e della cooperazione allo sviluppo. 
Alla ricerca sul campo si è affiancata un’opera di ricerca secondaria su documenti, 
rapporti, e pubblicazioni accademiche.  
La ricerca ha dimostrato che, per quanto riguarda la cornice legislativa etiope, vi sono 
poche differenze tra l’aiuto strettamente umanitario e la cooperazione allo sviluppo. 
Entrambe le tipologie sono soggette all’approvazione preliminare da parte delle 
autorità locali e nazionali, il che riduce la validità di argomenti legati alla differenza 
ontologica tra azione umanitaria e cooperazione allo sviluppo sulla base del grado di 
indipendenza della prima rispetto alla seconda. Dal canto loro, invece, le regole poste 
dai donatori internazionali tendono invece ad accentuare le differenze tra le due 
tipologie d’azione, per esempio per quanto riguarda la durata degli interventi, o i 
gruppi di beneficiari ammissibili. Allo stesso tempo, sono stati portati esempi di 
meccanismi recentemente introdotti da alcuni donatori, e che permettono un più agile 
passaggio dalla modalità “sviluppo” a quella di “risposta umanitaria”, e viceversa. 
Per quanto riguarda l’ambito normativo, si è esaminata l’esistenza di un discorso 
egemone che definisce l’azione umanitaria come di risposta alle emergenze, 
marginalizzando le opinioni favorevoli ad un approccio più olistico. L’insistenza sui 
principi fondamentali dell’azione umanitaria (umanità, neutralità, indipendenza e 
imparzialità) ed in particolare sulla neutralità, pur raramente rispettata nella pratica, 
rigetta come non-umanitario qualsiasi intervento che cerchi una soluzione di tipo 
politico alle crisi. Allo stesso tempo, si assiste all’emergere di discorsi che trascendono 
la divisione umanitario/sviluppo, come l’ormai onnipresente resilience (traducibile 
come elasticità), che potrebbero potenzialmente creare un punto di incontro tra le due 
comunità. Tuttavia, per quanto questi discorsi e sistemi di valori siano considerati 
particolarmente rilevanti a livello accademico e di formulazione e analisi delle 
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politiche, si è riscontrato come gli operatori umanitari e della cooperazione 
internazionale sul campo in Etiopia vi facciano riferimento con rarità. L’attitudine al 
pensiero strategico e alla riflessione sui principi sembrano diventare tanto più 
marginali quanto più ci si avvicina ai livelli “operativi”, concentrati sulla realizzazione 
dell’intervento e sul raggiungimento degli obiettivi (spesso di breve termine) prefissati. 
Per quanto riguarda il “pilastro” cognitivo e culturale, è interessante rilevare come la 
dicotomia tra azione umanitaria e cooperazione allo sviluppo risulti essere poco 
pronunciata tra gli operatori intervistati. La distinzione è stata spesso criticata come 
qualcosa di poco rilevante per chi opera “sul terreno”, o come una preoccupazione 
diffusa tra i donatori, ma che risulta inintelligibile alle vittime di disastri e a chi cerca 
di portare loro soccorso. La maggioranza degli intervistati mostrava invece di avere 
opinioni favorevoli ad un superamento della dicotomia. In altre parole, gli operatori 
non condividevano l’idea di una contrapposizione tra aiuti umanitari e allo sviluppo, 
anche se di rado avrebbero formulato questo concetto in termini di Linking Relief and 
Development o di superamento del divario. In alcuni casi, gli intervistati hanno 
ammesso di aver dovuto adattare il linguaggio di progetti e rapporti per conformarsi 
alla narrativa ufficiale di tipo umanitario, o a quella “sviluppista”. Nel complesso, gli 
operatori intervistati dimostravano nozioni di cosa sia “appropriato” o “legittimo” 
diverse da quelle promosse attraverso i discorsi dominanti, generalmente dimostrando 
un maggiore pragmatismo.  
In aggiunta alle conclusioni strettamente legate alla questione di superamento del 
divario tra aiuti umanitari e cooperazione allo sviluppo, si ritiene che questa tesi possa 
contribuire a fare chiarezza sulle pratiche dei progetti di aiuto messi in atto in Etiopia, 
con particolare riguardo al livello delle organizzazioni umanitarie e ai loro rapporti con 
i decisori (sia i donatori internazionali che le autorità nazionali e locali) e con le 
popolazioni servite. Il contributo di questa ricerca è pertanto da considerarsi rilevante 
sia nell’ambito degli studi Africani, sia in quello degli studi sullo sviluppo.  
La maggioranza degli intervistati aveva anzi opinioni favorevoli ad un superamento 
della dicotomia, pur considerandolo poco probabile in tempi stretti. In altre parole, gli 
operatori non condividevano l’idea di una contrapposizione tra aiuti umanitari e allo 
sviluppo. 
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Preface 
The inspiration for this thesis came during my traineeship at the European 
Commission, back in 2011. I was assigned to the European Commission Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection Office (ECHO), in a unit that was mostly dealing with food aid. 
During my five months there, I kept stumbling upon the expression “Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development”, or better, its acronym: LRRD. Rather than 
something clearly defined and present, the idea sounded as a sort of aspirational value. 
Yet, at the same time, there were many instances in which the same colleagues would 
proudly restate that ECHO’s mandate was “humanitarian”, limited to relief provision, 
and that “we were not doing development”.  
The concept of linking humanitarian relief and development assistance had first been 
introduced to me during my master’s studies in International Cooperation. While the 
course had two separate specialisations, in “Emergencies” and “Development”, we 
were all encouraged to reflect on the grey zones in between, and to be aware of what 
the others were doing. Eventually, I would end up having my first working experiences 
on the development side. I did not feel out of place.  
When I started inquiring on the concept of linking relief and development, I realised 
that the idea was already more than one decade old, almost history in humanitarian 
thinking, and yet so contemporary. Thus, I developed a research proposal for 
investigating practices and conceptualisations of linking relief and development in 
Ethiopia. I was eventually admitted to the doctoral course of “History, Institutions and 
International Relations of Modern and Contemporary Asia and Africa” of the 
Department of Social Sciences and Institutions  of the University of Cagliari, and which 
main focus is on African and Asian Studies in the widest sense. This course is where 
sociological and historical perspectives are dominant. Later on, a joint-supervision 
agreement was signed between the University of Cagliari and the Ruhr University 
Bochum. Following that, I enrolled in the PhD course in “International Development 
Studies” organised by the Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, 
becoming part of the research cluster on “Assessment of Development Interventions – 
Methods of Empirical Social Research”. Furthermore, I also carried out part of my 
research at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), 
where my supervisor in Bochum is based. The IFHV combines Social Science with 
studies of International Law, and strongly focuses on humanitarian practice. 
  2 
  
  3 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Humanitarian Assistance and Development Cooperation, although both concerned 
with providing assistance internationally, have different objectives and modes of 
implementation. Whereas the former is geared towards saving lives and reducing 
human suffering at immediate risk, the latter aims at promoting a general 
improvement of living conditions (mainly from a socio-economic point of view). 
Despite the differences, an integrated approach has long been advocated. 
The idea that the two types of aid needed to be linked up in order to prevent 
emergencies and avoid their recurrence, can be traced back at least to the 1980s, and 
was further developed during the following decade (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 
1994). The understanding that acute emergencies and structural poverty are related, 
and that the most appropriate way to avoid tragedies was to address their root causes, 
are however much older. 
In this research on linking relief and development, I chose to focus my attention on 
Ethiopia mainly because it seemed to be a promising context where to apply, and thus 
study, this approach. On the one hand, due to its vulnerability to shocks, crises were 
frequent, and usually followed by humanitarian response. On the other hand, it also 
attracted huge development financing, not just because of the widespread poverty, but 
also because of its role in the so-called war on terror in neighbouring Somalia. With 
both humanitarian and development actors present, I assumed that collaboration 
would be easier than in contexts where the presence of international aid actors is 
dwindling, or where it is limited to either humanitarian or development efforts. 
Furthermore, Ethiopia was reasonably accessible and did not present major linguistic 
obstacles, as English is widely used in the aid sector as a lingua franca.  
1.1 Purpose and originality of this research 
The main purpose of this research is to understand: 
Which institutional forces hinder, and which ones encourage, establishing linkages 
between humanitarian relief and development cooperation in Ethiopia? 
Most scholarly contributions to the debate on linking relief and development have 
focused on analysing concepts and debating the the reasons why such a link should be 
pursued or avoided. Policy papers and guidelines also mostly take a normative stance, 
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affirming or restating the necessity of bridging the gap, without due attention to the 
context.  
This doctoral thesis will take a different, more emprical approach contribute to fill in a 
gap in the literature, by looking at the reasons why the relief-to-development gap is 
still there, and what factors are nevertheless contributing to its reduction. The results 
might be of interest to scholars attempting to understand both development and 
humanitarian crises, to policy-makers seeking for ways to improve the humanitarian-
development collaboration, and to practitioners wanting to improve their aid efforts. 
Furthermore, this dissertation will shed more light on practices of aid in Ethiopia, 
looking in particular at the operational meso-level of aid organisations, between the 
decision-makers – national government and foreign donors – and the affected 
populations. The meso-level of organizations should still receive more scientific 
attention in development and area studies, as organisations play important roles in the 
provision of aid (Pries 2008; Dijkzeul 2008). 
1.2 Limitations  
The main limitation of this research is that it does not attempt to study the full impact 
of linking relief and development, let alone to assess the costs and benefits to establish 
whether this approach would be intrinsically better than the perpetuation of the 
humanitarian-development dichotomy. Such an endeavour would have required a 
longer period of time than the one allocated for my doctoral studies, a bigger research 
team, and the full cooperation of aid agencies willing to give not just full access to their 
project records, but potentially open to let researchers devise different projects and 
monitor them over time. An assessment of the costs and benefits of linking relief and 
development compared to business-as-usual would likely generate a notable 
advancement of the debate, and remains one of the possible subjects for further 
research.  
A second major limitation of this study is that it only takes into consideration one case, 
albeit a critical one. Again, time and resources would not have permitted otherwise, 
but extending the study to contexts other than Ethiopia would provide additional 
insights, and possibly corroborate – or contradict – the results of this research.  
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1.3 Definitions 
Before moving on to the theoretical framework and methodology of the research, it is 
necessary to provide short definitions of key terms employed. Some of these concepts 
will be further analysed in chapter 3. 
1.3.1 Development  
Development is a disputed concept and, despite its wide use, remains fuzzy and loaded 
with different meanings. Sumner and Tribe (2008) have identified the three main ways 
of conceptualizing development: i) development as a long term process of societal 
transformation; ii) development as short- to medium-term outcome of desirable 
targets; and iii) development as dominant discourse of western modernity. In this 
context, it is not relevant to choose one meaning over the others, but it is paramount to 
shed the light on the fact that development can mean different things to different 
people. A simple way to define development could be Chamber’s (2004), who 
recognises that development is just anything that can be considered “good change”. 
In addition, development is often used as shorthand for “development assistance” (see 
below), as it is often the case when discussing linking relief and development. 
Throughout this dissertation, the word development will be used in this latter 
meaning, unless otherwise specified.  
1.3.2 Development assistance 
In this study, the expression “development assistance” will be used to indicate all 
forms of international resource transfers that are undertaken with the professed 
purpose of promoting economic or social development (or both). Although the main 
objectives, intermediate outcomes and activities undertaken to achieve them can differ 
to a large extent, a common element of various types of development assistance is the 
confidence that the world can be changed for the better.  
This meaning of development assistance differs from the more specific Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) as: 
those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
(available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral 
development institutions which are: 
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i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or 
by their executive agencies; and 
ii. each transaction of which: 
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and 
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) (OECD-DAC 
2008) 
Since the 1970s the term “development cooperation” has been introduced in order to 
highlight the fact that development cannot be imposed, and that the parties involved – 
often euphemistically called partners – for practical and ethical reasons are the agents 
of their own destiny and not just passive recipients of assistance. Instead, they – 
ideally – cooperate. It is questionable, however, how much the narrative of cooperation 
among partners is reflected in practice. More often than not, “development 
cooperation” is simply used as a synonym for “development assistance” or 
“development aid”. 
1.3.3 Humanitarian  
The term “humanitarian” came into use in the early nineteenth century to refer to a 
form of compassion characterised by a transnational dimension, by a transcendental1 
view of such assistance, and by an increasing degree of institutionalisation (Barnett 
2011:10). Humanitarianism is often associated with emergency relief, as opposed to 
development action which focuses on structural change, despite a long history of 
humanitarian thought and practice aimed at addressing the causes of suffering, besides 
its symptoms — what Barnett (2011) refers to as “alchemical humanitarianism”.2  
                                                
1 Transcendence refers here to humanitarians believing “in the existence of something bigger than 
themselves” (Barnett 2011: 237). This “something” can have a religious connotation – and it is 
undoubtable that religious sentiments have informed humanitarian involvement through the centuries – 
but can also be the possibility of improving the world (through humanitarian action).  
2  When Barnett uses the term alchemicial organizations, he refers to organizations that combine 
developmental with humanitarian work. These organizations are also often called multi-mandate 
organizations. 
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The word “humanitarian” has yet another nuance in the domain of international law, 
where it indicates the corpus of rules that seeks to regulate the conduct of hostilities, 
known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or jus in bello.3 The objective of IHL 
is to make warfare more humane, and its scope has expanded progressively over time, 
starting from ensuring that wounded soldiers could be taken care of (and that medical 
staff were not shot at while serving in or near battlegrounds), to the prohibitions of 
certain warfare techniques (such as chemical weapons), to rules aimed at protecting 
civilians (Akehurst and Malanczuk 1997). Although this legal corpus might not, at a 
first glance, seem related to the provision of humanitarian relief (at least not in case of 
natural disasters), it is still pivotal during humanitarian crises resulting from conflict. 
The humanitarian principles (see below) are part of customary international 
humanitarian law. 
Alongside specialist notions of humanitarianism, the word “humanitarian” is also used 
in everyday language — both as an adjective and as a noun — to indicate anything or 
anyone “concerned with or seeking to promote human welfare” (Oxford Dictionary of 
English, 2010), and is therefore synonymous with “philanthropic”. In this sense, it can 
encompass all acts of solidarity, including what usually goes under the “development” 
label; it might also include activities performed at national level, besides international 
efforts. Particularly problematic is the widespread use of the adjective “humanitarian” 
to refer to anything that purportedly aims at a greater good. This is the case, for 
instance, of “humanitarian” military interventions. 
It is important to note that all these conceptions of humanitarianism originated within 
Western culture, and thus their roots are far from universal (despite their claims and 
ambitions). While notions of human solidarity exist in other cultures, only recently 
they have started to be considered as potential alternative discourses of 
humanitarianism, such as the work of Hirono (2013) on Chinese humanitarianism, or 
that of Moussa (2014) on Islamic humanitarianism.  
                                                
3 The other component of what is sometimes referred to as “laws of war” is the jus ad bellum, which covers 
the rules aimed at defining when the recourse to armed conflict is lawful, and when it is not. The jus ad 
bellum include most notably norms on international and civil wars, as well as on the right to self-
determination (Akehurst and Malanczuk 1997: 306).  
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1.3.4 Humanitarian action 
Humanitarian action indicates “aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate 
suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-
made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness 
for the occurrence of such situations.” (Global Humanitarian Assistance). Typical 
forms of humanitarian action include the provision of healthcare, shelter, water and 
sanitation services, the distribution of food, tools and other necessary items. In recent 
years, the provision of cash (or vouchers) instead of in-kind goods has become 
increasingly common.  
It is generally understood that humanitarian action should be guided by the four core 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence:  
Humanity indicates the duty to save human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it 
is found.  
• Humanity is intended as the key objective of humanitarian assistance, and the 
other three core principles are instrumental to achieve it.  
• Impartiality indicates the prohibition of making any discrimination between or 
within affected populations, and conversely the obligation of providing 
assistance solely on the basis of need, and regardless of nationality, religion, 
gender and any other consideration.  
• Neutrality indicates that humanitarian actors should refrain from taking any 
sides in conflicts and other disputes.  
• Independence implies that humanitarian decisions should not be influenced by 
considerations other than humanitarian needs. In particular, humanitarian 
action should not become an instrument of foreign policy. 
These principles originate from the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement, approved in 1965 (International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies 2013).4 Despite general agreement that these principles 
                                                
4 The three principles that only apply to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are: voluntary 
service, unity (there can be only one National Society in each country), and universality (all National 
Societies have equal status)  
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should guide humanitarian action, their implementation has always been inconsistent 
at best. This aspect will be treated more in detail in chapter 3.  
The terms humanitarian aid, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian relief (or 
simply relief, as in the phrase Linking Relief and Development) are often used rather 
interchangeably to refer to humanitarian action. In this dissertation, I prefer to use the 
word action because it is less focused on external supply of funds or items, and also 
better encompasses the aspects of protection that are part of the humanitarian 
mandate.  
1.3.5 Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
The term Non-Governmental Organisation – also known by the acronym NGO – 
indicates any organisation that is not part of a government structure, and is not a 
business enterprise either. Typically, NGOs deliver some sort of public services and do 
not distribute profits. Some governments might require a form of registration for a 
non-profit organisation to be labelled as NGOs (or charities).  
In the last decades, NGOs have become major players in both humanitarian and 
development assistance, often receiving grants from governments, intergovernmental 
organisations and private donors to implement aid projects. 
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
In the following chapter, I will present the theoretical foundations and methodology 
adopted in this work. I will first discuss the implications of carrying out a research that 
spans across disciplines and fields of study, and clarify my own critical realist ontology. 
Next, I will introduce the framework, inspired by neo-institutional scholarship, 
adopted to analyse the forces that encourage, and those that hinder, the linkages 
between relief and development work. 
Before delving into the empirical material, in chapter three I will summarise the 
historical evolution of humanitarian and development action as two separate domains, 
and examine the main differences and similarities between the two. I will also outline 
the evolution of “bridging the gap” discourse, presenting the main arguments and 
concepts employed to support or refuse it. In chapter four, I will expand on the context 
of the case study, providing an historical background to crises and humanitarian 
response in Ethiopia, as well as a descriptive account of the 2011-2012 food crisis. The 
following chapters will be based on the empirical material collected during field 
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research in Ethiopia. Chapter five will be dedicated to outlining an example of response 
to the 2011-12 food crisis in Ethiopia, based on participant observation at the NGO 
MERLIN. In chapter six, I will present material on linking relief and development in 
Ethiopia, organised along the three institutional pillars, which are to be introduced in 
chapter two: rules and regulations applicable to humanitarian and development action; 
norms and values of the different actors; and cultural-cognitive elements reproduced 
(consciously or not) by aid workers. Finally, in chapter seven I will discuss the findings 
and draw my conclusions on the impact of the different institutional forces against or 
in favour of of linking Relief and Development (LRD).5 
 
  
                                                
5 In this dissertation, I have chosen to use the acronym LRD over Linking Relief , Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD), because the latter is strongly associated to specific EU policies, whereas I wanted to 
remain open to different modalities of integrating the two modes of action. Furthermore, LRRD implies a 
linear sequence that moves from relief through rehabilitation to development, which is not always the case 
(see chapter 3). Nevertheless, I will use the term LRRD when referring specifically to the EU, or when 
reporting quotes from EU official explicitly using that expression. 
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Chapter 2. Theory and methodology 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of my research, as well as its 
methodology and techniques used. Often, a researcher’s disciplinary affiliation carries 
a luggage of theoretical assumptions, which – unless openly discussed in one’s work – 
may seem to require little clarification, particularly when the study is intended for 
fellow scholars of the same discipline. Such assumptions, however, need to be made 
explicit when a study is not grounded in one single discipline, which is the case of the 
present study. In the following section, I will therefore introduce a general reflection 
on the cross-disciplinary status of both African and Development Studies, before 
delving into the presentation of the theoretical framework of this research, and of the 
research methods used.  
2.1 Crossing disciplines 
As a political scientist with a background in African Politics and Institutions, and who 
later on has developed an interest on International Development and Humanitarian 
Action, I do not identify with one single corpus of knowledge, but rather engage with a 
range of disciplinary fields. Furthermore, this doctoral research was carried out across 
different institutions, each one with slightly different, albeit compatible and 
complementary, domains. None of these alone has determined my theoretical 
framework, yet all together have contributed to shaping it.  
This study, which looks at a specific aid practice (linking humanitarian relief and 
development cooperation) in an African context (Ethiopia), belongs to both African 
Studies and Development Studies. As argued by Sumner and Tribe (2008:65) neither 
of these fields constitute a discipline in the strictest sense, but they can rather be 
defined as subjects, kept together by a common interest (a geographical area or the 
broader issue of development, respectively). As a consequence, the research topic itself 
could have been analysed from different theoretical perspectives and using diverse 
methods. Hence, clarifying my own theoretical stance and the rationale behind my 
methodological choices becomes of particular importance. 
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One crucial similarity between Area and Development studies is that both draw from 
other disciplines6 for theories and methodological tools, based on the nature of their 
specific research interest. Area Studies, of which African Studies is a branch, is 
commonly intended as research focussing on a geographical area, with a multitude of 
possible disciplinary approaches. These can typically include, but are not limited to, 
Historical, Sociological, and Anthropological works on (parts of) the given area. As a 
result of the focus on the area rather than on the methods, it is rather common among 
area specialists to combine approaches from different disciplines in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of their domain, for instance by studying the local language or 
the history of a country in addition to investigating its political institutions (Bates 
1997). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Usually from within the broader Social Sciences, although Natural Science approaches to specific issues 
of development, such as climate change, are also being used. 
Figure 1: Area and Development Studies intersections with main disciplines. 
Source: Author 
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Likewise, Development Studies does not constitute a discipline, but it is rather a 
subject of inquiry that draws from disciplines as diverse as Sociology, Economy, 
Anthropology, Geography (all of which have developed a “Development” branch), but 
also Political Science and International Relations. According to Sumner and Tribe 
(2008:35), cross-disciplinarity is one of the three main elements that characterise 
Development Studies, together with a focus on investigating “development”, however 
defined, and an instrumental character, in other words, the desire to influence change. 
Such a broad definition allows for including Humanitarian Studies within the domain 
of Development Studies.7  
As sketched in figure 1, Area and Development Studies themselves present overlapping 
areas as subjects of cross-disciplinary inquiry. This is due to the geographical 
concentration of many so called “developing” countries in Africa and Asia – the focus 
of African and Asian Studies, respectively. As mentioned, the present study lies at the 
intersection of the two areas, and has benefitted above all from insights from 
sociological and political science scholarship on humanitarian and development 
practices and institutions. This position leaves a range of possibilities as far as theories 
are concerned; I will now proceed to clarify my own theoretical framework for this 
study. 
2.2 A critical realist study 
This study is grounded in critical realism, a philosophical stance located in the middle 
ground between positivist/empiricist and relativist approaches (Sumner and Tribe 
2008), overcoming the weaknesses of both. The former share with realists the 
assumption that a reality independent of human knowledge exists, but they postulate 
as well that such reality is accessible through sensory experience. Relativists, on the 
other hand, deny the existence of one objective reality, and focus instead on meanings, 
which can be different for each interpreter. As a result, no objective knowledge is 
possible, as the researcher and the researched are intertwined (Sumner and Tribe 
2008).  
                                                
7 In line with Chambers’ definition of development as “good change”, (2004: iii, 2–3), Humanitarian 
Studies can also be considered to concern itself with (some) aspects of development. Despite the fact that 
some topics, such as humanitarian law, are relevant to humanitarian affairs but not to development ones 
(and vice-versa), the boundaries between the two subjects are rather porous and it is difficult to draw a 
line in practice. As a result, relevant pieces of humanitarian research are published in journals that are 
primarily concerned with development. 
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Positivist thinking strongly shaped the development field after the Second World War, 
with theories that assumed a single, linear path to industrialisation (Sumner and Tribe 
2008: 69) that could be triggered or facilitated by foreign aid. The word “development” 
itself already conveys the idea of a linear and almost necessary progression, is a 
product of positivist thinking. Yet, with its search for regularities (Sayer 2000) and 
generalisable “laws”, positivism does not appear to adequately account for diversity 
and complexity observed in the social world in general, and in the field of development 
in particular.  
Relativist thinking completely reversed the positivist worldview: instead of one 
objective reality that can be revealed to knowledge, there are multiple ambiguous 
“realities” based on different perceptions (Sumner and Tribe 2008). The focus of 
inquiry shifted to (subjective) meanings and discourses. Yet, arguing that there is no 
such a thing as objective knowledge, such relativism seemingly fails to address the 
ontological question of “what exists.” Despite an overall tendency towards more 
relativistic approaches in development studies (Sumner and Tribe 2008), positivism 
remains evident in the search for technical fixes (by doing X, “development” will 
follow) and technocratic blueprint approaches, of which the logical framework matrix 
(see chapter 2) is one illuminating example.  
A critical realist stance, in contrast, maintains that while “the world can only be known 
in terms of available descriptions or discourses” (Sayer 2000: 47), some descriptions 
are more accurate representations of reality than others. Furthermore, a critical realist 
approach maintains that an external reality exists, while rejecting any simplistic or 
naïve linear accounts of development in favour of a more nuanced analysis of complex 
phenomena. This approach appears to be particularly suited to the study of 
humanitarian and development affairs, as it allows to satisfactorily take into 
consideration the role of discourses, organisational culture, and expectations that 
influence actions of aid organisations and other stakeholders, while at the same time 
recognising the existence of epidemics, malnutrition, or financial and logistic 
constraints that shape the day-to-day working life of many aid workers. 
2.2.1 Ontology and epistemology of critical realism 
As far as ontology (what exists?) is concerned, critical realism – in line with other 
strands of realism – maintains that there is a reality independent of human knowledge 
of it (Sayer 2000:2). From an epistemological (what can we know?) point of view, 
critical realism postulates that while reality is not entirely accessible and intelligible, 
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knowledge – albeit fallible and always subject to revision – is still possible (Bhaskar 
1979).  
Critical realism notably distinguishes between an intransitive dimension (the object of 
knowledge) and a transitive one (the knowledge of the object) – or between referent 
and reference (Al Amoudi and Willmott 2011). Epistemic fallacy (Bhaskar 1979) is the 
term adopted by critical realists to indicate the conflation of knowing an object with 
the object itself. For critical realists, the experience of hunger (intransitive), for 
instance, is and remains separate from conceptualisations of hunger (transitive). At 
the same time, whether something is transitive or intransitive depends on context: 
different conceptualisations of hunger can well be the objects of inquiry themselves, 
and thus be, in that specific situation, intransitive.  
From an epistemological point of view (what can we know?), the main feature of 
critical realism is that this reality is constituted of three stratified domains: the Real, 
the Actual, and the Empirical (Sayer 2000). The deepest layer, that of the Real, is the 
one that comprises structures and causal powers, or “the inherent dispositions of 
things to act in certain ways” (Clegg 2010:10). A key feature of causal powers is that 
their activation is contingent and not necessary (Sayer 1992: 104-107). For instance, 
being able to speak does not either imply talking all the time, nor rules out voluntary 
abstention from verbal communication. Normally, causal powers are not observable as 
such, but only through events that they might eventually produce (Mingers 2005:152). 
Such events constitute the domain of the Actual. Finally, the tip of the iceberg of the 
stratified reality is the Empirical, or the domain of experience (Sayer 2000: 12), which 
is directly observable.  
Notably, for critical realists not only natural objects are real, but also social constructs, 
such as discourse, can be real (Fleetwood 2004:4), insofar as they are capable of 
transforming structures and events, as well as reproducing them (Clegg 2010:10). 
However, the production of effects will be contingent on whether causal powers will be 
enacted, and the magnitude of such effects will depend on the context (Sayer 2004: 
13). The assumption of a stratified reality and the difficulty of accessing the deeper 
layers beyond the empirically observable result in the impossibility of objective 
knowledge. Perception is dependent on available concepts, but, as summarised by 
Andrew Sayer: 
[Concepts] do not determine the structure of the world itself. And 
despite our entrapment within our conceptual systems, it is still 
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possible to differentiate between more and less practically-adequate 
beliefs about the material world. Observation is neither theory-neutral 
nor theory-determined, but theory-laden. Truth is neither absolute nor 
purely conventional and relative, but a matter of practical adequacy. 
Differences in meaning need not render inter-theory or inter-paradigm 
communication and criticism impossible. Knowledge changes neither 
wholly continuously and cumulatively nor by comprehensive 
replacements of one monolithic paradigm by another. Theory does not 
order given observations or data but negotiates their 
conceptualisation, even as observations (Sayer 1992: 83-84) 
As a result, knowledge can only be provisional, grounded on a specific historical, 
cultural and technical context, and multiple accounts of reality are possible (Maxwell 
2012). Nevertheless, “the admission that all knowledge is fallible does not mean all 
knowledge is equally fallible” (Sayer 1992:67). It is precisely the rejection of the 
epistemic fallacy that allows critical realists to claim that rational judgements about 
contrasting theories on the same reality are possible (Al Amoudi and Willmott 2011). 
For critical realists, science should be concerned with understanding and explaining 
the underlying mechanisms of causality, rather than with discovering universal laws 
(Mingers 2005:152). The search for regularities, argues Sayer (2004) says little on the 
causal mechanisms. Despite a strong support for qualitative research, critical realism 
does not however dogmatically embrace any specific research technique, and is instead 
quite open to many.  
2.2.2 Structure and agency in critical realism 
Critical realism offers a useful approach to the longstanding debate over structure and 
agency. Social scientists have long argued on whether it is structures that determine 
individual and social action (a position favoured by objectivists), or if, following a 
subjectivist point of view, individuals and groups – all of them “actors” – are 
ultimately free to choose a course of action (Ebrahim 2005: 14). The notion of 
structure refers to “the tendency of patterns of relations to be reproduced, even when 
actors engaging in the relations are unaware of the patterns or do not desire their 
reproduction” (Sewell 1992:3). Agency, on the other hand, is, as elegantly put by 
Giddens (1979: 256, emphasis added), the “capability of intervening, or refraining 
from intervening, in a series of events so as to be able to influence their course”. 
Clearly, whereas structure refers to the role of rules and the surrounding environment 
in influencing one’s conduct, eventually leading to deterministic assumptions, using
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agency automatically places greater importance on individual freedom (Ebrahim 2005: 
14).  
In the stratified reality of critical realism, there is space for both structure and agency. 
There are structures, yet there remains also space for exercising agency. More 
importantly, actions can either reproduce structures, or change them (Clegg 2010: 10). 
Critical realist scholar Margaret Archer has notably developed a theory of 
morphogenesis in which she explains the interactions between structure and agency 
over time: “structure necessarily predates the actions which transform it” (Archer 
1995: 202), and “structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions” (ibidem). 
Archer’s position might at first sight be close to that of Anthony Giddens, who had first 
tried to overcome the structure-agency debate by theorising that structure is both 
constitutive of agency and shaped by it (Giddens 1979). Yet, Archer criticises the 
absence of time-related considerations in Gidden’s theory of structuration.  
According to Archer, structure and agency are best examined separately, rather than 
conflated into one concept, in order to understand how they interact and influence 
each other over time (Archer 1995:252-253). Archer’s morphogenetic approach to the 
structure-agency dyad is useful in examining practices of LRD because it allows to 
identify the current structures of humanitarian and development aid provision – 
including discourses, organisational mandates, donor requirements – as well as 
recognising the capacity of aid organisations of choosing among different possible 
courses of action (as well as non-action) and ultimately even contributing to the 
modification of these structures.  
2.3 Neo-institutional theory and aid organisations 
The research problem of the present study concerns practices of linking humanitarian 
relief and development. Considering that both types of action are normally 
implemented by aid organisations – mostly, but not necessarily, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) – it appeared sensible to focus the analysis on these 
organisations, as they are the ones that may eventually establish such links.  
Critical realism can be a fruitful philosophical stance for the study of such 
organisations (e.g., Fleetwood 2004; Sayer 2004; Leca and Naccache 2006; Al Amoudi 
and Willmott 2011), because it recognises beyond any ambiguity that both structures 
and actors exists and interact constantly (Leca and Naccache 2006: 643). More 
specifically, from a critical realist perspective, organisations are structures that are 
(re)produced by its participants. Yet, these structures have “their own distinctive real 
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properties” (Ackroyd 2004:136) which in turn, shape the pattern of relationships with 
and within the organisation itself. Critical realism acknowledges both “the influence of 
institutional embeddedness and the partial autonomy of actors’ actions” (Leca and 
Naccache 2006: 643).  
In line with critical realist thinking, this research has been influenced by neo-
institutionalist theory, which constitutes one of the most influential schools of thought 
in organisational studies and the social sciences in general, which looks at the ways in 
which institutions shape organisations (Scott 2008a: 427). Institutions can be defined 
as “multifaceted, durable social structures made up of symbolic elements, social 
activities, and material resources” (Scott 2008b: 48). In these neo-institutional 
theories structure and agency interact (see below). 
Following Scott (2008b), neo-institutional scholarship has highlighted various 
elements of institutional forces that can be subsumed into three main “pillars”: 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar refers to “explicitly 
regulatory processes” (Scott 2008b: 52) and is often studied by examining the political 
structure of a society. The normative pillar takes into consideration social obligations, 
and include both values and norms. Normative systems can both constrain and enable 
social action (Scott 2008b: 55). The cultural-cognitive pillar, in turn, stresses the 
criticality of “shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made” (ibid.).  
The concept of legitimacy is particularly relevant in organisational analysis. 
Legitimacy is the (perceived) social acceptability of an organisation and of its actions, 
or in other words, the degree of cultural support for an organisation” (Meyer and Scott 
1983: 201). Notably, legitimacy does not necessarily imply increased efficiency, and it 
can even entail worsening performances (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2008b; 
Oliver 1991; Rauh 2010). Sources of legitimacy can be found in each of the three 
institutional pillars. From a regulative point of view, legitimacy is equated with 
conformity to law and rules, whereas from a normative standpoint, legitimacy would 
imply also complying with established procedures, expectations of what is appropriate, 
and other non-binding norms. Finally, a cultural-cognitive approach emphasises 
“legitimacy that comes from conforming to a common definition of the situation, frame 
of reference, or a recognisable role or structural template” (Scott 2008b: 61).  
For instance, aid organisations might adopt a certain behaviour simply because they 
are following a mandatory rule, such as a clause in a contract with a donor (regulative 
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pillar), or – in what can sometimes appear to be a somewhat opportunistic conduct – 
because they are aware that such behaviour is highly valued and regarded as just 
among their constituencies (normative pillar), or on a more subtle level, because they 
have internalised certain categories and scripts, and they believe them to be right or 
appropriate (cultural-cognitive pillar).  
All three institutional pillars are normally observed in any institutional form, albeit in 
varying combinations. The alignment of the three pillars – when rules, norms and 
cultural-cognitive elements all point to the same behaviour – is believed to generate 
the strongest institutional forces. Yet in most of the cases, pillars can be misaligned, 
with some working in support of the existing order and other(s) against it (Scott 
2008b: 62).  
Earlier neo-institutionalist scholarship tended to emphasise structural constraints 
produced by institutional mechanisms. Their focus was on how institutional pressures 
push towards increased similarity (isomorphism) among organisations in the same 
field(s) (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They thus focused more on the influence of 
structures than on independent actors. More recent contributions, often dealing with 
institutional change happening despite pressures to conformity, have brought agency 
back in the picture. Such positions, which acknowledge the relevance of both structure 
and agency, are compatible with the broader theoretical framework provided by critical 
realism. 
Agency is exercised whenever a decision between two (or more) courses of action is 
taken, as well as in instances of selection of applicable rules, and interpretation of rules 
and norms (Scott 2008b: 78). It is worth remembering that institutional pressures are 
not necessarily aligned, and that different behaviours might be justified by competing 
pressures. And even when they are rather aligned, conformity to the expected/fostered 
behaviour(s) is recognisably only one among a wider range of possible responses to 
institutional pressures (Scott 2008b: 54). Christine Oliver (1991) identified five types 
of strategic responses to institutional pressures, varying in the degree of organisational 
agency from passive acquiescence to compromise, avoidance, defiance and ultimately 
to overt manipulation. Her typology shows how institutional theory can actually be 
compatible with a view that does not neglect agency. Ultimately, the search for 
legitimacy in itself is an interesting example of the interplay of structure and agency, 
where organisations exercise their agency by deciding which institutional pressures to 
follow, and might even only pretend to be complying.  
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2.3.1 Symbolic systems and discourses 
Institutions can be conveyed in different ways, among which are the so-called 
“symbolic systems”. According to Scott, these include “rules, values and norms, 
classifications, representations, frames, schemas, prototypes and scripts used to guide 
behaviour” (Scott 2008b: 80). The idea of symbolic systems resonates with the concept 
of “discourse”, intended “as a category for designating particular ways of representing 
particular aspects of social life” (Fairclough 2010: 2). Lister (2003: 188) indeed notes 
that sociological institutional theorists often avoid the term discourse, and yet refer to 
similar concepts when examining “taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications” 
or “rational myths” that exert pressures on organisations.8.  
Conformity to dominant discourses is arguably a source of legitimacy for organisations 
in a given field, and including those working in the humanitarian and development 
sectors. Such conformity does not necessarily imply – although it might – sharing the 
meanings and representations advanced by dominant discourses, but it can be enacted 
precisely to increase legitimacy. According to Cornwall (2005; 2007), popular 
development buzzwords often owe their success to fuzziness, which shields “those who 
use them from attack by lending the possibility of common meaning to extremely 
disparate actors” (Cornwall 2005: 1056). The intentional and opportunistic adoption of 
a popular discourse for the purpose of enhancing an organisation’s legitimacy, without 
necessarily changing its practices, is a powerful example of how agency can be used to 
eschew institutional pressures. This resonates with Oliver’s concealment, one of the 
tactics of avoidance, which consists in “disguising nonconformity behind a façade of 
acquiescence” (Oliver 1991: 154).  
In addition, discourses can also work to reproduce structures that are not necessarily 
aligned with the currently dominant paradigms, thus working against organisational 
isomorphism, and at the same time hindering organisational change. For instance, 
Ebrahim (2005: 50) notes that NGOs remain influenced by discourses prevailing at the 
time of their foundation, to which he refers as “embeddedness of NGO behavior in 
development discourses”. In this view, discourses act as structural factors that 
contribute to the constitution of organisational values, behaviours and established 
practices that ultimately get replicated. This could also partially explain differences 
among NGOs operating in the same field, but with different constitutive myths. 
                                                
8 For exceptions, see Vijge (2013) and Schmidt (2008).
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2.3.2 Aid chains as organisational field 
Institutional analysis can be carried out at different levels. At macro level, it can focus 
on the world system or society more in general, while at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, it can take into consideration a single organisation or even a subsystem (e.g. 
department) within an organisation. The meso level in this continuum is represented 
by the concept of organisational field (Scott 2008b: 85-89). Organisational fields are 
defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148) as organisations that, taken “in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life”. As such, a field can 
comprise different organisations that operate in the same sector or business. 
Organisations involved in the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance 
can be seen as part of an organisational field, and studied as such. I argue that the 
concept of aid chain (Wallace, et al. 2006) can be considered as a subtype of 
organisational field. An aid chain can be defined as: 
the series of organisations and actors involved in the process of moving 
funds from their initial institutional source to be spent on behalf of the 
targeted beneficiaries in the recipient area, and the associated 
processes of accounting to donors for the use of these funds (Wallace et 
al. 2006:12). 
A typical aid chain usually features one or more institutional donors, an international 
NGO, which can often be further subdivided into the three different levels of the 
headquarters, the country office and “the field”, local implementing partners, and 
communities. While money moves down the aid chain, from the donor towards the 
intended beneficiaries, there is also a movement of other types of resources, most 
notably information, going upwards (Ebrahim 2005). In the most common setting, the 
cost of any given project is split between one major donor – the one featuring in the aid 
chain – and the NGO’s own funds. The latter can derive from diverse sources as private 
donations, commercial activities (e.g. selling of second-hand clothes), and overhead 
costs, and normally come without strings attached. However, the institutional donor 
that is providing most – although not all – of the funds needed for a given project, can 
frequently set conditions that apply to the whole project. These conditions may at 
times be more or less negotiable, and typically include specific formats for funding 
proposals and reports, timeframes of implementation and other requirements to be 
met in order for each instalment to be disbursed, as well as visibility measures for 
acknowledging the generosity of the donor. Hence, with the exception of projects 
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funded entirely through small private donations in their own public fundraising 
campaigns, NGOs rarely find themselves located outside of this aid chain. 
The aid chain is a vertical aspect of the organizational field(s). It is important to note 
that it generally leaves out of consideration many actors, mainly local ones, and their 
impact – and thus part of the (everyday) politics – in crises. Examples of such actors 
include the national government, private enterprise warlords, traditional local leaders, 
and insurgents (see DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 1-37). In other words, a sole focus on 
the (humanitarian and/or development) aid chain gives the wrong impression that aid 
is a rather technocratic issue area neatly separated from local politics and other issue 
areas. In this dissertation, I will also explicitly focus on the Ethiopean government, 
which deeply influences the activities within the aid chain, as well as the impact of aid. 
2.4 Research methodology 
In examining the issue of LRD in Ethiopia, my working hypothesis is that there are 
institutional forces pushing for maintaining the separation of humanitarian and 
development action. This, despite the fact that the two often take place in the same 
contexts and frequently in the same (or adjacent) timeframe, and that are often funded 
and implemented by the same actors. Simultaneously, there are also relevant 
discourses – such as that of “resilience” – that apparently challenge the status quo, 
favouring a more integrated approach. 
2.4.1 Operationalisation  
Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, the operationalisation of the study 
examines symbolic systems (and their material impact) at work in the three pillars 
identified by Scott (2008a): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive, by studying 
aid chains in Ethiopia. For each of the three pillars, I set out to highlight which 
elements perpetuate the division between humanitarian and development aid 
provision, and which work towards bridging that gap.  
Looking at the regulative pillar, I will examine the systems created through the rules 
that both humanitarian and development organisations are bound to follow, and which 
can be grouped in two types: i) the applicable laws of the recipient country, that apply 
to all aid organisations in the country indistinctly, and ii) the contractual stipulations 
on the use of funding as they are determined by (or at best negotiated with) donors, 
that are defined on an ad hoc basis for each grant. As for international law, in this 
specific case it appears to be of secondary importance in defining day-to-day practices 
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of humanitarian and development assistance. In fact, despite the existence of the 
above-mentioned branch of international law called “International Humanitarian 
Law”, its domain of applicability restricted to armed conflicts, and therefore its 
usefulness is questionable in a case study on a food crisis in peaceful times. As for crisis 
other than war, there is growing recognition towards the so-called “International 
Disasters Response Law” (IDLR). However, to date IDLR merely defines the possibility 
(not the right) for affected governments to receive assistance without establishing a 
corresponding duty for humanitarian agencies to intervene (Fisher 2007). As a 
consequence, its standing as “law”, as well as its relevance to the case under 
examination, remain questionable.  
For the normative pillar, I will examine the in which way norms and values that 
differentiate the humanitarian from the development mandate, as well as discourses 
that promote better integration between the two, were reproduced in the Ethiopian 
context. I will examine in particular the role of humanitarian principles, as they are key 
to defining the humanitarian “identity”, despite the absence of formal sanctions in case 
of their infringement, and anecdotal evidence that violations have actually been rather 
frequent. The argument that linking relief and development would jeopardise the 
humanitarian principles is indeed one of the most frequently employed by critics of 
LRD approaches. In my overview of the uptake of norms and principles, I will focus 
specifically on three key actors: the Ethiopian authorities, international donors, and 
aid organisations.  
Finally, moving to the cultural-cognitive pillar, the focus will be on categories, 
representations and interpretive schemas, often reproduced unconsciously, and that 
might work in one direction (maintaining the status quo) as well as in the opposite one 
(favouring LRD). The primary source of information on this respect would be the 
voices of aid workers themselves. In this regard, the focus has been placed on 
understanding what is considered as appropriate and legitimate and to unveil how – if 
at all – normative discourses related to the desirability (or not) to bridge the gap end 
up shaping the views of aid workers in the field, and how this contributes or hinders 
linkages between humanitarian relief and development.  
2.4.2 Case study selection 
This study has been carried out through a qualitative case study of the response to the 
2011 food crisis in Ethiopia. Case studies examine a (set of) selected unit(s) of analysis 
in detail, producing context-related knowledge in a way that replicates the process of 
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human learning, and the creation of expert knowledge in particular (Flyvbjerg 2006; 
2011). Case study research is also a method frequently employed within realist research 
(Ackroyd 2004: 144).  
Case study research, and intensive research more in general, is primarily concerned 
with describing “how some causal process works out in a particular case or limited 
number of cases” (Sayer 1992: 242), as opposed to extensive research designs, which 
aim at discovering general laws applicable, ideally, to an entire population. Among 
others, Flyvbjerg (2006, 2011) has demonstrated that generalisation on the basis of a 
case study is possible, although he also points out that generalisation is often 
overvalued in science. Nevertheless, generalisation is possible in particular when using 
a critical case study, that is, a case designed in such a way to allow for logic deductions 
of the type “if X did not happen in this case, it cannot happen anywhere else” or “if Y 
happened in this case, then it will apply to all other cases”.  
In this research, I argue that humanitarian relief operations in Ethiopia can be seen as 
a critical case study to explore the practice of LRD, because the country has long 
suffered from recurrent crises, in particular in terms of adequate access to food. Such 
crises – often triggered by drought – exacerbate pre-existing food insecurity and leave 
affected populations even more vulnerable than they were before. In such a context, 
where the next crisis is not much a matter of “if”, but of “when”, linking immediate 
relief with longer-term poverty-reduction efforts seems to be more appropriate than 
anywhere else. In addition, the relatively stable political situation and low perceived 
risk have made Ethiopia a donor darling, which receives significant amounts of 
external aid both for humanitarian relief and development purposes. In other contexts 
humanitarian and development assistance are on a shoestring budget compared to 
needs,9 which hampers planning even in the short term, let alone strategising for the 
switch to development programming. Indeed, most aid agencies that are present in 
Ethiopia have been operating in the country for several years (sometimes even 
decades), and do not have plans to leave any time soon. Given these characteristics, I 
argue that Ethiopia would make an ideal environment in which to link humanitarian 
relief with development assistance. Conversely, any difficulty in putting this approach 
into practice in Ethiopia would probably mean that linking relief and development is 
                                                
9 At the time of writing, the World Food Programme has for instance announced that, due to insufficient 
funding, it will have to reduce the usual ration size and scale down the number of beneficiaries of its Syria-
crisis operations, effective two weeks after the announcement was made (WFP 2014). 
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(or will be) downright impossible in contexts where the presence of either 
humanitarian or development actors is lower, or where donors are less than likely to 
provide support in the medium-long term.  
The choice of employing qualitative data stems from the fact that it allows for in-depth 
understanding and interpretation of specific, context-bound causal processes better 
than the search for regularities and universal rules that hold across cases (Sayer 1992; 
2000), and such processes are crucial in the critical realist view, because for critical 
realists looking for regularities or universal rules does not explain causality; they 
consider it more important to understand causality (even if applicable to a single case 
only) than to find regular occurrences that cannot be explained. In addition, the 
available quantitative data are not suited to answer questions on linking relief and 
development as datasets on aid projects are often limited to information on project’s 
location, sector of intervention, and amount of money received/spent. Information on 
whether the projects transcend the categories of “humanitarian relief” and 
“development” is normally not required and provided in these data sets.  
Furthermore, there is usually some degree of flexibility in how implementing agencies 
attribute their projects to different sectors. Except when the project’s objective clearly 
falls into a specific category, the choice can be influenced by a variety of factors, 
including the mandate of the organisation10 or of its donor(s), the overall aim of the 
budget line(s) being tapped for the financing of the project, or the host government’s 
definitions, to mention a few. Large projects encompassing a range of different 
activities across sectors might be either entirely reported under one main sector, or 
roughly split into a few sub-projects, and reported separately. Humanitarian appeals 
for Ethiopia in years 2011-2012 notably referred to five sectors: food, health and 
nutrition, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, and education. Reports were 
mostly consistent with such categories. Hence, any of these sectors might offer chances 
for “linking up” the immediate relief response to development interventions, but the 
way data is presented does not allow to clearly distinguish projects with an LRD 
approach from more “business-as-usual” ones. Moreover, even if reliable quantitative 
                                                
10 For instance, the World Food Programme (WFP) usually reports its cash-based interventions under 
“food security”, because the organisation has the mandate of fighting hunger, and not something else. Yet, 
as cash is fungible, some beneficiaries use (part of) the money received from WFP to buy other items, such 
as medicines, shelter material, or assets for starting a small business. 
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data on LRD were available, from a critical realist perspective these would not suffice 
to holistically understand the phenomenon. 
2.4.3 Data collection  
Data collection was first conducted in Addis Ababa, where most, if not all, 
humanitarian and development organisations active in Ethiopia have an office, and, 
second, in the Borena zone, one of the areas stricken by the food crisis in 2011-2012, 
where some implementing organisations maintained a field presence. Besides being 
among the areas where humanitarian activity could be observed in early 2012, the 
Borena zone was selected because it was easily accessible thanks to a gatekeeper, the 
British NGO Medical Relief International (MERLIN) that supported my research.11 
This organisation was mostly active in the field of health and nutrition, with on-going 
projects in different areas of the country. Later in 2012 and 2013, I carried out 
additional interviews in Ethiopia. 
In terms of data collection techniques, I employed a combination of participant 
observation semi-structured interviews, and an extensive literature search. All the 
conversations were held in English, the working language of all international aid 
organisations operating in Ethiopia, even though it was not the first language for most 
of the informants.  
2.4.3.1 Participant observation 
Participant observation is intended here as taking part in daily activities and 
interaction of a selected group of people in order to make sense of both explicit and 
implicit aspects of their routines (De Walt and De Walt 2011: 1). I carried out 
participant observation in the humanitarian NGO MERLIN, during my first field visit 
to Ethiopia in 2012. Participant observation started before any of the interviews had 
taken place. The selection of MERLIN depended on a combination of my interest in 
observing an organisation receiving funds from the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), and their 
availability to host me both in their country office and in a field office. Other NGOs had 
been contacted, but they were not willing or able to accommodate guest researchers. As 
                                                
11 MERLIN does not exist as an independent organizations anymore (see below). As an organization it has 
not been studied sufficiently (for an exception, see Dijkzeul and Lynch 2006), which is an indication of the 
importance and the relative lack of attention to the meso-level of organizations in Development, 
Humanitarian and Area Studies. 
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for the rationale of focusing on ECHO-funded agencies, this lay mainly in the fact that 
the European Commission, with its humanitarian (ECHO) and development 
(EuropeAid) arms, had itself coined the acronym LRRD, standing for Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation, and Development (see Chapter 3). As all ECHO-funded NGOs were 
required to include a paragraph on LRRD in their funding proposals, I expected 
personnel in these NGOs to be, at least to a certain extent, familiar with the topic, and 
therefore able to provide fruitful insights. In addition, having myself served as trainee 
within ECHO for five months in 2010-2011, I was already accustomed with their rules 
and procedures, and I was also able to use the network of former colleagues to reach 
out to NGOs working in Ethiopia.  
Participant observation in Ethiopia lasted two months in total, with the first month 
(February 2012) spent in the country office in Addis Ababa, and the second (March 
2012) in the Borana zone field office. In both settings, I was given office space, 
attended staff meetings, and supported the NGO work by performing clerical activities 
such as data entry or proofreading reports. I had access to project documents and 
proposals, and could informally discuss the activities with staff.12 I was officially 
introduced to the staff as a doctoral student, and all the employees were aware that I 
was carrying out my own research. My previous experiences and training as an aid 
worker meant that the “participation” aspect – in terms of sharing a (sub)culture – 
was no less relevant than the “observation”. During participant observation I took field 
notes which, coupled with organisational documents and information gathered 
through interviews, allowed me to build a better understanding of the specific context 
in which the response to the 2011 food crisis in Ethiopia was taking place, and provided 
me with empirical evidence of how work was organised, and what were the priorities of 
that organisation at country and field level. 
2.4.3.2 Interviews 
Whereas participant observation allowed a better understanding of the context, and in 
particular of regulative and normative aspects of LRD in Ethiopia, additional semi-
structured interviews provided more insights on cultural-cognitive elements.  
Overall, I interviewed thirty-one informants working for fifteen different organisations 
that had responded to the 2011 drought-related food crisis in Ethiopia, including staff-
                                                
12 Towards the end of my participant observation, I also formally interviewed five MERLIN staff members. 
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members of MERLIN. 13  The informants were mostly NGOs workers, but also 
representatives of the European Commission (both the humanitarian and the 
development branch), as well as staff of different agencies of the United Nations (UN).  
The first set of informants, interviewed between February and April 2012, had been 
identified among NGOs that received funding from ECHO for the response to the 
drought-related food crisis of mid-2011, for the same reasons listed above. Some of the 
people contacted never reacted to my interview requests. Five of the interviewees were 
employees of the NGO where I was carrying out participant observation. In addition, in 
November 2012, I was able to interview two people of the same organisation, who were 
overseeing activities in Ethiopia (and elsewhere) from the NGO headquarters in 
London. A second set of interviews was held in April-May 2013 in Addis Ababa, with 
the aim of understanding whether, after the end of most (if not all) strictly 
humanitarian projects, the supposed transition to development interventions had 
happened, or was at least underway. Initially, I intended to go back to the same 
informants to assess what had changed in the past twelve months. However, only one 
of the persons interviewed in the previous year was still in the country (and she was 
leaving the post in a few months’ time). In two cases, I managed to interview the 
person who had replaced the previous’ year informant, while in a third NGO, I could 
interview someone holding a different position. In addition, I reached out to other 
organisations using a snowball technique, getting interviews with some UN agencies’ 
and NGOs’ staff that had not been available during the previous periods of fieldwork.  
All the interviews were loosely structured, with the main topics covered revolving 
around relations along the aid chain, with donors and with an organisation’s 
headquarters, as well as with Ethiopian authorities involved in the supervision of aid 
projects14. Particular attention was given to donor requirements as structural factors 
that may hinder or enable LRD more specifically, but also to possible spaces for 
exercising agency, such as the degree of autonomy in the proposal development 
process and in the project implementation phase.  
Before starting the interview, the informants were given a brief introduction on the 
research, and they were asked to sign a consent form in which they agreed to 
participate in the study, which they all did. In the same form, they had the possibility 
                                                
13 See annex 1 for the full list. 
14 See interview guideline in Annex 2. 
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of opting out of tape-recording, and they were allowed to choose among three different 
levels of privacy: 1) Public, meaning that any quote would list the full name and 
organisation of the interviewee; 2) semi-anonymous, with name of the informant and 
organisation hidden / changed, but some background information revealed; 15  3) 
completely anonymous. Upon request, informants could receive a copy of their 
transcript, and they were allowed to add further comments and clarifications.16  
2.4.3.3 Literature Search 
Where possible, I also collected and studied the internal documents of the 
organizations involved in this study. The documents ranged from project proposals to 
policy and strategy papers, as well as flyers and webpages. This grey literature 
contributed to my other data-collection techniques and helped cross-check the other 
data that I had collected.  
Needless to say, I also carried out a literature study of the academic literature relevant 
to the topics covered in this dissertation. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the theoretical underpinnings and methods adopted 
for this research. In the absence of a mainstream worldview for either African or 
Development studies, critical realism has provided the ontological and epistemological 
foundations for this study. The assumption of a stratified, complex reality works well in 
a context in which empirical, observable phenomena and discourses are both relevant 
and connected with one another.  
Furthermore, Archer’s morphogenetic approach to structure and agency satisfactorily 
balances the need of recognising the impact of structures with the recognition that 
individuals – and organisations, for that matter – are ultimately in charge of their 
actions and even capable to modify existing constraints.  
                                                
15 There are cases in which data such as role, gender and nationality, and the date and place of the 
interview, can be sufficient to unequivocally identify the informant. This could happen, for instance, if one 
is the only expatriate working as nutritionist in a given zone/period, or the sole female country director.  
16 The template of the consent form is reproduced in Annex 3. 
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Building on critical realist foundations, I have described how I intend to use neo-
institutional theory as the framework with which to analyse the interplay of 
institutional forces in the creation of opportunities for linking humanitarian and 
development actions. Using Scott’s (2008b) distinction of three key pillars – 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive – I have outlined the operationalisation 
of this study, which will constitute the key backbone of chapter 6.  
Finally, in the last part of this chapter, I have presented the rationale for the choice of 
Ethiopia as a case study for this research, and detailed the methods adopted for data 
collection. Before presenting and discussing my empirical data (chapters 5-6), in the 
next two chapters I will provide an extended background of the evolution of 
humanitarian and development action and of the discourses of bridging the gap 
(chapter 3) and of the broader context of the Ethiopian food crises (chapter 4).  
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Chapter 3. Discourses of 
humanitarianism and development 
 
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, humanitarian and development action 
constitute two different modes of providing assistance to the needy, the former more 
focused on alleviating suffering, the latter geared towards improving living standards. 
Whereas both refer to broader ideals of solidarity, they differ in their overall aims, 
guiding principles, and in many cases also in the modalities of intervention. Yet there 
are also areas of overlapping, and there is a rather lively debate on whether they should 
converge (bridging the gap) or diverge.  
After outlining the historical evolution of each “type” of action, I will summarise the 
main differences and similarities between the two in contemporary practice. 
Subsequently, I will present an alternative strand of discourses, which challenge the 
institutional setup that sees humanitarian and development efforts as separate and 
somehow juxtaposed. The debate on “bridging the gap” has been going on for at least 
two decades, with different approaches and concepts being introduced over the years. 
Yet, and despite having been formally incorporated into policy guidelines, it these 
alternative discourses have not really been able to affect the polarised aid architecture. 
3.1 The evolution of humanitarianism 
Although acts of solidarity have been reported during all of human history, 
international arrangements to provide relief to the suffering – the essence of the 
current understanding of “humanitarian” – only date back to a couple of centuries ago. 
In this section, I will provide a brief historical outline of the genesis and evolution of 
humanitarian discourses. Barnett (2011) distinguishes among three “ages” of 
humanitarianism: the age of “Imperial Humanitarianism” from the XIX century to the 
end of the Second World War; the age “Neo-Humanitarianism” during the Cold War; 
and the age of “Liberal Humanitarianism”, from the Cold War to the present day. 
Roughly same periodisation is adopted by Walker and Maxwell (2009). The shift from 
one period to the other does not imply total rupture and, conversely, changes took 
place also within each period. Indeed, authors such as Davey, Borton and Foley (2013) 
identify the period between the two World Wars as a separate “era”, which they call 
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Wilsonian. Barnett (2011: 82) himself indeed recognises that this phase constituted a 
period of transition. While recognising the value and merits of both periodisations, in 
this brief overview of the evolution of humanitarian discourses I will mainly follow 
Barnett’s one.  
Put in historical perspective, many elements of the current humanitarian system can 
be traced back to the past, and in particular to the early postwar period, even though 
not necessarily in their current shape (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 10). Barnett 
(2011: 5) also reached the conclusion that features of post-Cold War humanitarianism 
were “hardly unprecedented” and reflected well known contradictions and dilemmas, 
such as the debate on politicisation of humanitarian action, or the swinging balance 
between the arguments of emergency humanitarians and those of the alchemical 
branch. The evolution of humanitarianism shows that change in the humanitarian 
world was often the product of moments of self-reflection and debate, often triggered 
by failures of the humanitarians of the time to respond to major crises – the Holocaust, 
the secessionist war in Biafra, the Ethiopian famine of the mid-eighties, the Rwandan 
genocide and refugee crisis, and more recently the tsunami in South-East Asia. Clearly, 
agency has played a role at every turn, re-shaping structures with minor and major 
adjustments, which confirms the morphogenetic interaction of structure and agency 
theorised by Margaret Archer (1995).  
3.1.1 From the nineteenth century to the Second World War 
The birth of humanitarian action is often traced back to 1859, when Swiss businessman 
Henri Dunant witnessed great suffering among the injured soldiers after the battle of 
Solferino, in Italy, and tried to alleviate it. He subsequently advocated for the creation 
of “societies” in charge of providing relief to the wounded in combat. In October 1863, 
the “International Committee of the Red Cross” (henceforth ICRC) was established. 
While certainly a watershed moment, the foundation of the Red Cross is hardly the 
first event in the history of humanitarianism.  
Barnett identifies in the late eighteenth century the moment in which “organised 
compassion became part of the everyday” (Barnett 2011: 50), as opposed to charitable 
acts as sporadic acts of benevolence, something that had existed throughout history. 
He relates this development to the emergence of discourses of “humanity” and of 
“natural rights”, coupled with a positivistic belief in the “human capacity to make a 
difference” (Barnett 2011: 51-52). Religious sentiments were often part of the 
combination, and the desire to save people’s souls went hand in hand with the efforts 
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to save their bodies. The anti-slavery movement was possibly the first instance of large-
scale humanitarian-motivated advocacy movement, although many activists were 
driven by reasons other than pure compassion (Barnett 2011:58). In this period, all 
forms of formal, organised humanitarianism, united by a commitment to help 
strangers, were as much interested in addressing the causes of suffering as in treating 
its symptoms. In other words, the earliest manifestations of humanitarianism had a 
rather alchemical character.  
The relationship between humanitarianism and colonialism was not necessarily 
confrontational; on the contrary, they often referred to the same discourses of 
civilisation – the “white man’s burden” of the British, or the “mission civilisatrice” of 
the French (Barnett 2011: 61-62). The colonial enterprise, while fundamentally 
motivated by the self-interest of the colonisers, also “served as a laboratory for the 
techniques of later humanitarian action, including famine relief, the provision of cash 
assistance to the needy and colonial medicine and health services” (Davey, Borton and 
Foley 2013: 6). A notable example was the British empire response to the 1837 Indian 
famine, which included both the distribution of food aid and the setup of “public 
works” schemes, not dissimilar from today’s “cash-for-work” and “food-for-work” 
programmes, to ensure that food reached the tables (Walker and Maxwell 2009:18).  
Christian evangelical missions represent another grey zone in the relationship between 
colonial powers and humanitarianism. Colonial powers allowed, and in some instances 
encouraged, priests to establish missions in colonised lands. Many missionaries shared 
the view that colonised peoples were backwards, but they also maintained the belief 
that they were part of one humanity, and that they could achieve progress. Apart from 
spreading the gospel, missionaries also brought schooling and basic healthcare to the 
remote provinces of colonial empires, (Barnett 2011: 64-66) de facto foreshadowing 
what many NGOs would do in the second half of the twentieth century.  
3.1.1.1 The ICRC and emergency humanitarianism 
Even though the ICRC was by no means the first humanitarian organisation, it was 
remarkably different from those that existed before it. The ICRC encouraged the 
formation of voluntary committees in each state – the so-called National Societies – 
which would assist the army medical services in their respective countries. During 
peace times, these societies would focus on preparatory activities such as the training 
of volunteers (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 22-23). Apart from that, the ICRC was 
involved, since the beginning, in the promotion of what would later become 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In its campaign to make warfare more 
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humane, the ICRC successfully promoted the Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (signed in Geneva in 1864), which 
established that wounded and sick combatants should receive care (art. 6) and that 
medical personnel and facilities should be considered neutral (art. 2) and thus 
inviolable. The 1864 convention also introduced the red cross on a white background 
(art. 7) as the distinctive symbol that would identify medical staff, hospitals, and 
ambulances.  
More than directly providing relief, the ICRC focused its work around setting up a 
framework for international relief activities (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013). It is 
however crucial to recognise that Dunant’s success was not merely the product of his 
actions (agency), but that they matched a broader Zeitgeist of the period (structure). 
Not only was humanitarianism already in vogue, but national states themselves were 
open to finding ways to improve war, particularly at a time when their constituencies 
were concerned about the treatment of conscripted soldiers, who were progressively 
replacing mercenary troops. Indeed, out of Dunant’s proposals, only those that worked 
in favour of states end up being accepted (Barnett 2011: 79). Furthermore, the ICRC’s 
insistence on international agreements was in line with the increasing relevance of 
treaties as sources of international law (Akehurst and Malanczuk 1997). 
Because the provision of relief during wartime depended on the willingness of national 
States to allow access to battlefields, the ICRC was always particularly concerned with 
its relationship with states (Barnett 2011: 80). Had it been seen as too critical of a 
government, or too friendly with another, the organisation could have jeopardised its 
capacity to deliver medical care among warring factions. Impartiality was key to 
fulfilling its mandate – and yet National Red Cross Societies had a necessarily close 
relationship with their own militaries. Even though forms of humanitarianism, mostly 
of the “alchemical” type, already existed, the Red Cross represented the birth of a 
wholly new attitude to relief, which would rapidly become “the official face of 
international humanitarianism” (Barnett 2011: 76). 
3.1.1.2 Humanitarianism and the World Wars 
During the First World War, the ICRC and the National Red Cross Societies, alongside 
a variety of faith-based organisations, strived to provide assistance to a huge number of 
wounded soldiers and prisoners of war (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 7). 
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Humanitarianism was not much concerned with civilians yet17. A remarkable exception 
to this tendency was the creation of the Commission for Relief to Belgium, created in 
1914 to provide famine relief in occupied Belgium, and headed by Herbert Hoover, who 
would later go on to become President of the United States. After the end of the war, 
the organisation was repurposed as the American Relief Administration (ARA), with a 
mandate to provide relief to Europe and to post-revolutionary Russia.  
Between the two wars, the main humanitarian issues were associated with 
statelessness – above all people who had fled Russia after the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 7) – and widespread poverty. The creation 
of the League of Nation in 1919 prefigured the establishment of an “international 
community”, although the organisation proved to be dramatically ineffective in its 
mission to maintain peace. Another notable event of the interwar period was the 
creation of the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) in 1921, although with a 
mandate initially confined to the assistance to Russian refugees. However, its 
competence was on the protection end of the spectrum, rather than on provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the strictest sense. Its major competence were the 
negotiation of refugee’s rights, and the provision of special travel documents to eligible 
refugees – the so-called Nansen passport (Barnett 2011: 88-89). 
During this period, relief was still mostly provided along identity lines, as noted by 
Barnett (2011: 82), such as assistance to fellow citizens and allies, or to people sharing 
a religious or ethnic identity. This practice was openly challenged for the first time by 
Eglantyne Jebb, the English woman who in 1919 founded the first humanitarian NGO, 
Save the Children. Jebb notably insisted that relief should be provided to all needy 
children, including German ones, which were suffering from the consequences of a 
naval blockade (Barnett 2011: 85-86). Her commitment to impartiality, however, went 
hand in hand with political engagement: she lobbied against blockades and drafted the 
Declaration for the Rights of the Child (Walker and Maxwell 2009:25). Again, the 
separation of humanitarianism and politics, or between humanitarianism and human 
rights, was not yet particularly pronounced as it would become in the following 
decades.  
                                                
17 At the time, the bulk of humanitarian action was still focused on “man-made emergencies”, i.e. those 
resulting from wars and blockades. Nevertheless, there had also been a few examples of international 
relief efforts delivered in the wake of natural disasters, such as the earthquakes in San Francisco in 1906, 
and Kingston and Messina in 1908 (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 6).  
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Despite claims of universality, humanitarianism was mostly a Western affair, made up 
by US Americans and Europeans stepping in to assist fellow Europeans. Notions of 
“civilisation” still permeated the field, and it is not without reason that Barnett refers 
to this era as “Imperial Humanitarianism”. Particularly telling is the ICRC’s neglect of 
the Italian aggression to Ethiopia – an independent state, member of the League of 
Nations, predominantly Christian (even though orthodox), which even had its own 
national Red Cross society. Barnett reports that one high-ranking ICRC official had 
questioned the “civilisation” of Ethiopia and stated that the Ethiopian Red Cross was 
just a façade (Barnett 2011: 92).  
Relief operations during the Second World War showed little organisational and 
conceptual breakthroughs, but humanitarianism would change dramatically after its 
conclusion. The League of Nations had failed in preventing the war. The Holocaust had 
happened, and the ICRC policy of discretion showed its limits – even though the 
organisation technically lacked a mandate for intervening whenever people were 
oppressed by their own governments (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 9). These failures 
would trigger much debate within and outside these institutions.  
In parallel, however, some changes were already happening on the ground. In 1942 a 
group of British citizens founded the Oxford Famine Relief Committee (later to become 
OXFAM), a group campaigning for shipping food aid to German-occupied Greece, 
where people were starving. Their argument was not dissimilar from Eglantyne Jebb’s 
position concerning German children, and constitutes the essence of the principle of 
impartiality: relief should be provided to people in need, regardless of any other 
consideration. After the war, OXFAM would keep the same line, and insist that aid 
should be provided also to eligible Germans (Barnett 2011: 117). 
3.1.2 Humanitarianism during the Cold War 
The international system that emerged from the Second World War reflected in many 
respects the new world order. Europe, the once powerful Old Continent, was in ruins, 
facing widespread poverty, hunger, and disease. The United States stood as the major 
international player, challenged only by the Soviet Union. The Allies, who had 
succeeded in defeating nazi-fascism, established a new intergovernmental body, the 
Organisation of the United Nations (UN). Other than its constitutive organs, the UN 
system comprised a number of semi-autonomous agencies, some of which had a 
humanitarian mandate. Apart from newly established agencies, some pre-existing 
organisations from the League of Nations were also absorbed in the UN system. 
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A unique case is that of the United Nations’ Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), created established already in 1943 to coordinate aid to liberated areas, and 
replaced in 1947 by the short-lived International Relief Organisation (IRO), with a 
mandate to assist refugees in Europe. The IRO subsequently gave way to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Barnett 2011: 110-112), which 
adopted the same name (plus the “UN” prefix) of the organisation founded under the 
auspices of the League of Nations.  
A number of new agencies were created under the United Nations’ umbrella in the 
years immediately following the war, in order to face the huge needs. Among these, 
there were the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), with a mandate to rebuild 
Europe’s food production systems; the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), 
initially intended as a temporary instrument to cater for the needs of children; and, in 
1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), 
with a mandate limited to Palestinians displaced after the creation of the state of Israel. 
It is worth noting that all of these agencies, including the above mentioned UNHCR, 
are still active today.  
In parallel, private charities were also mushrooming, with about 200 NGOs established 
between 1945 and 1949 alone (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 10). Once the emergency 
phase in Europe was over, these humanitarian organisations were faced with the 
choice of disbanding or extending their mandate beyond the provision of immediate 
relief. Many went for rehabilitation, partly because they believed it was the right thing 
to do, and partly because there was an increasing amount of money made available by 
states, and the U.S. Government in particular, specifically for the purpose. These were 
also the years of the Marshall plan, the unprecedented scheme of loans given by the 
U.S. to Europe to support reconstruction and allow for import of (American) goods and 
machinery (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 36). Clearly, governments had motives other 
than pure compassion for providing assistance – from pursuing foreign policy interests 
to disposing of agricultural surpluses. 18  Being dependent on public money, 
humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies alike faced difficulties in maintaining their 
independence and impartiality (Barnett 2011: 104).  
                                                
18 Indeed, food aid has become the default option of innumerable humanitarian and development 
assistance projects not because of its efficiency, which was often questionable, but because it served the 
primary objective of disposing of agricultural surpluses, thus de facto subsidising farmers in industrialised 
countries, most notably in the U.S. (Barrett and Maxwell 2005).  
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Once European reconstruction was underway, humanitarian attention started to turn 
towards Asia and Africa, which were facing poverty and other legacies of colonial 
times. Cold war logics essentially prevented the involvement of Western-based 
organisations in communist countries (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 10), but the 
officially “non aligned” – the majority among the newly independent states – remained 
fair game. In this context, discourses of economic “development” started to flourish, 
together with interventions aimed at promoting it. It is relevant to note that 
humanitarianism did not exist in a vacuum, and therefore humanitarians were exposed 
to, and influenced by, ideas on how to overcome global poverty and inequality (Davey, 
Borton and Foley 2013: 10). Furthermore, it is worth restating that humanitarian 
organisations of the alchemical type were already quite open to the possibility of 
working to address the causes of suffering, and thus ready to embrace developmental 
concerns.  
3.1.2.1 Humanitarianism and sovereignty: Biafra and beyond 
A major turning point for humanitarianism was the war in Biafra. Being an internal 
conflict between the central government of Nigeria and the secessionist Ibo 
government, it was technically outside of the sphere of competence of the UN and of 
the ICRC. The situation was remarkably politicised: on the one hand, the central 
government had provoked a famine by imposing a blockade against the secessionist 
province, and it would only consent to relief operations under strict conditions, 
allegedly to prevent rebels from benefitting of the assistance. On the other hand, the 
secessionists saw foreign relief as an opportunity for gaining visibility and resources, 
and tried to lure relief agencies to stand on their side. Both parties acted with little – if 
any – regard for the plight of the affected population. But once disturbing news of 
mass starvation in the Biafra province started being broadcasted abroad, the pressure 
to act increased. Church-based groups were keen to support Biafra because of its 
Christian identity, whereas the rest of Nigeria was predominantly Muslim. OXFAM 
was the first major humanitarian player to intervene, de facto siding with the rebels, 
and other NGOs followed suit (Barnett 2011: 134-135).  
The ICRC, which had survived the legitimacy crisis due to its silence during the 
Holocaust and had restated its role by solemnly stating its seven fundamental 
principles in 1965, kept trying to negotiate with the government to be allowed access to 
Biafra, with no success. In August 1968, in a rather surprising move, the organisation 
decided to launch relief operations without the government’s consent. The government 
reacted by attacking an ICRC-run refugee camp and, some months afterwards, by 
shooting down an ICRC aircraft which was transporting relief supplies. The ICRC 
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eventually stopped all its operations in Biafra until an agreement with the Nigerian 
government was reached (Barnett 2011: 135-137). Meanwhile, NGOs kept running their 
humanitarian interventions, even though their assistance ended up supporting the 
secessionist government, to the detriment of the civilian population (Davey, Borton 
and Foley 2013: 10). UN agencies, instead, mostly distanced themselves to what was 
perceived as an internal issue of a sovereign state; with the exception of UNICEF that 
decided to provide relief to Biafra. Instead for asking permissions to the Nigerian 
government, which might have refused to allow the activities, UNICEF cleverly turned 
the vague wording of some government’s declarations of concern for Biafra into 
justifications for their uninvited intervention (Barnett 2011: 142).  
All the things that had gone wrong in Biafra sparked a rethinking of humanitarian 
action. A first strand of criticism was directed towards the inadequacy of a 
humanitarian system that did not have appropriate means to intervene in an internal 
conflict. With the exception of UNICEF, the UN had used legal arguments to steer clear 
of any involvement with the Biafra crisis (Barnett 2011: 137). The vacuum would only 
be filled in about one decade later, in 1977, with the signature of an additional protocol 
to the 1949 Geneva conventions dealing with the protection of civilians and former 
combatants in internal conflicts.  
A second, and related, issue arising from the Biafra war was related to the principle of 
neutrality. When suffering is caused by human decisions, or when parties to the 
conflict obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, should humanitarians remain 
silent, or should they speak up? The official position of the ICRC was to maintain 
confidentiality, so as to be perceived as neutral. A number of NGOs, such as OXFAM, 
had instead clearly and publicly taken the side of the Ibo rebels, perceived to be 
defending the Biafran people (Barnett 2011: 134-135). Later on, it would be widely 
recognised that the presence of humanitarian actors gave legitimacy to the rebels, and 
that relief goods themselves were being manipulated for political reasons, to the point 
that it is now recognised that humanitarian assistance had prolonged the war itself 
(Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 10). 
As a reaction to the ICRC policy of discretion, a group of French doctors returning 
from Biafra, led by Bernard Kouchner, broke the vow of silence and started publicly 
expressing their outrage for the acts of the Nigerian government. In 1971, as a direct 
result of their dissatisfaction with the ICRC way of conducting humanitarian 
operations, these doctors would eventually establish a new humanitarian NGO, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (henceforth MSF). What made MSF unique compared to 
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other humanitarian organisations, was that it combined adherence to the 
humanitarian principles as defined by the Red Cross with a commitment to speaking 
out about injustice – the so-called principle of témoignage, or witnessing (Barnett 
2011: 143-146). In other words, MSF humanitarianism was born as a humanitarian 
organisation with an openly political mission, as long as it judged that it could help to 
address the needs of people suffering in a humanitarian crisis. 
As De Waal (1997: 77) notes, another effect of the crisis in Biafra was to consolidate the 
role of NGOs. Despite all the ethic issues that the humanitarian intervention had raised 
– above all, that aid does sometime harm its intended beneficiaries, in this case by 
prolonging conflict – it was also the first time NGOs had entirely managed an 
operation of that magnitude, boosting their self-confidence. Many of the NGOs that 
had worked in Biafra subsequently moved to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), first to 
respond to the 1970 cyclone, and later on to provide relief during the 1971-1972 
secessionist war. Since then, humanitarian NGOs have never stopped moving from a 
disaster stricken location to the next.  
Politics kept interfering with humanitarianism all along, and NGOs were often pretty 
close to their home governments foreign policy lines (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 
11). Nevertheless, there were instances in which humanitarians were able to challenge 
the Cold War dynamics, such as when OXFAM led a coalition of NGOs to carry relief 
within Cambodia, despite the vehement opposition of the US, because the country was 
de facto under Vietnamese control. However, the amount of aid that the NGOs were 
able to channel to Cambodia was minimal if compared to the assistance received by 
Cambodian refugees in Thailand, assisted among others by the UN and the ICRC with 
US funding. This, despite the fact that the camps were controlled by the Khmer Rouge, 
the former rulers of Cambodia that had caused a famine in the country (Walker and 
Maxwell 2009: 50-51).  
3.1.2.2 African food crises and the growth of the humanitarian system  
Another major turn in humanitarianism followed the so-called African food crises in 
the 1970s-1980s. By 1972, following a few years of drought, countries along the Sahel – 
in particular Mali, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Chad – were facing 
famine19 (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 51-53). A couple of years later, northern Ethiopia 
                                                
19 It is worth remarking that at the time there was no agreed upon definition of famine (Walker and 
Maxwell 2009: 52), thus the label might have been used in situations that by today’s standards may or 
may not qualify as famines.  
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also found itself in the grip of famine (see chapter 4 below). Amartya Sen would later 
frame these crises as problems in access to food for everyone, that is, as fundamentally 
political issues, rather than of an outright food shortage. Nevertheless, the latter was 
the dominant view at the time and as a result, the crises were addressed from a merely 
technical point of view. Apart from NGOs, on this occasion the response was 
dominated by United Nations’ agencies, namely the FAO and by the World Food 
Programme (WFP). The latter had been founded in 1961 to effectively dispose of 
agricultural surplus in industrialised nations (most notably the USA), and its role had 
been since then limited to development, not humanitarian initiatives (Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005: 61-62). This first attempt at humanitarian response to slow-onset crises 
has been judged as uncoordinated and amateurish (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 52), 
shortcomings that still haunt humanitarian activity today. 
The African food crises impacted humanitarianism on many level. First of all, they 
prompted a depoliticised, technocratic understanding of slow-onset crises and of 
“natural” disasters more in general, only later to be challenged by Jean Drèze and 
Amartya Sen (1990), among others. Secondly, the realisation that these crises had been 
a long time in the making led to the development of famine early warning systems. 
Again, politics were taken out of the equation, and attention focused hard data such as 
rainfall patterns. Moreover, it has been argued that data collection was more strongly 
geared to the needs of the international aid community than to local governments 
(Walker and Maxwell 2009: 55). The fact that humanitarians were starting to think 
about preventing crisis, instead of arriving once the situation has turned into an 
emergency, was also a sign that alchemical thinking was still present.  
Finally, and on a slightly different note, these crises – which reached the Western 
public just a few years after the pictures of starving Biafran children – contributed to 
the consolidation of the image of Africa as the locus of hunger, which still permeates 
mainstream representations of the continent. This despite the fact that mass starvation 
had also occurred elsewhere. The largest famine ever recorded, claiming the lives of an 
estimated 15 to 30 million people, had actually happened in China, as a result of Mao 
Tse-Tung’s “Great Leap Forward”, even though its occurrence remained a well-kept 
secret for decades (De Waal 1997:18).  
The Ethiopian famine of the mid-eighties demonstrated in the worst possible way the 
shortcomings of early warning systems, barely a decade after these systems were put in 
place following the 1972-74 famine. It is questionable whether an early warning system 
based on rainfall patterns could have ever predicted the crisis, as the causes of the 
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famine were political rather than ecological (see chapter 4 below). However, a 
widespread drought did indeed happen in 1984, resulting in an even worsening 
situation in Tigray, and in famine reaching other parts of the country (De Waal 1997). 
Leaving aside what could have (and what could have not) been predicted in advance, 
by 1983 there was sufficient evidence of localised starvation, “in the form of destitute 
migrants [from Tigray] turning up at feeding centres” (De Waal 1997: 114).  
Humanitarian response, however, was very late. The reluctancy of Western donors to 
send aid to a country that had recently shifted alliances and sided with the USSR 
played a role in the delay (Barnett 2011: 155). However, there were NGOs already 
operating in the country, and their late response to the emergency remains puzzling. 
Tony Vaux (2001) attributes the delay to the prevalence of developmentalist discourses 
over humanitarian ones. As he effectively points out, at that time “[t]o belong to the 
‘teach a man to fish’ school carried much greater status than to belong to the ‘give a 
man a fish school’” (Vaux 2001: 46). He even recalls that in 1984, when the famine was 
already ravaging northern Ethiopia, OXFAM board of trustees recommended to avoid 
relief activities and focus on development instead (Vaux 2001: 46). While this attitude 
may not have been present in all NGOs, it has probably contributed to the initial 
disregard for humanitarian activities aimed at saving lives.  
The situation suddenly changed once the BBC aired a reportage presenting the 
Ethiopian famine in biblical terms. Pop stars also contributed to the visibility of the 
crisis, by organising unprecedented fundraising efforts, and particularly the famous 
Band Aid and Live Aid initiatives. In the following months, money – including from 
private donors – started pouring in, and Ethiopia was invaded by all sorts of 
organisations providing relief, more than in any previous emergency. Some of these 
were proper NGOs, other were groups of volunteers with little or no humanitarian 
experience, which contributed to the disorganisation and duplication of efforts 
(Barnett 2011: 156). Adding to that the government, who had played a role in causing 
the famine, wanted to manipulate aid for their own purposes, namely to break the 
insurgencies by relocating populations to other areas of the country. Only MSF dared 
to speak out against the practice, which led to its ban from the country in December 
1985 (Barrett 2011: 156-157).  
On their side, insurgent militias in Tigray also benefitted from relief being channeled 
through their charitable arm, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). By distributing food 
aid provided through covert cross-border operations, they undoubtedly increased their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population (De Waal 1997). Crucially, notes again De Waal 
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(1997: 130), “these political dynamics were not made explicit to the donors. On the 
contrary, an elaborated charade was played whereby the superficial requirements of 
neutral humanitarianism and NGO-ism were established to protect the operation from 
the perils of publicity”. Once again, humanitarianism and political action could not be 
easily disentangled. 
3.1.3 Liberal humanitarianism 
For many Third World countries, the end of the Cold War meant the termination of the 
financial and military aid they had received for decades in exchange for loyalty to 
either of the superpowers. These resources had been crucial to maintaining internal 
stability through clientelistic practices; once the money was gone, it became more 
difficult for states to provide basic services and to contain the rise of paramilitary 
organisations (Barrett 2011: 161-162). The early 1990s saw a rapid increase in internal 
conflicts, particularly in Africa, Easter Europe, and in Near and Central Asia (Duffield 
1994). It was immediately apparent that these conflicts were different from the past. 
Rather than ideologically motivated insurgents wanting to replace the government, 
there were paramilitary militia thriving in the absence of a state. The UN Security 
Council, whose prerogatives had been long limited by the exercise of veto powers, 
suddenly became a privileged forum for discussing intervention in what were now 
labeled “complex humanitarian emergencies”. Humanitarian arguments began to be 
used to justify not only life-saving relief measures, but also efforts at peace-keeping 
and peace-building (Barnett 2011). 
With humanitarian emergencies becoming more frequent, more disruptive, and more 
visible to Western audiences, humanitarian funding sharply increased, at the expense 
of development budgets (Duffield 1997; Carbonnier 2013). In 1992, the UN created a 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) mainly to deal with issues of coordination 
arising from the increase in humanitarian activities. Similarly, the European 
Community also established its own Humanitarian Office (ECHO); and other donors 
institutionalised some form of emergency response capacity (Duffield 1997: 42).  
3.1.3.1 Complex humanitarian emergencies 
Somalia was one of the first complex humanitarian emergencies of the early nineties, 
proving to be a major challenge for the international community, and it still remains 
the epitome of the failed state. In the previous decades, the country had been ruled by 
Siad Barre. Barre used the aid money coming from the USA to maintain his grip on 
power, rewarding his clientele, and played the country’s different clans one against the 
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other (Duffield 1997). Once Barre had been ousted in 1991, Somalia fell into the hands 
of warring factions. Apart from militiamen looting food stocks, the conflict caused 
displacement and the paralysis of productive activities, which resulted in limited food 
availability and starvation in what used to be Somalia’s granaries (Duffield 1997: 162-
164). The ICRC, working in partnership with the Somali Red Crescent Society, 
mounted an unprecedented relief operation by feeding an estimated two million 
people. However, it had for the first time in its history to accept the presence of armed 
guards, and tolerated high rates of food aid diversion on the grounds “that ‘flooding the 
country with food’ would bring down the price and thus reduce the famine” (Duffield 
1997: 170). MSF and other NGOs also had to hire armed personnel to protect food 
supplies (Barnett 2011: 173).  
The UN, which had withdrawn its entire staff for security reasons in late 1990, only 
resumed operations in 1992, through a food aid operation run by the WFP in 
partnership with the NGO CARE. The program however was remarkable more for the 
length of time supplies remained stuck in the warehouses, rather than for its impact on 
the hungry populations (Duffield 1997). At the political level, the UN Security Council 
established a peacekeeping mission with the double aim of monitoring a ceasefire 
reached in April 1992, and of providing protection to UN humanitarian operations. As 
the security situation remained precarious and there were reports of massive relief 
diversion, the UN accepted a US-led task force to protect humanitarian activities, 
followed by an enhanced UN peacekeeping operation. However, the international 
forces did not remain neutral, but engaged in combat activities (Duffield 1997). The 
international involvement in Somalia would eventually come to an end in 1995, leaving 
the country at the mercy of warlords.  
Meanwhile, and for the first time since the Second World War, war was back to 
Europe. The first conflict erupted in 1991 between Croatia – which had declared 
independence in 1991 together with Slovenia – and the Serbian-dominated 
Yugoslavian federation. Many ethnic Serbs who used to live in Croatia fled, receiving 
assistance from UNHCR. In the following year, Bosnia-Herzegovina also split from 
Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s own Serb community fought back and attempted an 
ethnic cleansing, which resulted in the displacement of millions of Bosnians. UN 
peacekeeping forces sent to the region were given the objective of enabling and 
protecting the delivery of relief supplies, which were being targeted by the Serbs. The 
UNHCR – which for the first time was assisting people who had not yet crossed an 
international border – was appointed as the lead agency, coordinating other UN 
agencies and scores of international NGOs. Humanitarian assistance allowed the 
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international community to claim they were involved in the Bosnia, without actually 
taking any step to bring the conflict to an end (Barnett 2011: 174-179).  
In 1994, another major crisis shook the foundations of the humanitarian world: the 
Rwandan genocide. Tensions had been escalating, and immediately following the 
assassination of the country’s President, the ethnic Hutu majority turned against the 
tutsi minority (and moderate Hutus as well), killing an estimated 800,000 people 
within a few months. Despite a longstanding presence in the country, which included a 
UN peacekeeping mission, the international community remarkably failed at both 
anticipating the genocide and at providing an adequate humanitarian response. What 
is even more remarkable is that when NGOs and UN agencies eventually intervened, 
they did so in support of those who had left the country after the genocide was over. 
These fugitives were mostly Hutus abandoning Rwanda for fear of retaliation after 
Tutsi militias eventually gained control of the country, and included the very 
perpetrators of the genocide (De Waal 1997; Barnett 2011).  
De Waal (1997: 195) notes that among the over one million people who fled, only a few 
fit the legal definition of refugee. The mass exodus itself had been orchestrated by the 
génocidaires, who then were able to control the camps and the international assistance 
that soon poured in. The Western public was shocked by the genocide and responded 
with the expectation that humanitarians “do something”, while misleading media and 
NGO reports had supported the belief that these “refugees” were genocide survivors. 
Yet, despite the fact that the situation was a blatant violation of the principle of 
neutrality, the pressure to be on the ground was such that only a few organisations, 
among which there was MSF, came to the decision of shutting down operations (De 
Waal 1997; Barnett 2011).  
As if the militarisation of camps and diversion of aid was not enough to call the relief 
operation a failure, international aid agencies were not able to respond to a cholera 
epidemic that ultimately claimed lives of about 12,000 refugees within the course of 
three weeks, in July 1994. It would later be established that the fatality rate in some of 
the camps was much higher than in the facilities managed by local authorities in the 
nearby town of Goma, due to the fact that some of the aid organisations lacked the 
professional skills to tackle the disease (Siddique, et al. 1995). Indeed, of about one 
hundred NGOs operational in Goma at the peak of the emergency, a significant 
number had never previously worked in Africa, lacked relevant experience in crisis 
response, or both. Furthermore, with so many actors on the ground, duplication of 
efforts does not strike as unexpected (Borton et al. 1996). 
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3.1.3.2 Humanitarianism after Rwanda 
The failures in Rwanda and subsequently in the Rwandan refugee camps in then Zaire 
led to reflection and self-criticism within the humanitarian community, so acute that 
Barnett (2011: 212) points out that there is a “before Rwanda” and an “after Rwanda”. 
With the backing of the Danish international cooperation agency, DANIDA, an 
independent and comprehensive joint evaluation of the humanitarian response in 
Rwanda was carried out. The findings confirmed that whilst some organisations had 
performed well, others had been so “unprofessional and irresponsible” that they may 
“have contributed to an unnecessary loss of life” (Borton et al. 1996: 161). In other 
words, there was indication that humanitarian action had not just failed at its primary 
mission of saving lives, but that it had actually caused more suffering that it would 
have been the case otherwise. Reflecting on unintended consequences of aid, 
influential scholar Mary B. Anderson would later suggest humanitarians to abide by 
the same principle that binds medical action: “do no harm” (Anderson 1999).  
The reaction of the humanitarian world to the public shame of such strong 
condemnation was, indeed quite commendably, to undertake reforms aimed at raising 
the bar (Barnett 2011). The most notable outcome of this climate was the SPHERE 
project, aimed at improving the quality of assistance by setting some minimum 
standards, to be used particularly in a refugee camp setting. Sphere also contained a 
“Humanitarian Charter” which even affirmed a “right to humanitarian assistance” 
(Barnett 2011). Even if it did fit into a broader movement towards improving 
humanitarian effectiveness, SPHERE was quite a unique product of a very specific 
moment (Buchanan-Smith 2003). In the years immediately before Rwanda, 
humanitarians had agreed on a Code of Conduct, launched advocacy networks such as 
VOICE, and even established a joint master’s degree in Humanitarian Action (NOHA). 
Even more initiatives aimed at an increasing professionalisation, efficiency, and 
accountability would follow, including for instance the Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). In this respect, 
Rwanda “directly and fundamentally shaped the conduct of humanitarian practitioners 
today” (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013: 14).  
Despite its merits, the move towards increasing professionalisation of humanitarian 
action – a path already followed in international development – also implied 
depoliticisation. If what matters are such things as the litres of drinking water per 
person or the appropriate configuration and location of latrines, independence and 
neutrality seem to be of less use than a degree in engineering. Furthermore, by shifting 
the focus on material output, it actually became obvious that organisations other than 
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humanitarian ones, most notably the military, were well placed to deliver items from A 
to B. Armed forces had indeed a long history of involvement in the response to natural 
disasters at home and abroad (Walker 1992), but it can be argued that in such cases the 
ethical implication of the lack of neutrality and independence were less pronounced. 
More recently, military personnel had been deployed to protect humanitarian convoys, 
such as in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The relationship between humanitarians 
and armed forces was only to become more blurred with the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo.  
Kosovo, once part of Yugoslavia, had voted for independence in 1991, roughly at the 
same time when other republics had split from the federation. As opposed to Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where conflict erupted immediately following the declaration 
of independence, the situation in the region remained relatively calm for a few years. 
Tensions mounted in 1996 between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the forces of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which led to civilian deaths and mass displacement of 
Albanian Kosovar people. In 1998, the UN Security Council passed resolutions aimed 
at promoting a peaceful settlement of the dispute, but it could not approve the use of 
force because of Russia’s veto. Given the situation, and anxious to find a new role for 
NATO in the post-Cold War environment, Western countries launched the first ever 
“humanitarian war”: air strikes against Serbia to avoid another ethnic cleansing 
(Barrett 2011). Yet, ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars was precisely what followed 
the NATO intervention, although the relation of causality has been questioned. A 
refugee crisis ensued, and although the needs were not as dire as in other parts of the 
world, the plight of Albanian Kosovars received disproportionately high attention and 
funding (Rieff 2000).  
In another unprecedented move, NATO took over from UNHCR the task of 
coordinating humanitarian response. NATO entrusted camp management to different 
national contingents, which then subcontracted part of the relief work to NGOs – often 
selected on the basis of nationality rather than technical expertise – and UN agencies. 
Surprisingly, the intrusion of armed forces in the domain of humanitarian action was 
received fairly well by most humanitarian organisations. Many NGOs openly supported 
the intervention, and benefited from a considerable amount of funds, while dissenting 
voices – among which there was, once again, MSF – remained a minority (Barnett 2011; 
Rieff 2000).  
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Shortly after Kosovo, the idea that the international community had the right to 
intervene to prevent crises or provide relief even against the will of the sovereign state 
evolved in the concept of a “responsibility to protect”. This concept, first formulated in 
2001, maintains that states are primarily responsible for keeping their citizens safe 
from humanitarian catastrophes, and that in case they fail to do so, the international 
community is not just entitled, but required to step in. Eventually, the idea of a 
responsibility to protect would be adopted by the UN at the 2005 World Summit. 
However, it has been noted (Stahn 2007) that whereas there is substantial consensus 
on the fact that states should be considered responsible for protecting their citizens, 
the exact obligations of the international community are more vague and remained 
questionable.  
Some of the most recent instances of humanitarians and foreign military forces 
touching elbows have taken places during what is known as the “War on Terror” that 
followed the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the US. The boundaries among 
military forces, humanitarian actors, and the broader international community, have 
become increasingly blurred. Governments involved in the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and mainly the US, have been trying to “win hearts and minds” by embedding 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in their military operations. 
This has taken place both by having military forces deliver relief items, and by 
subcontracting relief, reconstruction and development projects to NGOs (among other 
types of implementers). In particular, it is to be noted that the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), a government agency and major humanitarian 
and development donor, sits in the so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” 
established in Iraq and Afghanistan with the main aim of stabilising the countries. 
Many NGOs, including some mostly development NGOs, have expressed unease at the 
prospect of being funded by governments involved in combat operations. Furthermore, 
it has been argued (Barnett 2011; Carbonnier 2013) that the confusion generated by the 
coexistence of foreign troops occasionally involved in humanitarian-like activities and 
“truly” humanitarian organisations might increase the risks for the latter to be targeted 
by enemies of the former.  
3.1.3.3 The Indian Ocean Tsunami and Humanitarian Reform 
Compared to the humanitarian involvement in conflict situations, the response to 
natural disasters is usually less controversial. In December 2004, an earthquake 
triggered a series of tsunamis in the Indian ocean – which remain, to date, the most 
destructive ever recorded. Even though it is possible to conceive early warning systems 
tailored for the risk of tsunamis (there is one in the Pacific Ocean), no such a system 
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existed in the affected area. Within hours, the waters claimed the lives of about 
230,000 people across 14 countries. Although media attention focused on the fate of 
Western tourists in the area (of which some two thousand perished in the disaster), the 
overwhelming majority of the victims were citizens of the affected countries. As a 
matter of fact, the disaster disproportionately affected vulnerable groups, with the 
highest mortality rates among elderly people, children, and women (Telford et al. 
2006). As it is usually the case in sudden-onset disasters, in the hours and days that 
immediately followed the catastrophe, local communities carried out most search and 
rescue operations and provided assistance to the survivors. Shortly thereafter, national 
institutions – including the military – joined in, followed by foreign humanitarian 
organisations.20 
The sheer magnitude of the disaster, the extensive coverage provided by news outlets, 
as well as the fact that some of the countries were tourist hotspots the Western public 
could easily relate to, led to a massive outpour of private and public donations 
matching or even exceeding assessed needs for both relief and recovery (Telford et al. 
2006; Brown and Minty 2006; Brauman 2006). In a move that generated some 
controversy, less than ten days after the disaster MSF announced that they had already 
raised the necessary funds for the operation, and advised their supporters to revert 
their donations to underfunded crises. Most of the other humanitarian organisations, 
however, kept raising funds for the tsunami response (Telford et al. 2006; Brauman 
2006).  
With funding so readily available and public pressure to intervene, hundreds of 
humanitarian organisations descended upon the affected countries, in what has been 
referred to as a“second tsunami” (Brochard 2006, quoted in Telford et al. 2006: 38). 
Apart from UN agencies and established NGOs, there were also newly-founded 
charitable groups, and even individual philanthropists. Given the diversity in size, 
organisational mission, and capacities of the relief agencies, the effectiveness of the 
response also varied considerably. Overall, the extent of damage and needs was poorly 
collected, with spotty geographical coverage, duplication of efforts, and a general 
attitude towards prioritising each agency’s own sectoral mandate. In terms of actual 
response, the most accessible communities got a larger share of the assistance 
compared to those lying farther afield, regardless of the extent of needs. Nevertheless, 
                                                
20Understandably, organisations with a presence in the affected countries or in the region were able to 
deploy their staff faster (Telford et al., 2006). 
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the humanitarian response was also praised for being fast and effective, even though 
there were instances of inappropriate aid,21 duplication of efforts, and poor targeting.  
The size of the humanitarian operation triggered, as it had happened in the past, a 
phase of reflection on the effectiveness and appropriateness of the response. For the 
first time since Rwanda, a comprehensive joint assessment of the humanitarian 
response to the tsunami was undertaken, under the leadership of a group of donors, 
UN agencies, NGOs and research institutes that formed the Tsunami Evaluation 
Coalition (TEC) (Telford et al. 2006). Furthermore, the tsunami response was one of 
the case studies used in the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (Adinolfi et al. 
2005), which would inform the process known as the Humanitarian Reform. This 
reform had two main related components: the streamlining of funding processes and 
the improvement of coordination. To address the former point, the UN established an 
international pooled fund – known as the Central Emergency Response Fund or CERF 
– to quickly disburse grants for emergency response, as well as pooled funds, also 
called humanitarian response funds, at the country level. As for the latter, an entire 
new mechanism for humanitarian coordination was established, known as the “cluster 
approach”. Clusters are sort of pre-arranged working groups to be activated in the 
aftermath of an emergency to facilitate coordination and improve effectiveness. 
Clusters are of three different types: thematic (Emergency Shelter, Health, Nutrition, 
WASH, Education, and Agriculture); cross-cutting (Early Recovery, Camp 
Coordination/Management, and Protection); and common services (Emergency 
Telecommunications and Logistics). The lead agencies for each cluster are defined in 
advance, and they are almost always UN organisations, except for the Education 
Cluster, which falls under the joint responsibility of UNICEF and Save the Children 
(Stoddard et al. 2007). Although the cluster system is mostly a UN-led effort, NGOs are 
expected to participate as well. The system emerged from the 2005 humanitarian 
reform has, by and large, remained until the present day. 
                                                
21 A wide range of items can be considered inappropriate for distribution in the context of an emergency 
response, but also during development interventions, because they do not match local needs and put an 
unnecessary strain on logistical capacities. Examples of inappropriate aid include, for instance: drugs that 
have expired, have information leaflets in foreign languages, or are not necessary given the 
epidemiological situation; clothes that are culturally inappropriate or that are not suitable for the local 
climate; food items that are past their “best before” date, that violate religious prescriptions, or that are 
not part of the local diet.  
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3.2 The evolution of development action 
The history of development action is inevitably linked to that of humanitarian action. 
As stated, this is first and foremost because the two types of action are often 
intertwined in practice, and refer to broader concepts of philanthropy and solidarity. 
In addition, many development organisations have a dual mandate (humanitarian and 
developmental) or, as Barnett (2011) puts it, are “alchemical humanitarians”. A 
number of organisations, the most notable of which are UNICEF, Save the Children 
and Oxfam, were founded to provide emergency relief, but have expanded their 
mandate to include also development activities. Having already presented the 
historical evolution of humanitarian action, in this section I will focus on the aspects 
and events that have shaped development assistance more specifically.  
In this section I give an account of the evolution of development thinking that is clear 
without merely providing a chronology of events. As Ellis and Biggs note, 
“development ideas are not trapped in time capsules conveniently organised in 
decades. Ideas that first appear in one decade often gain strength in the following 
decade” (Ellis and Biggs 2001: 438). Therefore, I have avoided giving an account by 
decade, and preferred to distinguish four main, partly overlapping periods: i) the 
origins of development, encompassing the years since the late colonial period through 
the Bretton Woods conference to the Marshall Plan; ii) development and 
decolonisation, starting with the birth of the Third World to the mid-1970s; iii) the 
debt crisis and Structural Adjustment Programmes, which looks at the policies of 
multilateral lending between the late 1970s and 1980s; and iv) Development after the 
Cold War, examining the period from the fall of the Soviet Union till the current day.  
3.2.1 The origins of development  
Development action, compared to humanitarian relief, is a relatively recent product of 
international relations, as it was established only after World War II. The use of the 
word “development” to indicate the funding of initiatives to improve the economy of 
overseas territories can be traced back at least to the 1929 British Colonial 
Development Act (Morgan 1964). In that setting, however, “development” of the 
colonies was intended to have positive repercussions on the empire. The main change 
that took place with decolonisation was that what once was a matter of internal affairs 
(of the empire) became international politics (Finnemore 1997: 205-206). At that time, 
the main idea behind the concept of development was that there is one linear path that 
leads countries to towards modernisation, which was de facto equated to 
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industrialisation. In his classic work on economic development, Rostow (1960) 
identified five “stages” of growth, that all industrialised countries had experienced. In 
this perspective, “underdeveloped” countries were simply behind schedule, but they 
could and should copy measures from already industrialised countries to catch up.  
The primary indicator of industrialisation – and, by extension, of development – was 
economic growth, measured in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) or GNP per 
capita. The main reason why some countries were not yet industrialised, it was argued, 
was a scarcity of capital accumulation, which in turn implied low investments levels. 
Following this diagnosis, the cure was to inject external resources into economies 
lacking internal savings, in order to boost investments and then growth. Development 
projects, then, were mostly “large infrastructural projects, such as dams or highways, 
designed to have large secondary industrialisation-promotion effects” (Finnemore 
1997: 207). Macroeconomic performance was the main objective of development 
action, whereas poverty alleviation was regarded as “a happy byproduct of expanded 
production and efficient industrialization" (Finnemore 1997: 205).  
The 1944 Bretton Wood Agreements, which led to the creation of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD, now part of the World Bank Group), are believed by some 
scholars (Moyo 2010; Helleiner 2006) to have marked the birth of international 
development. There is some controversy on this respect, because as Finnemore (1997: 
206) notes, “development was not a major concern at the Bretton Woods conference”. 
Indeed, the Bretton Woods agreements focused on establishing a new monetary policy, 
and on promoting European reconstruction. However, as Helleiner (2006) 
demonstrated, there is evidence that during the negotiations “developmentalists” 
concerns were discussed. This is for instance demonstrated by the fact that Latin 
American delegates objected to the priority given to European reconstruction, arguing 
that their development was also worth funding (Helleiner 2006). Furthermore, she 
argues that the international system created at Bretton Woods was modelled on 
existing policies adopted by the US towards Latin America since the 1930s.  
In any case, “development received little international attention in the years 
immediately following the war” (Finnemore 1997: 206). It is possibly for this reason 
that other scholars (Sachs 1992) post-date the birth of development to US President 
Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949. In that occasion, Truman announced a “bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman 1949). 
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Despite referring to the “primitive” economic lives led by people in those countries, a 
concept reminiscent of colonial narrative, Truman stated that his programme would 
not be aimed at increasing profits at home, but to improve living standards abroad 
through increased production, fostering “prosperity and peace” (ibidem).  
These themes resonated with those of the Marshall Plan, launched during Truman’s 
first term as a President. The Marshall Plan – as the European Recovery Program is 
most commonly referred to – was a major funding instrument intended to support 
Western European post-war recovery while at the same time preventing the expansion 
of Communism. Between 1948 and 1952, the US disbursed over 13 billion US dollars, 
most of which constituted by grants (Wood 1986: 29). Apart from the (disputed) 
impact on European recovery, it is believed that the Marshall plan has contributed to 
the constitution of the world order during the Cold War, and given legitimacy to the 
idea of the usefulness of concessional external financing (Wood 1986: 31), 
institutionalising aid practices. In this sense the Marshall plan can be considered the 
prototype of (bilateral) development cooperation (Wood 1986, Finnemore 1997). Thus, 
development action was born as an interstate (often bilateral) resource flow, intended 
to help states – not people – in their industrialisation processes, and strongly 
influenced by political considerations. 
3.2.2 Development and decolonisation 
With the first wave of decolonisation in Africa, the scope for development action grew 
further, as the number of “eligible” countries suddenly increased. At the end of the 
1960s, the number of independent states had more than doubled compared to 1945,22 
and most of the newly-born countries were undoubtedly “underdeveloped” former 
                                                
22 The number of members of the United Nations offers a good proxy of the waves of independence, with 
the caveat that not all independent states are necessarily part of the organisation (Germany and Italy, for 
instance, were not immediately part of it, whereas Switzerland only joined in 2002). The United Nations 
were founded in 1945 by 51 members; in 1968, membership had expanded to 126 countries. In the year 
1960 alone there were as many as 17 new members, 16 of which former African colonies. The “second 
wave” of African independence took place around 1975, with the dismantlement of the former Portuguese 
colonial empire. UN membership continued to grow steadily until 1990, averaging one new member per 
year. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and that of Yugoslavia led to another wave of newly independent 
countries joining the UN in the early nineties. In 1993, UN membership had expanded to 185 states, well 
over three times the number of original founders. Since then, the rate of accession has slowed down, with 
just ten new members in over twenty years, the last one being South Sudan in 2011 (United Nations 
website). 
  54 
colonies. In an effort to distance themselves from Cold War policies, most states in 
Africa and Asia, together with Yugoslavia, formed the “Non-Aligned movement”. This 
was a group of states that, in the name of anti-imperialism, rejected both the Western 
bloc (where their former colonisers stood) and the Soviet one23. Nevertheless, their 
efforts had mixed results at best, as in most of the cases they would enter either of the 
two superpower’s sphere of influence. Development aid, along with military assistance, 
were relevant aspects of such a relationship (White 2012).  
The 1960s were optimistically hailed by the UN as the first “Development Decade”, 
with industrialised countries expected to contribute one percent of their GDP to 
development aid (Black 2007). Bilateral aid from capitalist countries remained the 
major source of development assistance, although a growing proportion of aid was 
being disbursed through multilateral agencies such as the United Nations and the 
World Bank (Wood 1986). The narratives of poverty reduction, of defeating hunger, 
and of human rights began to be used to justify aid expenditure to the western public. 
Most third world economies did indeed grow in the 1960s, even without the level of aid 
promised24. Yet, towards the end of the decade, it became evident that growth itself 
had not made those countries more industrialised, nor sensibly reduced the levels of 
poverty (Black 2007). Disillusionment towards the potential transformative impact of 
development aid emerged for the first time. A commission led by Lester Pearson was 
given the task to investigate the impact of development assistance. In its final report 
(Pearson, 1969), the commission recognised the shortcomings of aid policies until 
then, most notably the fact that aspects other than economic growth – robustness of 
local institutions, political stability – had been neglected. In its critique of development 
programmes, the Pearson Report maintained however a pro-aid stance, advocating for 
the abolition of import restrictions and against tied aid.25 The report also introduced 
                                                
23 It is precisely the fact that these countries sought to distance themselves from both the “First World” 
(capitalist bloc) and the “Second World” (socialist bloc) that led to the use of the expression “Third 
World”. Given the conditions of most of the non-aligned countries, “Third World” soon became 
synonymous with “developing countries”, or simply “poor countries”. It is mostly in this meaning that it is 
sometimes still used today, even though it has become obsolete since the end of the Cold War (Black 
2007).  
24 With the caveat that ODA data was not thoroughly collected in the 1960s, it is however possible to 
conclude that, on average, total aid remained lower than 0,6% of donor’s gross national income (OECD 
2011). 
25 Aid is labelled as “tied” when it is offered on the condition that it is used to procure goods or services are 
from the donor country itself (OECD-DAC 2008a), thus representing an instrument for industrialised 
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the target, for donor countries, of devolving 0,7% of GDP to development assistance. 
This has remained until today the reference value for assessing donors’ commitment, 
despite having been largely unmet.  
A more radical critique to the development model came from the so-called 
“dependency theorists”. 26 Drawing on the arguments advanced by Prebisch (1950) and 
that focused mostly on Latin America, these scholars maintained that the existence of 
“underdeveloped” areas of the world was not due to their backwardness or late 
industrialisation, but rather a necessary feature of the capitalist international system, 
which required some countries to be “dependent” in order for others to flourish. 
Dependent countries had to sell their resources at cheap prices and import more 
expensive manufactured good from industrialised countries, and thus the 
underdevelopment of the “periphery” was functional to the development of the 
“centre”. Furthermore, according to Cardoso (1973) economic growth in dependent 
countries did not trickle down to the poor, but remained a prerogative of the elites. 
Rather than providing “solutions” to the development conundrum, however, 
dependency scholars have focused on challenging the mainstream analysis of 
(under)development (Palma 1978). 
The disillusionment with the record of development led to a shift in focus of 
development policy priorities, from investment aimed at promoting industrialisation 
towards programmes aimed at tackling “basic needs”, such as improving access to 
water or launching immunisation campaigns. Even the World Bank, through its 
president Robert McNamara, pledged for more aggressive measures to reduce poverty 
(Black 2007; Ebrahim 2005). The refocusing of priorities, however, did not imply the 
abandonment of the economic growth objective or the adoption of radical policies. 
Much to the contrary, initiatives aimed at fulfilling basic needs were technocratic and 
apolitical, and did not challenge social, political and economic systems. Arguments in 
favour of attending to basic needs even focused on their expected economic benefits, 
such as increased productivity (Ebrahim 2005: 36-37). Another notable characteristic 
of development aid was also that it was being increasingly provided as soft loans 
                                                                                                                                         
countries to export their products abroad, and not necessarily a benefit for the beneficiaries. Put 
differently, tied aid is never impartial. 
26 Some authors, such as Palma (1978) claim that it would be more appropriate to refer to a “dependency 
school” rather than to a “dependency theory”, given the variety of positions among the scholars who have 
studied dependency.  
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(whereas the Marshall plan had been largely financed through grants), to the point that 
in 1970, the IBRD “received more in debt service on past loans than it disbursed in new 
loans” (Wood 1986: 77). 
3.2.3 The debt crisis and Structural Adjustment Programmes 
A turning point for the Third World were the oil crises of the 1970s, when a group of 
oil-rich developing countries united under the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) banner formed a cartel, leading to a sharp increase of oil prices. As a 
result, a handful of Middle Eastern states suddenly transitioned from a situation of 
“underdevelopment” to one of extreme wealth, and reassessed their power relations 
with oil-importing countries. While the move demonstrated that developing countries 
were not necessary hopeless and that there were alternatives to the “Western” way of 
development, it also resulted in a worsening of the situation for those developing 
countries which could not count (at least not at the time) on an oil-extracting industry 
(Black 2007). Many of the latter experienced difficulties in their balance of payments, 
and had to resort to external debt, while OPEC countries, flooded with oil dollars, 
gained a prominent place among development donors (Wood 1986).  
In parallel, another group of former developing countries – dubbed as the “Newly 
Industrialising Countries” (NIC) – experienced rapid economic growth even in the 
absence of oil resources. The NIC most notably included the four Asian “tigers” (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) (Black 2007: 24). Meanwhile, African and 
most Latin American countries were facing economic decline, and were accumulating 
massive debts (in some cases taking out new loans to pay interest on pre-existing 
ones). Due to increasing interest rates, several countries – Mexico being the first in 
1982 – defaulted on their loans (Wood 1986; Black 2007). Debt renegotiations in the 
early 1980s substantially hardened the conditions for the lenders. The IMF and the 
World Bank required developing countries to adopt extensive packages of reforms – 
which go under the name of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) –, consisting 
mainly in the reduction of state budgets and privatisation of formerly public services. 
Presented as apolitical, technocratic solutions to economic problems (Wood 1986), 
SAPs were actually informed by the same neoliberal agenda that was being 
implemented by the US under Reagan and by the UK under Thatcher, to name the 
most relevant advocates of these policies (Black 2007). Rather than putting into 
question the established practices of development and the relationships among 
developing countries, industrialised donors, and multilateral organisations, the debt 
crisis had the paradoxical effect of consolidating the “aid regime” (Wood 1986: 313).  
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Meanwhile, the neoliberal emphasis on downsizing state apparatuses and outsourcing 
service provision to private actors presented an opportunity for NGOs to gain a more 
prominent place in the development arena. The number of international and local 
development NGOs increased exponentially, and so did their capacity to attract more 
and more institutional funding. Edwards and Hulme note that the proportion of aid 
from OECD-DAC donors “channeled through NGOs rose from 0.7 percent in 1975 to 
3.6 percent in 1985” (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 962). NGOs did not only fit well in an 
environment that was supportive of non-state actors, they also seemed to be 
particularly well placed to bring about “participation”, which was gaining relevance as 
a development discourse (Edwards 2005; Lewis and Kanji 2009). For a while, NGOs 
were acclaimed as the “magic bullet” (Vivian 1994) that could fix development. The 
trend continued well into the 1990s, although gradually the limits of NGOs began to be 
recognised (Lewis and Kanji 2009).  
The 1980s had been a “lost decade” for development, during which there was little 
progress on either the economic front or the living conditions in most Third World 
countries. Furthermore, the value of debt repayments from developing countries to 
their creditors had been much larger than that of aid flows, despite the steady increase 
of the latter (Black 2007: 25). Towards the end of the 1980s, the attention of the 
development community moved towards considering a wider variety of elements apart 
from economic performance. The discourses of environmental protection and of 
sustainable development gained strength, and provided new sources of legitimation to 
NGO work (Ebrahim 2005). 
3.2.4 Development assistance after the Cold War 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between developing countries and the 
rest of the world changed significantly. During the Cold War it had been common 
practice, for both the Western and the Soviet bloc, to prioritise alliances over actual 
economic and socio-political record in the allocation of “aid” money. On the one hand, 
developing countries, and Africa in particular, rapidly lost their strategic importance, 
and thus the capacity to attract external aid. On the other hand, however, the new 
geopolitical scenario gave donors more leverage, making aid conditionality – the 
option of disbursing or withdrawing development aid based on a country’s 
performance – more credible (Ake 1996; Dunning 2004). Indeed, “good governance” 
has become a key theme of development policy since the 1990s, with more attention 
given to structural reforms. 
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The end of the Cold War also meant that the capitalist/neoliberal paradigm, which had 
already been dominating development policies, remained virtually unchallenged as 
even former communist states opened to markets. At the same time, and despite the 
prominence of economic arguments in the development debate, the equation of 
economic growth with development became increasingly contested, as GDP per capita 
alone could not account for differences in living standards worldwide. Drawing on the 
work of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, the UN launched in 1990 the “Human 
Development Index” (HDI) –, a composite index meant to take into account different 
aspects of wellbeing: health, education, and income (UNDP 1990). The three 
dimensions were intentionally given the same weight in the calculation of the index, to 
underline that wealth alone could no longer be considered ad a proxy for development 
(Sagar and Najam, 1998).  
The turn of the millennium represented a major milestone for development policy, as 
for the first time, a set of goals – known as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) – was agreed upon at global level. The eight goals were inspired by a 
multidimensional vision of development, reminiscent of the 1970s focus on “basic 
needs”.27 Each goal is accompanied by one or more quantifiable targets to be achieved 
by the end of 2015, with a baseline set in 1990. For instance, the target for goal number 
three, “reducing child mortality”, is to reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among 
children under five years of age. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on 
the success (or not) of the MDGs, there is substantial agreement that they have 
contributed to shaping the development agenda in the last years (e.g. Clemens et al. 
2007; Kenny and Sumner 2011), as well as provided effective tools for advocacy, 
including on previously neglected themes such as child mortality (Lancet Commission 
2010). 
Another feature of development policy in the third millennium has been an increased 
attention towards aid effectiveness. Through a series of high-level forums, consensus 
was built around a set of key principles, centred around the idea that aid recipient 
governments should become the key actors in the formulation and implementation of 
development policies (OECD 2011). This was the first attempt of development actors 
                                                
27 The eight MDGs are to: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary 
education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve 
maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental 
sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development (UNDP 2010). 
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and stakeholders at agreeing upon a set of guiding principles – something that the 
humanitarian sector had had since at least the mid-1990s. As opposed to the 
humanitarian principles, however, the aid effectiveness ones did not formalise an 
existing norm, but introduced a new framework, substantially different from prevailing 
practices of development. In the light of the emphasis placed on receiving countries, 
aid delivery through “budget support” gained popularity. In essence, budget support 
consists of predictable contributions to a government’s state budget (or, in the case of 
sectoral budget support, to that of a given ministry) for the implementation of a 
development-oriented programme, usually with some form of conditionality (Koeberle 
et al. 2006). 
3.3 Two sides of the same coin 
As a result of their different paths, humanitarian and development action have 
remained differentiated until today, despite being both inspired (or at least justified) 
by solidarity with other human beings, and being often implemented by the same 
actors.28 In this section, I will give an account of what humanitarian and development 
action are in contemporary practice, highlighting common aspects as well as major 
differences.  
A useful analogy to explain the relation between humanitarian and development action 
is that of an hospital: the priorities and working styles of an emergency room surgeon 
and those of the doctor specialising in the treatment (or prevention) of a chronic 
disease are clearly different, yet both work to improve patients’ health, and can be 
legitimately called colleagues. Furthermore, there will be occasions in which their 
paths will cross; for instance, when the two will happen to be treating the same patient, 
even if for two unrelated pathologies. In short, humanitarian action incorporates much 
of the “emergency room” attitude, i.e. trying to save lives and operating quickly; 
whereas development action aims with a range of interventions at improving the living 
conditions of its beneficiaries. Yet, much like the doctors in the analogy, they often 
operate on the same “patient”, even though not necessarily at the same time.  
                                                
28 Although normally motivations other than pure solidarity often play a role in the decision to provide aid 
and other forms of cooperation. 
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3.3.1 Ideal types of humanitarian and development action 
My aim here is to provide a brief description of the two modalities of action. I will start 
by outlining the main characteristics of each ideal type of action, highlighting the main 
differences between the two, and then proceed to examine the common aspects. It is 
useful to start by outlining two very simplified and juxtaposed ideal types of action (see 
figure 2 below). In this exercise, I will take into account three main aspects, where 
differences are particularly noticeable: objectives, guiding principles, and operational 
frameworks.  
 
3.3.1.1 Objectives 
As mentioned above, a first, major difference lies in the overall objectives of the two 
types of intervention. Humanitarian action, particularly if intended as “emergency 
humanitarianism” (Barnett 2011: 37-38), has the clear aim of saving lives and reducing 
suffering. Even by accepting the broader notion of “alchemic humanitarianism”, the 
objective is still limited to the eradication of the causes of suffering and, by extension, 
to the prevention of future disasters. By definition, the objectives of humanitarianism 
– both emergency and alchemical – are met whenever all people are able to survive 
with dignity, regardless of how this achievement was brought about. Provided that 
those basic needs are met, humanitarianism is compatible, at least theoretically, with 
any socio-political system or rate of economic growth.  
By contrast, the objective of development action is development itself, which is 
problematic as a number of competing views exist over what development is, or should 
be (see also chapter 1). As Chambers (2004) put it, development could be just about 
any type of good change, which obviously encompasses the most disparate views over 
what is “good”. Another problem arising from the genesis of the “development” 
concept is that it leaves room for interpretations of the process as a necessary sequence 
Figure 2: Ideal types of action. Source: Author 
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of events that might be slowed down or accelerated, but that will have to happen 
(Sumner and Tribe 2008).  
As I have shown in the previous section, for decades the idea that development is, in 
essence, economic development, has been dominant. This conception is, however, 
increasingly challenged by views that development should aim at poverty reduction, if 
not at its elimination altogether, something that does not automatically follows from 
the experience of economic growth (Toye 2010). It is also increasingly common, 
particularly following the MDGs,29 to frame development as the achievement of a 
discrete set of goals, which brings it closer to some forms of humanitarianism.  
In other words, humanitarian action must address suffering and possibly prevent it 
from happening in the future, including, but not necessarily, through structural 
changes. Development action, on the other hand, must spark off some kind of change 
(in terms of income, or living standards) and in doing so it might as well contribute to 
the reduction of suffering. In both cases, the main objective of one type of action is a 
possible, but not necessary, side-effect of the other. 
3.3.1.2 Guiding principles and discourses 
Guiding principles are of the utmost importance, as they constitute and reflect norms 
and values, which can shape the institutionalisation of practices from a normative 
perspective (Scott 2008b). The sets of principles adopted by humanitarian and 
development organisations have different scopes and reflect fundamentally different 
priorities. Even if they are rarely followed to the letter, principles are relevant because 
they contribute to define what is legitimate, and therefore to shape action. At the same 
time, principles can (and are) “interpreted and reshaped” (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 
2002: 493) though everyday practice. It can be argued that the persistence of two 
separate, and in partially mutually contradictory, sets of principles for humanitarian 
and development action contributes to perpetuating the separation between the two. 
As anticipated in chapter 1, as well as in section 3.1 above, the humanitarian 
community grounds its actions on the principles of humanity, impartiality, 
independence, and neutrality. What is relevant to note here is that these principles 
stem from the ones elaborated by one major player, the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, which has embodied the so far hegemonic approach to (emergency) 
                                                
29 At the time of writing, talks are being held to discuss the “Sustainable development goals” (SDG), or the 
framework that has been envisioned to replace the MDGs after the 2015 deadline. 
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humanitarian action (Barnett 2011). Nevertheless, as Hugo Slim (1997) noted, there 
has been some leeway in the interpretation, let alone implementation, of these 
principles.  
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (henceforth “Code of 
Conduct”, IFCR and ICRC 1994) is a non-binding document to which hundreds of 
humanitarian organisations worldwide have signed up. Donor organisations 
represented in the OECD-DAC group have formalised their own commitment towards 
humanitarian principles in 2003, through the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) 
initiative. In both cases, signatories include organisations with a dual humanitarian-
development mandate, which raises the question of whether they think the code is 
applicable to the whole of their activities, or only to humanitarian ones (and how do 
they tell the latter from the former). 
It is worth noting that the humanitarian principles are particularly functional to 
providing relief in the context of international conflicts, to which International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies. In such circumstances, humanity refers to the duty 
to provide relief to the suffering; being defined as a duty, it implies a corresponding 
right to intervene. In order for doctors and nurses to gain access to the wounded in 
combat, it was necessary to ensure that they would support none of the parties to the 
conflict (principle of neutrality), that they would provide care to any injured person 
solely on the base of needs (principle of impartiality) and regardless of any external 
pressure (principle of independence). In other words, humanitarian principles are 
critical for the fulfilment of ICRC’s mandate, and indeed, much of the ICRC’s work 
revolved around the promotion of the advancement of IHL. The strength of this 
discourse is such that isomorphism can be seen not just among NGOs based in 
Western countries, but also among Southern NGOs. The latter have been complying 
with prescribed norms and procedures, and have adopted the language of 
humanitarianism to enhance their own legitimacy. Even organisations that do not fully 
agree with all the tenets of mainstream humanitarian doctrine cannot fully disengage, 
as their own structures are embedded in the system (Donini 2010).  
It is worth noting that the Code of Conduct does not explicitly list the principle of 
neutrality, that is the prohibition of taking sides in hostilities, while it is present in 
both the Red Cross Movement’s own principles and in the more recent GHD initiative. 
The Code of Conduct only includes a watered down obligation of not considering the 
adherence (or lack thereof) of the affected populations to political or religious opinions 
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held by the humanitarian organisation when taking decisions on aid allocation. This 
resonates with Hugo Slim’s (1997) observation that relief agencies have abandoned 
neutrality, either because they misunderstand the concept as “indifference”, or because 
they see it as unfeasible.  
More recently, consensus has been built around the principle of “do no harm”, which 
Mary B. Anderson (1999) has borrowed from medical ethics. The “do no harm” 
approach is featured in the SPHERE handbook (SPHERE 2011), and has also been 
adopted by a number of major humanitarian players including UNICEF, the ICRC, 
OXFAM, and Save the Children. There are in fact numerous examples of relief turning 
out to be damaging its own intended beneficiaries; a case in point is humanitarian 
supplies being diverted and used to support militias, leading to the continuation of 
conflicts – and thus human suffering – that may have otherwise come to a halt. At the 
same time, it must be recognised that the “do no harm” principle bears the risk of 
providing a justification for disengaging from complex crises.  
On their side, development actors do not have such strong guiding principles as 
humanitarians do. It is only in the last decade that the principles of aid effectiveness 
have been formally adopted, and they have been reworked over the years since the first 
formulation in the Paris Declaration. The most recent formulation (Busan Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation, 2012) settles for four main elements:  
1. Ownership of development priorities by developing countries; 
2. Focus on results; 
3. Partnerships for development; 
4. Transparency and shared responsibility.  
It is worth noting that these principles have been negotiated by donors (governments 
and multilateral institutions) and recipient governments, together with a handful of 
civil societies organisations, while some NGOs have denounced the fact that they were 
not involved in the process (Concord 2008). As a consequence, they are applicable to 
external aid (including when implementation is sub-contracted to NGOs), but not to 
the entire domain of actions undertaken with the aim of promoting development. This 
means that their scope is not universal as that of humanitarian principles, which aim at 
guiding any instance of humanitarian action. Even if the aid effectiveness principles 
were applicable also to activities carried out by NGOs with private funding, as argued 
for instance by Koch (2008), they still differ from humanitarian ones for being geared 
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towards supporting recipients in implementing their own development-oriented 
policies.30  
In other words, development action does not aim at following any of the humanitarian 
principles. It cannot be neutral, as it sides openly with a government (or other local 
partner), and not with others. It is not bound to impartiality, as need is not the main 
rationale for the decision to provide assistance (or not); development action can only 
be as impartial as its counterpart chooses to be. Furthermore, development action does 
not have to be independent nor humane, although it might be. Similarly, humanitarian 
action might take into consideration local priorities, focus on results, establish 
partnerships and promote mutual accountability, but none of these elements is 
essential. In other words, there can be instances in which a given course of action 
ensures the respect of both humanitarian and development principles alike; however, 
this alignment would not happen because of some feature of the principles themselves, 
but despite them. The fact that humanitarian and development actions are guided by 
fundamentally different norms contributes to the institutionalisation of a two-pronged 
aid system in the normative domain, by promoting contrasting discourses of 
legitimacy. 
3.3.1.3 Operational frameworks 
An element that corroborates the humanitarian/development distinction refers to 
eligible countries and situations. Development action can only be provided to countries 
meeting – or better, not meeting – a certain number of characteristics, mostly related 
to economic development, and which have presented a development strategy deemed 
acceptable by the donor. If bilateral relations are strained for any given reason, 
however, there may not be any agreement, and thus, no assistance. Humanitarian aid, 
in turn, does not imply acceptance of the local government’s policies, and can be 
delivered everywhere provided that some minimum conditions are met. These 
conditions refer mainly to the possibility of directly accessing people in need, and to 
the absence of major aid diversions. In addition, humanitarian aid may be provided, in 
theory, also to industrialised countries, if struck by a disaster they are unable to cope 
                                                
30 Even though it can be argued that donors can shape the way development policies look like, by 
influencing the debate and, potentially, by refusing to finance anything that does not comply with their 
own views.  
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with. Therefore, there can be (and there are) situations in which only one type 
assistance can be provided.31  
Another evident dissimilarity between the two kinds of action, which directly descends 
from the different operational settings and objectives, is in the timeframes of action. 
Humanitarian projects generally cannot last for more than twelve months,32 while 
development ones normally last about three years, and often more than that, as 
promoting structural change is reasonably considered to be a longer-term task. There 
are cases in which humanitarian assistance has been provided to a given community 
for years if not even decades in case of protracted crises. Even in those cases, however, 
it is not the deadline of each project that gets extended, but “new” projects are 
elaborated year after year, ideally taking into account the variation of needs. 
Furthermore, as a result of the fact that humanitarian projects are often “emergency” 
response, the approval mechanisms for humanitarian funding are normally 
streamlined to ensure rapid disbursement of funds, at least if compared to 
development projects. The time between the first submission of a proposal and the 
actual launch of a humanitarian project can be as short as a few days or weeks after a 
disaster is declared, and normally it does not take more than a few months; whereas 
the same process for a development proposal may even take years. It is worth noting 
that timeframes for implementation are included as clauses in funding contracts, and 
therefore operate as regulative elements. As such, they influence the 
institutionalisation of the humanitarian-development dichotomy on a different level 
than discourses, which operate in the normative domain. 
Not surprisingly, also the type of activities and services delivered by humanitarian and 
development actors are often different, and conform to often contrasting views of what 
is appropriate. By and large, humanitarian actors try to fulfil their mandate by 
ensuring that basic needs are met, such as providing food to the hungry, shelter to the 
homeless, or medical care to the sick. Nowadays, most humanitarian organisations 
                                                
31 For instance, the European Commission does not provide any humanitarian aid to Eritrea – even 
though there are humanitarian needs – on the grounds that humanitarian space is not being respected 
(European Commission 2014). The same institution, through its development arm, does however finance 
projects in the country, which have been agreed upon with the government.  
32 It is normally possible, however, to ask for an extension of the project, or to get funds for a similar one 
year after year. As a result, humanitarian action is being provided year after year in chronic crises. 
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refer to the SPHERE “Minimum Standards” which provide clear and quantified 
guidance on what each person should be entitled to in order to survive with dignity. 
Others (Dufour et al. 2004) criticise the Standard’s blueprint approach, which could 
result in distortions in humanitarian practice – such as providing assistance in a 
culturally-insensitive fashion, or not responding to needs in situations where it is clear 
that standards cannot be met – and argue that SPHERE responds more to the 
concerns of Western/Northern aid agencies than to the priorities of affected 
populations. 
Development actors often despise the supply-driven, band-aid approach of 
humanitarians, and try to address underlying problems with a range of interventions, 
shaped according to the nature and scale of the identified problem and the mission and 
vision of the implementing organisation. The variety of possible approaches is reflected 
in the amount of different types of activities which can all be counted under the label of 
“development”: large infrastructural projects; monetary contributions to a State’s 
budget; service provision (such as education or healthcare) at local level; micro-finance 
schemes; advocacy and promotion of human rights; just to mention a few.  
3.3.2 Common aspects  
Despite the above-mentioned differences between humanitarian and development 
action, the two also share some common aspects and can sometimes overlap, even if 
they are undertaken with different objectives. For instance, cash distributions can be 
carried out as an emergency response to a shock in which people have lost their source 
of income (e.g., with a natural disaster or with displacement) or as a development 
initiative aimed at preventing further descent into poverty (safety nets). In such cases, 
even though the activities look similar, the rationale behind targeting of beneficiaries 
can be different, reflecting different priorities. Here I will focus on two main aspects 
under which the differences between humanitarian and development action are less 
pronounced: actors and tools.  
3.3.2.1 Actors 
A common aspect of both humanitarian and development assistance is that they are 
made possible by private and public donations – ultimately, they both originate from 
the same pockets (of taxpayers and of magnanimous citizens). Even from a financial 
point of view, public contributions for both humanitarian and development purposes 
are both accounted as Official Development Assistance (ODA). To be sure, ODA is 
framed in terms of fostering economic development, humanitarian aid is typically 
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included in ODA statistics. These flows include also resources given by official agencies 
to NGOs to carry out development or humanitarian activities (see also definitions in 
chapter 1).  
What is more, these funds are often administered by the same donor organisations, 
even though there are often different units in charge of humanitarian and development 
activities, respectively, as it happens for example in the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID). One notable exception is represented by the 
European Commission, which has two separate Directorate-Generals (DGs), one 
dealing exclusively with Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) and 
another for Development Aid (DG EuropAid, also known as DEVCO), with completely 
separate decision-making processes. In the past, however, the distinction was 
sometimes blurred by the appointment of a single Commissioner (equivalent to a 
Minister) for both DGs. Sometimes, Italy being the case in point, the structure 
overseeing external aid – the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation 
(Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, DGCS) – is part of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may jeopardize the neutrality, impartiality and 
independence of humanitarian decisions, as foreign policy considerations may be 
prioritized. In contrast, the German Foreign Office, which is responsible for 
humanitarian funding, operates independently from the Ministry of Development 
Cooperation, and even the Minister of Foreign Affairs officially only has limited 
influence on its funding decisions.  
As far as implementing partners are concerned, there is also a good deal of overlap. In 
both areas, particularly after the 1980s, NGOs are key players. Whereas some NGOs 
specialise in either humanitarian or development assistance, others have a “dual 
mandate”, meaning that they operate both as humanitarian and as development 
agencies according to the context. On this respect, Donini (2010) recognises four main 
types of NGOs, of which only one (which he refers to as dunantist, from the name of 
the founder of the Red Cross) limit their scope to humanitarian assistance alone. All 
other NGOs are characterised by considerations other than respect of humanitarian 
principles: wilsonian ones are aligned with their home country’s foreign policy; faith-
based organisations refer to religious values as their founding principles; solidarist 
NGOs promote human rights alongside strictly-speaking humanitarian action. 
Similarly, Dijkzeul (2004) recognise that not all “humanitarian” NGOs are equal even 
in the application of two of the core humanitarian principles: independence and 
impartiality. His typology, reproduced in figure 3 below, shows that there is a 
considerable amount of variation even among the largest international NGOs. Only the 
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ICRC (which is not technically an NGO but holds a special status) is fully independent 
and impartial, with MSF following suit. All other NGOs are, in general, open to 
implementing some kind of development activity, and are more keen to be influenced 
by their national governments or influenced by(other) government donors.  
 
 
The fact that humanitarian organisations can and do differ from each other on so many 
aspects, is not just a matter-of-fact observation that defies isomorphism, but has an 
effect on humanitarian action. As pointed out by Heyse (2006), NGOs operating in the 
same context, but with different identities, tend to adopt different decision-making 
strategies and end up with different aid chains and outcomes. 
It is relevant to note here that a number of organisations have expanded their mandate 
over time. For instance, NGOs such as Save the Children, OXFAM or CARE were 
founded as emergency humanitarian organisations dealing with wartime hunger, and it 
is only during the Cold War that they have added development initiatives to their 
mandates. The same holds true for UNICEF. Interestingly, at certain points in time the 
development mandate has come to overshadow the humanitarian one. For instance, 
Vaux (2001) recalls that when the mid-Eighties Ethiopian famine was unfolding, 
OXFAM had been reluctant to intervene with emergency relief because that type of 
Figure 3: A Mental Map of NGOs. Source: recreated from Dijkzeul (2004: 218) 
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action did not quite fit into the organisational values of the time, which favoured 
development.  
Furthermore, even when an organisation remains strictly on one side of the 
humanitarian-development divide, it can still have staff members with working 
experience in the other side, and therefore exposure to different discourses of 
legitimacy. Moreover, also the final beneficiaries of the two types of aid may, in some 
cases, be the same communities, which can lead to humanitarian and development 
organisations discussing and possibly coordinating aspects of their activities. In 
addition, humanitarian and development workers operating in the same area — and 
expatriates in particular — are likely to spend part of their free time together, and will 
probably get familiar with other organisations’ activities, which might contribute to 
increasing mutual understanding , thus possibly favouring more interactions across the 
divide. 
3.2.3.2 Tools 
The fact that humanitarian and development aid are funded by the same donors and 
implemented by the same (or similar) actors makes the adoption of comparable tools 
and procedures more likely. This is true in particular of tools related to the tools 
required to account for the use of public money, which go under the label of “new 
public management” (Barnett 2011: 215). The adoption of such instruments is not of 
course limited to aid, as most public funding, including in the academic research field, 
has similar requirements. One telling example is that the unit of funding is almost 
universally the project. Although there is some degree of variability, formats for project 
proposals are often very similar, especially if issued by the same agency. As a result, 
familiarity with donor requirements and project management tools is relevant to all 
NGOs, regardless of whether an employee has gained that experience on the 
humanitarian or the development side. This in turn contributes to the establishment of 
a larger organisational field, where the distinction between humanitarian and 
development action is blurred.  
In terms of common tools, one in particular has gained almost universal acceptance: 
the logical framework, frequently referred to as logframe. The logframe is a matrix 
that shows the overall aims (or general objective) to which a project contributes, the 
specific objective that the project will attain if everything goes well, the results or 
intermediate outcomes that will be produced, and the activities The logframe matrix 
also indicates the objectively measurable indicators for each of the steps, as well as the 
sources of such information, and includes a column on assumptions and risks – what 
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should and should not happen, respectively, in order for project activities to go as 
planned. An example of logframe, in this case a template from the European 
Commission is reproduced in figure 4 below. Other donors have adopted slightly 
different versions of logframe.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The logframe was introduced in development programming 1990s, and by the 
following decade it had become the norm in any project proposal, only recently 
challenged by the emergence of the so-called theories of change (e.g., Valters 2014). 
The logframe has been criticised for its deterministic underpinnings that do not 
recognise the complexity of development processes, for being a burden that requires 
specialsed staff and interferes with the provision of development and humanitarian 
services, and for not being useful during the project implementation phase, once the 
funds have been granted, except for reporting purposes (Wallace et al., 2006). Despite 
its shortcomings, the logframe has been adopted en masse by NGOs, as major donors 
require it in the applications for funding.33  
                                                
33 However, a community of aid workers – arguably those who have been trained during the 2000s – has 
emerged, for whom the logframe is no longer just a tool, but the only way to correctly organise and present 
project information. 
Figure 4: Typical Structure of a Logical Framework Matrix. Source: Recreated 
from European Commission (2004: 58) 
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At the same time, the plain fact that most (if not all) large NGOs adopt similar 
practices – particularly logframes – does not necessarily imply that they are all the 
same, much less that structure wins over agency. A number of scholars have set to 
explain instances of organisational choices that do not follow passively – or even 
overtly contrast institutional pressures. In Oliver’s (1991) typology, passive compliance 
is simply one extreme along a continuum of different responses to institutional 
pressure, with active manipulation as the opposite extreme. Oliver assumes that the 
greater the gains (in terms of legitimacy or of resources) that derive from adhering to a 
given standard, the more likely compliance becomes. Similarly, if an institution exerts 
a high degree of control over an organisation, the latter will be more prone to conform 
to the rules. Consistency between organisational and institutional goals is yet another 
factor that would enhance the possibility of non-confrontational compliance. When, 
instead, there is a multiplicity of stakeholders with different requirements, or the 
degree of enforcement is low, other strategies might be pursued, from seeking 
compromise to avoid the implementation of a given norm (or implementing it only as a 
façade), to overtly challenging its value or trying to change it (Oliver 1991: 160-171). 
Following Oliver, Ohanyan’s (2009, 2012) network analysis shows that NGOs 
supported by more donors, and with their own independent goals, tend enjoy more 
power and independence than those dependent on only one or two funding sources, or 
that have adopted the same view as their donors.  
The logframe has brought a significant degree of uniformity in the way projects are 
conceived and represented to the prospective donor. The use of a common tool implies 
that humanitarian and development workers have to come to terms with it, and even 
more significantly, that they end up giving value to the same competences, enhancing 
the possibility of project management staff to work in either “side” of the divide.  
3.4 Discourses of “bridging the gap” 
This section discusses some of the main debates and approaches to bridge the gap 
between humanitarian and development action. As previously seen, humanitarian and 
development action evolved as two separate domains during the Cold War, even though 
the linkages between crisis and structural poverty became increasingly clear. These 
linkages became particularly evident in Sen’s (1981) groundbreaking work on poverty 
and famine, which shifted the attention from food availability to access to food 
(“entitlement approach”). By pointing to the socially determined lack of capacity of 
some groups to gain access to sufficient food, Sen was able to explain the occurrence of 
famines in situations of overall normal or even above-normal food production. Yet, 
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relief interventions continued to focus mostly on the provision of food and other life-
saving items. Lautze and Raven-Roberts have explained that “concerns that livelihoods 
interventions could conflict with humanitarian principles” (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 
2006: 388) and the identification of livelihoods as part of the development, post-crisis 
domain reified this distinction between the two domains. 
The two sides operated rather separately until the end of the Cold War, when the 
challenges posed by reconstruction rekindled the contention over the meaning of 
humanitarianism (Barnett 2011). Open discussions on “bridging the gap” humanitarian 
and development action, or “Linking Relief and Development” (LRD) gained strength 
in the early 1990s. The emergence of arguments in favour of better integration between 
the two domains was mostly related to two elements: the growing realisation of the 
linkages between poverty and vulnerability to crises, and the emergence of “complex 
humanitarian emergencies” in which the boundaries of humanitarian action were being 
overstretched. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet bloc also implied the fall of the 
distinction between Soviet clients only eligible for humanitarian assistance, and 
Western allies where both humanitarian and development aid could apply as 
appropriate. 
Interestingly, it was mostly humanitarians who took part to the debate, whether in 
favour or against LRD (Harmer and Macrae 2004; Buchanan-Smith 2005), with 
limited involvement of development scholars and practitioners. Among the possible 
reasons for this neglect was the fact that development actors were not interested in 
working in crisis contexts: “Relief aid was deployed in many protracted crises because 
donor governments wished to avoid engaging with states that were perceived to be 
repressive or undemocratic, that were belligerents in active conflicts, or that were 
subject to massive corruption” Harmer and Macrae (2004: 3). Additionally, I suggest 
that humanitarians have invested more energy in the debate because it questioned the 
applicability of their fundamental principles, whereas – at least when the debate 
started – the development arena did not even have any formalised principles at all. 
The early arguments in favour of LRD were built along the understanding that there is a 
somewhat linear progression from crisis through various stages of recovery towards a 
stable situation where development can take place. Traditionally-conceived 
humanitarian and development action focused only on the two ends of this continuum, 
leaving a “gap” in between, sometimes referred to as “grey zone”, that had to be bridged 
(Crisp 2001). However, the linearity of the continuum was soon recognised as an 
oversimplification (Anderson and Woodrow 1988). Moreover, the linear approach 
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received criticism for aiming to restore the pre-crisis situation, thus failing to recognise 
the endogenous factors that contributed to the crisis, as well as that lasting 
development also depends on geopolitical factors.  
Some emergency humanitarians simply rejected the idea that relief and development 
should be bridged. This position has been summarised as “back-to-basics”, as opposed 
to a “broader” conceptualisation of relief (Jackson and Walker 1999). The main 
argument of back-to-basics humanitarians is that broadened relief can result in an 
erosion of the humanitarian principles (Macrae 1998). As discussed above, when 
humanitarian actors have to work more closely with development ones, they run the 
risk that priorities are being set for political reasons, or that beneficiaries are selected 
for considerations other than their needs. This can cause political opposition and 
threaten both access to people in need and security of humanitarian workers and aid 
recipients. However, Barnett (2011) questions the view that this was the first time 
humanitarian agencies were confronted to dilemmas regarding the limits of their 
actions. Through his work on the history of humanitarianism, he had in fact 
demonstrated that there had been clashes over principles before, as well as that 
alchemical or dual-mandate organisations had been delivering both types of assistance 
all along. He agrees, however, on the fact that the 1990s saw an unprecedented 
“identity crisis” among humanitarians (Barnett 2011: 268).  
Overall, however, there has been little agreement on what a non-linear LRD would 
entail in practice (Jackson and Walker 1999). Over the years, different frameworks 
aimed at promoting integration between humanitarian and development action have 
been conceived, among them the European Union's “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development” (LRRD), and the UN’s “Early Recovery”. While none of these two 
frameworks has actually been mainstreamed, the idea and hopes behind integration 
have survived. Recently, the growing popularity of “resilience” thinking has raised 
expectations that it might eventually be the key to successfully “bridging the gap” (IRIN 
2013; IFRC 2012). In the following sections, I will provide an overview of these three 
approaches, which all imply some degree of integration between humanitarian and 
development action 
3.4.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)  
The concept of LRRD was coined in the mid-1990s by the European Commission (EC 
1996), and eventually adopted by its implementing partners, as well as some member 
states. Until the early 2000s, the term was relatively common within aid agencies and 
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think tanks based in Europe. Despite becoming part of the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship Initiative and being used by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, LRRD has 
almost disappeared from the vocabulary of the aid community, as “resilience” has 
become increasingly common. Even the European Commission has resorted to 
“resilience” to label its recent “SHARE” and “AGIR” initiatives,34 aimed at facilitating 
the transition from relief to development in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region 
respectively. During internal discussions or interviews with fellow practitioners and 
experts, EC officials often refer to those initiatives as “LRRD”, but the acronym is 
nowhere to be found in the information material published on the European 
Commission's webpages. 
The LRRD approach was conceived after roughly a decade of debate on the necessity to 
overcome the compartmentalisation of aid between humanitarian relief and 
development aid, and to work more on rehabilitation (Moore 1998). The expression 
itself indicates that it was envisioned with the linear continuum concept in mind. Even 
though the European Commission rejected the linear model (EC 1996), project 
proposal formats issued by ECHO referred to LRRD as the “Continuum strategy” at 
least until 2011. This seems to indicate an understanding of LRRD as a linear process, 
despite declarations to the contrary, was still rather common within the institution 
itself.  
While contrasting views even originated within the organisation that developed the 
concept, confusion reigned among implementing partners. Misled by its ambiguous 
name, some practitioners dismissed LRRD as unrealistic on the grounds of its 
perceived linearity. For some field staff, less exposed to theoretical debates than 
colleagues in headquarters, or working for organisations funded by donors other than 
the European Commission, LRRD was just a vague acronym. As will be shown in the 
empirical chapters, most of the NGO staff interviewed in Ethiopia was in favour of 
humanitarian organisations transitioning to development assistance, but no one ever 
framed these activities in terms of LRRD.  
In addition, there is little agreement on who should be ultimately responsible for 
LRRD. As the debate has mostly taken place among humanitarians, they share a 
widespread belief that development agencies should become more humanitarian, or at 
                                                
34 Which stand for “Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience” and “Global Alliance for Resilience 
Initiative”, respectively. 
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least bear a larger share of the LRRD burden, rather than vice-versa: “We still believe 
that the main responsibilities […] lie with the development side of the house” 
(interview EC_12_001). 
Several institutional gaps, however, hinder the implementation of LRRD approaches. 
The first institutional gap is the absence of an international body, or convention, 
responsible for ensuring that LRRD is put into place at a global, or at least regional, 
level. The communications issued by the European Commission on LRRD (EC 1996; EC 
2001) notably aimed to set a standard not just for European institutions, but also for 
individual European countries in their bilateral humanitarian and development 
initiatives. Nevertheless, LRRD’s domain has remained rather limited to the relevant 
European Commission’s Directorate Generals, ECHO for humanitarian assistance and 
DEVCO / EuropeAid for development cooperation. Secondly, even ECHO and DEVCO 
lack instruments, and often the will, to ensure compliance. For example, until 2011 
ECHO required humanitarian agencies to indicate an “LRRD strategy” in funding 
proposals, but in daily practice considerable discretion existed regarding what was 
accepted as viable. A third, major institutional gap is the fact that most donors, 
including the European Commission itself, have different organisational structures for 
humanitarian and development aid. While this responds to the different characteristics 
and objectives of the two types of aid, it certainly makes it more difficult to ensure their 
integration.  
The persistence of the separation is recognised by ECHO officers as well, albeit 
sometimes in positive terms, in the sense that the organisation did not compromise its 
humanitarian principles and integrity. After the Lisbon treaty entered into force, ECHO 
managed to prevent its integration into the newly created “External Action Service”, 
which oversees development policy as an element of foreign policy. Even at the field 
level, ECHO often maintains a separate office, while development cooperation is 
managed by the local EU Delegation. Quite often, NGO personnel refer to EuropeAid as 
“the European Commission” (or even “the European Union”), and to DG ECHO as 
ECHO, failing to notice that both are part of the Commission operating at the same 
level. Thus, LRRD also falls in between the cracks in the very institution that launched 
it. More generally, the institutionalised linkages between development and 
humanitarian organisations are weak. In the DRC in 2011, for example, the World Bank 
did not participate in formal and informal coordination meetings with the main 
humanitarian donors, DG ECHO, USAID/OFDA, and DFID. 
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3.5.2 Early Recovery 
“Early Recovery” is a concept developed by – and overwhelmingly used within – the 
UN system, as part of the humanitarian reform launched in 2005 (see section 3.1.3 
above). One of the eleven clusters devised with the reform is dedicated to Early 
Recovery, under the lead of the United Nations Development Programme. The choice 
of placing this responsibility with a development agency is peculiar, as the general 
trend has been for humanitarian agencies take the lead on integration. 
Conceptually, early recovery is defined as “a multidimensional process guided by 
development principles that begins in a humanitarian setting, and seeks to build on 
humanitarian programmes and catalyse sustainable development opportunities” 
(CGWER 2008: 9). It officially – and ambitiously – aims to generate self-sustaining, 
nationally owned processes for post-crisis recovery, encompassing the restoration of 
basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule of law, environment 
and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations. The 
concept of early recovery particularly addresses the importance of reinforcing local 
capacities is emphasised from the beginning of a humanitarian operation.  
Similarly to LRRD, early recovery has the drawback of implying a linear or parallel path 
between a humanitarian crisis and development. In addition, it mainly focuses on post-
crisis recovery, but rarely addresses issues like integrating crisis-prevention 
mechanisms and DRR into development action. Still, the concept of recovery is so 
broad that the early recovery cluster tends to become the “what else needs to be done 
during and after the crisis” cluster (e.g., Calvi-Parisetti 2013). In this sense, the broad 
concept of early recovery remains quite undefined.It has functioned primarily as a way 
of framing activities, strategies and approaches that take place in humanitarian and 
transitional contexts; its added value is often not clear (Bailey et al. 2009). 
A major reason for the difficulty to apply Early Recovery is that its conceptualisation, as 
well as its realisation, is dominated by UN agencies, as it is the case for the entire 
cluster system. So far NGOs have been rather marginalised in this process as they were 
in the whole process of humanitarian reform, which was reflected by the composition of 
active global partners of the IASC Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery. The whole 
concept and its application were highly dependent on UN bureaucratic structures and 
funding mechanisms. This UN-led process and concept, as well as pressure from 
donors, created risks for NGOs, as they can become exposed to instrumentalisation, 
when UN agencies become driven by the political agendas of the (main) member states, 
in particular those in the Security Council. In addition, member states also approve 
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programs, provide—earmarked and other—funding, have great influence on high-level 
personnel appointment, and officially set policy for all UN bodies. 
This fear of instrumentalisation is probably one the main reasons why NGOs are still 
keeping their distance towards the concept of early recovery and its application 
although it offers a good opportunity to respond to the humanitarian critique (Bailey 
2011: 9). Finally, the establishment of an Early Recovery cluster for each given crisis is 
not automatic – all remaining clusters are supposed to integrate Early Recovery into 
their planning, but the Humanitarian Coordinator can decide whether a dedicated 
cluster is also needed. All in all, implementation of and compliance with early recovery 
policies have been limited. 
3.5.3 Resilience 
The concept of resilience has gained prominence in aid debates, and is often used to 
advocate better integration between humanitarian and development efforts (among 
donors, DFID 2011, European Commission 2012, USAID 2012, and among UN 
organisations, OCHA (no date) and UNDP 2012). The term, borrowed from ecology and 
psychology, slowly gained popularity in disaster studies in the 1990s, but has been used 
since the 1940s (Manyena 2006). During the last decade, and especially after it became 
one of the goals of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005), resilience has become 
ubiquitous humanitarian jargon. In line with the Hyogo Framework, but in contrast 
with LRRD and early recovery, it also includes pre-crisis activities, including DRR and 
prevention. 
The popularity of resilience is so impressive that some observers argue that it may well 
be the next development buzzword (Grünewald and Warner 2012). Yet, like most 
buzzwords, it is quite “fuzzy” and likely to be defined and interpreted in different ways 
by different actors (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Cornwall 2007). Resilience “puts the 
agency of those most in need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of 
empowerment and capacity-building” (Chandler 2012), thus marking a difference with 
bridging-the-gap frameworks, where the focus is mainly on the organisations providing 
external assistance. However, when resilience is presented in terms of something to be 
built, the main agent still tends to be an external actor.  
In this dissertation, I focus on the use of the concept of resilience to inform aid 
programmes, and particularly as a way to bridge humanitarian relief and development 
cooperation, but reference will also be made to resilience as a characteristic of societies, 
regardless of external “resilience-building” interventions. 
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Despite its wide use in policy forums and academia (e.g., Chandler 2013a; Ponomarov 
and Holcomb 2009), there is little agreement on what resilience means in practice; its 
fuzziness constitutes a knowledge gap. A commonly used definition of resilience 
developed by the ICRC (2012) refers to “the ability of individuals, communities, 
organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying 
vulnerabilities to: anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from, the 
effects of adversity without compromising their long term prospects.” This definition is 
very broad. It covers the whole range of activities from disaster preparedness to post-
disaster development, but does not provide detail on what (building) resilience means 
in practice.  
A major source of confusion in the use of resilience is related to its literal meaning: the 
word comes from the Latin resilio, which means “to jump back” (Manyena 2006: 433) 
and returning to a previous state. This concept is problematic when referred to people 
and communities who survived a crisis. Here, bouncing back would often imply 
returning to the very situation of vulnerability from which disaster unfolded (Manyena 
2006, 2012), which is far from ideal. Understanding resilience as “bouncing back” 
bears the risk of favouring quick disaster-response solutions based on providing 
supplies to ensure pre-disaster levels. However, this ignores the legitimate aspiration of 
affected people not just to go back to normal, but to improve their living conditions 
(Manyena 2006). Alternatively, and moving away from the literal meaning of the word, 
resilience can be understood as “capacity to bounce forward” (Manyena 2012), a notion 
that implies change and adaptation.  
In response to the lack of conceptual clarity, Bourbeau (2013: 8) identifies three 
different strands of resilience thinking, the first one (“engineering resilience”) related 
to the idea of bouncing back, the second (“ecological resilience”) defined as “the 
capacity of a system to experience disturbance and still maintain its ongoing functions 
and controls”, and the third (“socio-ecological resilience”) related to the capacity of self-
reorganisation. The latter is closer to “bouncing forward” and is arguably the type of 
resilience that humanitarians and development workers would like to see, but the 
popularity of alternative meanings in other disciplinary fields adds to the confusion.  
The relationship between resilience and vulnerability is also conceptually problematic. 
Vulnerability is a key concept that has revolutionised disaster studies since the 1970s 
(e.g., Bankoff et al. 2004). Before, disaster risk was mostly framed in terms of hazard 
(event), while it is now widely accepted that vulnerability is what makes a hazard into a 
disaster. Often, resilience is conceptualised as the opposite of vulnerability: the more a 
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system is resilient, the less vulnerable to shocks it will be, and vice-versa. However, 
Manyena (2006) suggests that the two concepts could be viewed as discrete entities, 
thus allowing the possibility of vulnerable systems that are also resilient.  
Additional ambiguity has been identified by Brand and Jax (2007), who listed ten 
different nuances of resilience, broadly falling into three categories: descriptive, 
normative (or “boundary object”), and hybrid. While descriptive resilience is a 
measurable variable, defined as the magnitude of disturbance that a system can absorb, 
normative resilience is a very generic and desirable goal or approach, close to the idea 
of “sustainability” (another development buzzword). The use of the word resilience in 
the humanitarian field tends to be normative, as something inherently good. Yet, such a 
normative content does not automatically foster critical analysis of its contents (cf. 
Harrell-Bond 1987: 26). 
Resilience gained prominence in 2005, when the United Nations Assembly approved 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (United Nations 2005). However, as was the case with 
LRRD and Early Recovery, there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance. Resilience has become institutionalised in the sense that many 
humanitarian and development agencies now feature resilience departments, employ 
resilience advisors, or have included resilience building into their strategic plans (e.g., 
UNDP 2013). Whether or to which extent they are able to achieve an impact “on the 
ground” with these policies remains an open question. Being a prominent theme on the 
global development agenda does not automatically translate into more resilient 
communities. 
One of the major limitations of resilience is that, similarly to LRRD and Early Recovery, 
it does not fit into either the traditional relief or development budget lines. Still, 
compared to one or two decades ago, there are now more funding channels that can 
(also) be used for building resilience, such as Climate Change Adaptation or Disaster 
Risk Reduction budget lines, and the EC-led “Resilience” initiatives in protracted crises 
(the afore-mentioned SHARE and AGIR initiatives). Nevertheless, the usefulness of 
these instruments also depends on how they are designed and managed. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented an overview of the evolution of discourses and norms 
related to humanitarianism and development action, as well as a description of the 
frameworks that have been suggested to bridge the gap between the two. In neo-
institutionalist theory, in fact, the normative pillar is crucial for defining values are 
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legitimate and acceptable. In addition, norms and values also contribute to shaping 
identities and beliefs that, once internalised, act at the cultural-cognitive level.  
The mainstream view of humanitarianism, based on the fundamental principles of 
humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, clearly reflects the hegemony of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and of the emergency/dunantist 
approach to humanitarianism. Yet these principles were not the only ones constitutive 
of humanitarianism, as alternative discourses – in particular the “alchemical” desire to 
address causes of suffering apart from its symptoms – were present since its infancy 
(Barnett 2011). Nevertheless, humanitarian principles have become part of a 
humanitarian identity, to the point that they have been accepted also by dual-mandate 
organisations as their guidance in how to conduct during humanitarian crises. 
Development action, in turn, has been built upon rather different foundations. First, 
there was the belief that providing external investments would promote economic 
growth – for long synonymous with development – which in turn would help poorer 
countries catching up with the more industrialised ones, included in terms of standards 
of living. In the following decades, more attention was given to the problem of how to 
reduce or eliminate poverty, and development practices turned to fulfilling basic needs. 
Despite subsequent evolution of development thinking, views of development as 
growth is still present. Crucially, the development community never actually built an 
identity as strong as the humanitarian ones, with its principles of aid effectiveness only 
being introduced in the 2000s. 
I argue that principles, and particularly humanitarian ones, have played a role in 
reinforcing, and possibly institutionalising, the view that humanitarian and 
development action are two separate domains. Indeed, criticism from emergency 
humanitarians has been a permanent feature of any attempt to “bridge the gap” with 
development. In chapter 5, I will analyse how these conflicting discourses of emergency 
versus alchemical humanitarianism influence everyday practice of humanitarian action 
in the Ethiopian context. Before presenting the empirical material, however, I will turn 
to the history of humanitarian crises in Ethiopia. 
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Chapter 4. Ethiopian food crises 
 
As I have argued in chapter 2, Ethiopia makes a critical case study for linking relief and 
development, as it provides a setting where both humanitarian and development 
action take place, often simultaneously. Therefore, arguments insisting on the 
fundamentally different settings of humanitarian and development action do not 
necessarily apply in this context. Furthermore, as humanitarian crises – and food 
crises in particular – have proven to be recurrent in Ethiopia, humanitarian 
organisations are often involved in the country over a number of years, when not 
decades, thus invalidating the “humanitarian as short-term intervention” idea.  
In the first part of this chapter, I present a brief historical overview of food crises in 
Ethiopia, focussing in particular on the ones that happened after the Second World 
War. After a digression on the structural causes of famines, I will proceed to examine 
the dynamics of aid provision in Ethiopia. The final part of this chapter is dedicated to 
the description of the 2011 food crisis and of the related humanitarian response. This 
will serve as a general background to the empirical research, which will be the subject 
of chapters 5 and 6.  
4.1 Historical overview of food crises in Ethiopia  
The purpose of this section is to put the 2011-2012 food crisis, which is at the centre of 
this research, into broader historical context. Mass starvation, in fact, is not a recent 
development for Ethiopia; on the contrary, it appears to have punctuated its history all 
along. Kiros (2006), for instance, finds that the earliest references to starvation 
following a crop failure in what is now Ethiopia date back as early as 253 B.C.; whereas 
Pankhurst (1985), in his work on famines and epidemics prior to the XX century, 
considers some legendary accounts referring roughly to the period between 831 and 
849 as the earliest evidence of famine in the area. However, more reliable records of 
famines and other calamities are only available from after the establishment of the 
Ethiopian Empire in the XII century, and particularly from the XV century onward 
(Pankhurst 1985; Kiros 2006).  
Therefore, even though it is likely that famines afflicted Ethiopia even before, the 
following historical overview will start from the Imperial times, providing an account 
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of frequency and characteristics of famines, as well as on any sort of relief measure 
undertaken. A caveat is necessary here, because, as pointed out by Kiros (2006: 11) it is 
impossible to judge whether the reported events would qualify as famines today. In 
fact, most historical documents do not contain accurate estimates of mortality – 
sometimes the only indication is that many people had perished, or that the suffering 
was widespread. Furthermore, the Amharic language even lacks an equivalent of the 
term “famine” itself, which is usually referred to with the same word used to indicate 
“hunger”, rehab. However, notes again Kiros, the fact that these events of starvation 
were considered worth being included in chronicles can be taken as a proxy of their 
magnitude.  
4.1.1 Famines before the twentieth century 
According to Kiros (2006:13-14), an appalling series of famines characterised the rule 
of Ethiopia’s first imperial dynasty, the Zagwe, who ruled between the the XII and the 
XIII centuries, and in the following decades under early Solomonic rule. 35  In 
particular, there would have been as many as five famines between 1252 and 1275, an 
average of about one every five years. However, Kiros duly notes that records do not 
provide sufficient details on the type and magnitude of such calamities. In fact, the lack 
of information on famines in the XIV century is likely to be due to the overall scarcity 
of historical documentation, rather than to an exceptional period of plenty. It is 
therefore safe to assume that famines and other pestilence continued to happen, yet 
went unrecorded (Zewde 1976: 52). With historical records increasingly becoming 
richer and more reliable, there is progressively more documentation available on the 
catastrophes that affected Ethiopia.  
Pankhurst (1985: 25-27) brings evidence of at least two epidemics that happened 
during the fifteenth century, a pestilence that occurred around 1435 (although 
probably earlier), and a major one towards the middle of the century, under the reign 
of Emperor Zara Yaeqob;36 the latter also mentioned by Kiros (2006:14). Although it is 
impossible to make an estimate of the death toll of this disease, whose nature is not 
known, according to Pankhurst it might have been one of the worst in Ethiopian 
history. Various accounts agree on the fact that people were decimated to the point that 
there was hardly anyone left to bury the dead. Interestingly, among references to 
                                                
35 The Solomonic dynasty took power in 1270.  
36 Also spelled “Yaicob”.  
  83 
religious ceremonies and temples built to appease the wrath of God, there is mention 
of the fact that the emperor ordered that the dead be properly buried – a sensitive 
measure of public health ante litteram. 
The situation was not bound to improve any soon. “No less than six famines and nine 
major epidemics seem to have ravaged the country during the sixteenth century and 
the first decade of the seventeenth”, notes Pankhurst (1985: 28). Descriptions of causes 
and effects of famines also became more accurate. Some, for instance, were triggered 
by droughts, such as one that took place around 1540, or the extended failure of rains 
for three year in a row around 1559. Invasions of locusts were also rather frequent, 
particularly in northern provinces of the Empire. Portuguese missionary Francisco 
Alvares (quoted in Pankhurst 1985: 32-33) described the sight of people who, having 
lost everything to the locusts, tried to reach safety in some place spared by the plight: 
The people were going away from this country, and we found the 
roads full of men, women, and children on foot, and some in their 
arms, with little bundles on their heads, removing to a country where 
they might find provisions (it was a pitiful sight to see them). 
It is difficult not to note the eerily resemblance between these words and contemporary 
accounts of disaster-induced displacement. Similarly, reports of spikes in food prices, 
or the adoption of coping strategies such as eating roots resonate with the more recent 
past. Kiros (2006) and Zewde (1976) also observe that wars, particularly the one from 
1528-1543, had a devastating impact on the country, which added up to “natural” 
causes of starvation. Soldiers were described to be even more devastating than locusts, 
because they would not just seize crops from the fields, but would also confiscate any 
supplies kept at home. As far as the provision of relief is concerned, early accounts are 
remarkably rare. Imperial chronicles, for instance, note that emperor Galawedos “fed 
his entire people as a father feeds his son” during a famine that took place in 1543-44 
(Conzelman 1895, quoted in Pankhurst 1985: 33).  
Accounts written by Portuguese Jesuits are remarkably more detailed in the 
description of various plagues and their consequences. They detail, for instance, yet 
another invasion of locusts, noting that the insects began to appear in late 1626 and 
continued to ravage the fields throughout 1627. However, from the account of Father 
Almeida (as quoted by Pankhurst 1985: 39) it is clear that their impact was not 
homogeneous, for they did not cause much damage in Gojjam (north of present-day 
Addis Ababa), while destroying the province of Bur near the Red Sea (in what is now 
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Eritrea). Father Almeida also described the mass arrival of thousands of people to the 
Emperor’s residence, noting that many more had died along the way, and that those 
who arrived were in desperate conditions. The emperor ordered the distribution of 
grains and valuable cotton cloth, but above all, he ordered the survivors to be relocated 
in different districts, where they would have to be fed until they recovered (Pankhurst 
1985: 40-41). Furthermore, foreign Jesuit priests where reportedly providing handouts 
to the destitute, as well as converting them to Catholicism.  
Epidemics and famines similarly characterised the Gondarine37 period, which goes 
from 1635 to about 1750. Kiros (2006:12) lists ten periods of drought or famine during 
this era, although he does not provide further details. He specifies that little is known 
about the larger socio-economic consequences of these events, 38  but that it is 
reasonable to assume that they had negative impacts on the whole society (Kiros 2006: 
15). Pankhurst (1985: 51) presents evidence of a famine in 1636, during which prices of 
grain went up about five times compared to normal times, and many heads of livestock 
perished. According to Pankhurst, another period of famine, which affected the entire 
country, took place in 1706. The emperor of the time, Iyasu I, is said to have provided 
relief to the starving who gathered in Gondar for about two months, while others’ 
needs were being catered for by other aristocrats. Two successive invasions of locusts 
in 1747 and 1748 brought once again starvation to Ethiopian people, affecting 
inhabitants of both highlands and lowlands. As in previous instances, chronicles do not 
provide details on the number of the affected, but merely state that there were not 
enough survivors left to bury the dead.39 The famine was followed by an epidemic of 
influenza; similarly, other diseases, included smallpox, would often spread after 
famines (Pankhurst 1985: 52). The following century, known as the age of the princes 
as the empire was merely a façade (Marcus 1994), was similarly punctuated with 
calamities. In particular, famines broke out in 1752, 1772-73 (known locally as “my 
thinness”), 1788-89, which affected all the provinces, and 1796, this time following yet 
another locust invasion (Pankhurst 1985: 52). Furthermore, various plagues continued 
to affect the country throughout the first half of the XIX century, including a deadly 
                                                
37 The period is named after the capital of the empire was moved to the city of Gondar (also spelled 
Gonder), founded by emperor Fasiledes around 1636 (Markus 1994: 41) 
38 This might be related to the fact that the main sources of the period were imperial chronicles.  
39 This argument of not being enough people to bury the dead might as well be a literary topos, as it is 
found also in reference to the epidemic that took place in 1434, under emperor Zara Yaeqob.  
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combination of cattle disease, loss of crops, famine and cholera epidemics that took 
place in 1828-29 (Kiros 2006: 15).  
4.1.2 The “evil days” of the 1888-1892 famine 
Another famine, this time of impressive proportions, broke up again in 1888, a few 
decades after the restoration of the Empire,40  and remains known as the Great 
Ethiopian Famine, or kifu wan (“evil days”) in Amharic (Zewde 1976: 52). 
Documentation on this event is plentiful, and allows for tracing the multiple 
concurrent causes of the catastrophe. One of these causes, and the most widely 
referred to, is the epidemic of rinderpest that broke out in 1887, and which might have 
been spread by infested cattle imported by the Italians (Zewde 1976; Kiros 2006). 
Horses and mules had in fact been shipped to the port of Massawa, in today Eritrea, 
which had recently fallen under Italian control, and were used in their colonial 
expeditions towards the coastal lowlands. The rinderpest epidemic was particularly 
virulent, and from the north quickly spread throughout the entire country, reaching 
the neighbouring Somali region as well (Pankhurst 1985: 58-59). Various accounts of 
the time testify of the severity of the rinderpest, which would cause the death of almost 
entire herds in matter of days. According to some estimates of foreign visitors to 
Ethiopia, only about 7 to 10 percent of the heads of livestock survived (Pankhurst 1985; 
Kiros 2006). Understandably, the cattle disease inflicted a heavy toll on pastoralist 
populations, as it destroyed their sole source of livelihoods (Zewde 1976: 54).  
The cattle epidemic coincided with a period of drought and unusually hot weather 
throughout the country, which led to harvest failure in agricultural areas. Crop 
production was also being harmed by the lack of oxen – decimated by the rinderpest – 
for ploughing. Some farmers reportedly stopped working their land altogether, 
particularly among formerly pastoral populations, the Gallas, who had recently taken 
up agriculture, “and knew no other agricultural implement than the plough” 
(Pankhurst 1985: 69). To add more misery to an already bleak situation, large swarms 
of locusts and caterpillars also contributed to the devastation of the fields. By 1890, in 
the words of Italian diplomat Pietro Antonelli: 
it is one continuous desolation. Except between Harar and Burka 
where there are still a few inhabitants and occasional areas of 
                                                
40 In 1856, one prince, Tewdoros, had managed to establish his rule over all of Abyssinia, and eventually 
became the “first emperor of a new age” (Markos 1994: 68) 
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cultivation, the remainder up to Menta Cara in Minjar is absolutely a 
desert; no more inhabitants, no more cultivation, no more flocks, but 
low acacias and tall grass rendering the beautiful valleys of Chercher 
and the Ittu unrecognisable (quoted in Pankhurst 1985: 70) 
Yet, as Zewde (1976: 54-55) observes, the various plagues that affected the country, 
while being critical to triggering the catastrophe, constitute only one part of the story. 
The other element of the recipe for the disaster, often overlooked in official chronicles, 
were the socio-economic conditions of the peasant populations. Peasants were, for 
instance, required to devolve half of their produce, and sometimes even more, to the 
landlords, technically in exchange for the seeds that they had planted. Left with barely 
the minimum necessary to feed their families, peasants did not have any surplus to 
withstand adverse weather events or other calamities, which themselves were not rare. 
The landlords, instead, always had more than enough to eat, and would even pride 
themselves of feeding the starving – yet the produce being distributed had likely been 
harvested by the same people who were now begging for alms.  
In such a situation of chronic food insecurity, any external shock could easily 
precipitate the conditions of the poorer population. And external shocks that time were 
particularly hard and unusually occured simultaneously. In particular, the combination 
of the rinderpest and of the harvest failure (which as seen above where interrelated), 
together with the bad road conditions hampering trade, led to generalised scarcity of 
food supplies. As a result, prices of available commodities rose dramatically. Even in 
the relatively accessible port town of Massawa, food prices doubled between 1887 and 
1888. In the interior of the country, instead, the reported prices for cereals in 1890 
were a staggering one-to-two hundred times the value recorded only one year previous. 
Price dynamics were also negatively influenced by people stockpiling large quantities 
of grain for speculation purposes, a behaviour that was only put to a halt by the 
imperial order of confiscating all concealed grains. Livestock prices also skyrocketed, 
up to a forty-fold increase in the case of cattle (Zewde 1976; Pankhurst 1985). 
The magnitude of this crisis was such, that even richer people, since then relatively 
unaffected by famines, reportedly faced hunger or had to sell all their possessions in 
exchange for food. A priest who had lived in Ethiopia for twenty years, recounted that 
while having seen several occurrences of the various calamities that periodically 
affected the country, from locusts invasions to conflicts to epidemics, he had never 
witnessed anything comparable to the what he saw during the Great Ethiopian Famine. 
No province was spared the devastation. To make things even worse, towards the end 
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of the famine, in 1892, the country was ravaged by yet another plight of locusts and by 
an invasion of rats (Pankhurst 1985). The horrors and misery were such, that they were 
difficult to describe, although some accounts can be found in poems and songs 
(Pankhurst 1985: 74-80). Lasting five years in total, the famine is estimated to have 
caused the death of approximately one third of the Ethiopian population of the time, or 
about 3-4 million people. Death was not always caused by starvation itself, but also by 
the epidemics of typhus, cholera and dysentery that accompanied it (Kiros 2006: 16; 
Zewde 1976: 57; Pankhurst 1985: 89). Furthermore, many people abandoned their 
lands to search for food somewhere else – not always with success (Pankhurst 1985: 
93-97).  
As far as relief was concerned, Emperor Menilek, who had ascended to the throne in 
1889 following the death of emperor Yohannes (Markos 1994: 89), opened his 
granaries to the destitute. As thousands of starving people were reaching Entoto in a 
desperate search for food, a building was erected to host them, and the emperor 
himself is said to have personally distributed injera.41 Yet, imperial granaries were 
depleted after just a year of famine, to the point that lucky were those who received a 
piece of injera large as a hand. Local chiefs were also giving away large quantities of 
grains. Menilek also established a policy of austerity at court, reportedly abstaining 
himself from beef for three years – although a banquet including red meat was given 
on the occasion of the moving of the capital to the recently built city of Addis Ababa 
(Pankhurst 1985: 98-102). Furthermore, believing that the cattle disease and the 
resulting famine were due to the wrath of God, the emperor ordered his subjects to 
pray – and once the situation appeared to be spiralling out of control, he even scolded 
them for not being praying enough (Zewde 1976: 52-53). Menilek also tried to 
encourage his subjects to work the land even in the absence of any oxen, setting the 
example by showing how to hoe the soil with a axe (Pankhurst 1985: 102-103). Despite 
the buzz around humanitarianism in Europe, there is no indication of relief coming 
into Ethiopia from abroad, with the exception of some missionary congregations trying 
to alleviate the suffering of those around them. 
 
                                                
41 The typical spongy bread made from the flour of a cereal named teff, which constitutes the staple of the 
Ethiopian diet.  
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4.1.3 The 1972-74 famine and the end of the empire 
Repeated periods of drought and famine continued to plague Ethiopia also in the XX 
century, although with far less intensity than during the “evil days”. An average of 
about one occurrence of drought and famine per decade is reported by Kiros for the 
period between 1900 and 1970 (2006: 12), although not many details are provided. 
Kiros only mentions that some of the major famines that happened during these 
decades were localised to a few provinces of northern Ethiopia, and particularly to 
Tigray (Kiros 2006: 17). Plenty of documentation exists, instead, on the major famine 
that took place in the early 1970s, and which would lead to the end of an almost 
millenary empire, whose history had only been interrupted by a few years of Italian 
occupation.42 The 1972-74 famine was related to the drought that swept across the 
Sahel in the early 1970s, triggering the so-called “African food crises”. Causing the 
death for starvation of an estimated 100,000-200,000 people and affecting several 
millions (Kumar 1990: 187-188; Kiros 2006: 18), this was the most severe famine in 
Ethiopia since the “evil days”, and is still remembered as worse than the more recent 
famine of the mid-eighties (Gill 2010: 31).  
Far from affecting the entire Ethiopia, the crisis was rather localised, affecting in 
particular the north-eastern provides of Wollo, which suffered the most, and Tigray, as 
well as part of the south-eastern region of the country. Wollo and Tigray experienced 
the failure of the main rains – known as kremt – in mid 1972, and exacerbated by the 
near total failure of the belg rains, expected in spring 1973. While Wollo was 
undoubtedly suffering, the rest of the country was by then relatively unaffected. Once 
rains came back to the North East with the 1973 kremt season, the drought moved 
southwards, taking hold of the eastern province of Hareghe, which is known today as 
Somali region (Holt and Seaman 1976; Sen 1981). Given the temporal sequence of the 
crisis, Sen (1981: 87) argues that there were actually two famines, whereas Kumar 
(1990) refers to two “phases”. 
While the drought had an almost immediate negative impact on food production in 
Wollo and other of the most affected areas, agricultural yields in other parts of the 
country were normal, with even some localised pockets of surplus production (Holt 
and Seaman 1976; Hussein 1976). It follows that the root causes of widespread 
                                                
42 The Italian fascist regime occupied Ethiopia in 1936. After five years of exile, former emperor Haile 
Selassie, with assistance from the British government, successfully managed to be reinstated as the 
legitimate head of Ethiopia in 1941 (see for instance Markos 1994).  
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starvation had to be identified in factors other than drought and subsequent crop 
failure. Not unlike the previous generations, peasants were still oppressed by a semi-
feudal system, in which they had to surrender to their landlords – and to a lesser 
extent to the church – a substantial portion of their produce, which left them prone to 
starvation even in “normal” years. The recent introduction of commercial farming and 
mechanised techniques in the late 1960s also played a role, as it resulted in the eviction 
of both peasants and pastoralists from lands suitable for cash crops (Hussein 1976). 
Another element of vulnerability was related to price dynamics, with cereals becoming 
more expensive following the failed harvests, while the relative value of livestock 
decreased (Holt and Seaman 1976; Sen 1981). All the while, the rural rich were able to 
take advantage of the market situation, accumulating land and cattle that poorer 
people were selling to purchase food (Hussein 1976: 15).  
All this contributed to a situation where subsistence farmers had no food on their own, 
and no money to purchase it from the markets. Pastoralists were doubly affected by the 
loss of livestock – due to a combination of drought and lack of access to the best 
grazing lands – and by the devaluation of the surviving animals; as a result, they were 
not able to purchase sufficient food. Miller and Holt, in a conference paper presented 
only one year after the end of the famine, observed that people had “died in Ethiopia 
not because of an extreme shortage of food, i.e. famine, but because of an extreme 
shortage of money, i.e. poverty” (Miller and Holt 1975: 170). The first signs of distress 
became apparent when people – mostly Afar pastoralists – were seen lining the 
highway that transverses Wollo from North to South, stopping vehicles to ask for food. 
Others set up to reach Addis Ababa to receive assistance from the court, following a 
somewhat established pattern – “the Ethiopian tradition of mass supplication”, as 
defined by de Waal (1997:107). By December 1972, a thousand refugees from Wollo 
were receiving assistance from the Ethiopian Red Cross in Addis Ababa (Holt and 
Seaman 1976; Sen 1981: 87).  
The mounting of an adequate relief response was hindered by the authorities, who 
despite having had early warning alerts on the deteriorating situation did not take any 
countermeasure (Holt and Seaman 1976; Sen 1981), and even covered up reports about 
the crisis to avoid “political embarrassment” (De Waal 1997: 107). The government 
started to take action in April 1973, with the formation of a National Drought Relief 
Committee (Miller and Holt 1975: 169) and the establishment of relief camps in the 
famine-stricken areas. These structures were however understaffed and did not have 
sufficient resources to attend the needs of the displaced, mainly “women and children 
from the surrounding agricultural lands” (Holt and Seaman 1976: 4). At the peak of the 
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famine in August 1973, over 60,000 people were living in overcrowded camps 
equipped to deal with less than 20,000, while many more had moved to towns.  
International humanitarian actors initially did not take action, possibly out of fear of 
straining relations with the government. A UNICEF report detailing the plight of the 
starving in Wollo in August 1973, which had caused the anger of government officials, 
was later rejected also by the organisation’s headquarters in Geneva with the 
motivation that data were unreliable. There is evidence that the U.S. Embassy had 
informed its government of the deteriorating situation, and the same might be true of 
other diplomatic missions, yet no official reaction followed. It was only in September 
1973, after the broadcasting of a very graphic documentary shot in Wollo and titled The 
Unknown Famine, that the world became aware of what was happening, unleashing a 
wave of charity donations (Gill 2010: 30; Kumar 1990). When international relief 
finally arrived to Wollo in late 1973, however, the worst had already passed. Many had 
left the relief camps, whose population had decreased to a more manageable 15,000 
people. Nevertheless, relief efforts concentrated in the northern regions, largely 
ignoring the needs in Harerghe, which had become the epicentre of the second phase 
of the famine.43  
The famine, or as accurately pointed out by de Waal (1997: 108), the symbolism related 
to a regime insensitive to the suffering of its subject, would eventually lead to the end 
of the Ethiopian empire. The revolution was not led by the famine victims, but by a 
largely urban, intellectual movement of students and junior army officers. These 
groups used the famine both for discrediting the government and to reinforce their 
own image of proponents of social justice. Their actions included exhibitions of 
pictures of the starving, to call out the denial of the government, as well as protests 
over the lack of relief. Particularly telling of this symbolic use of famine was the fact 
that, the night before deposing the emperor in September 1974, the revolutionaries 
broadcasted on Ethiopian television an edited version of the documentary The 
Unknown Famine, in which the images of the starving in Wollo were contrasted with 
footage of the luxurious life of the emperor and the aristocracy. To reach the masses 
                                                
43 Sen (1981: 88) points out that the patterns of food aid distribution were not related to needs. Out of 
12,000 tonnes of food distributed by the government by November 1973, only about 6,500 tonnes reached 
Wollo, which was suffering the most. Equally startling is the fact that the much larger donations received 
between November 1973 and December 1974, amounting to about 126,000 tonnes of food, were sent 
predominantly to Wollo and Tigray, whereas only a tiny percentage reached Harerghe, by then the most 
affected area.  
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who did not own television sets, public screenings of the documentary were organised 
(Gill 2010: 35; De Waal 1997: 108). In its early days, indeed, the revolutionary 
government – later known as Derg – showed commitment to changing the situation 
that had led to famine, for instance by setting up a committee of inquiry on the causes 
of famine, as well as a largely independent agency to oversee relief distribution, known 
as the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). One of the first major measures 
taken by the new socialist regime was the abolition of the feudal system with the land 
reform approved in March 1975 (De Waal 1997).  
From the perspective of a scholar analysing the links between relief and development, 
it is relevant to note how the research produced on the wake of the famine, as well as 
the first measures undertaken by the government, all point to the necessity of 
addressing the root causes of vulnerability to food shocks. Miller and Holt (1975), 
writing shortly after the end of the crisis, after noting that some of the delays in relief 
provisions were related to the logistic constraints of buying and transporting large 
quantities of food, and that early warning systems were not sufficient to avoid another 
disaster, conclude their paper arguing that:  
[t]he most sensible method of preventing famine is to provide the 
peasant with the means to save himself. This would require an extent of 
development that might also reduce the annual toll of 500,000 deaths 
that occur in Ethiopia as a result of chronic undernutrition and lack of 
public health engineering, and which pass almost unnoticed (Miller 
and Holt 1975: 172) 
Unfortunately, their predictions about the risk of a new famine would prove true less 
than a decade later.  
4.1.4 The 1982-5 famine 
The famine that affected Ethiopia in the mid-eighties has been already briefly 
examined for its impact on the evolution of humanitarianism (see section 3.1.2.2 
above). Here I will focus on the internal dynamics of the catastrophe. It is difficult not 
note the paradox of a regime that came into power denouncing the inability of the 
emperor in addressing a famine, only to let its people starve again after less than ten 
years. One could conclude in a facile manner that the feudal system had been wrongly 
blamed for the peasant’s impoverishment, or that famines in Ethiopia are actually 
impossible to prevent. However, evidence suggests that also in this case, there were 
clear political responsibilities in the making of the crisis.  
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By the end of the 1970s, the Derg regime led by colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam had 
effectively created a new dictatorship, ruling by force and shattering the opposition 
under the so-called “Red Terror” (De Waal 1997; Marcus 1994). To avoid the risk of 
urban riots and insubordination among the military, the Derg established a system to 
ensure steady (and cheap) food supplies to the centre, to the detriment of the rural 
areas. No longer forced to devolve their produce to landlords, peasants were now 
obliged to pay heavy taxes and had to comply with a number of restrictions, most 
notably on trade and on migrant labour, two important sources of income. Ultimately, 
these policies resulted in a general impoverishment and increased vulnerability to 
shocks of the rural populations (De Waal 1997: 110-111). Adding to the destitution, 
were the conflicts that Ethiopia was fighting in the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden, 
as well as with insurgent militias in the north (Kumar 1990; De Waal 1997).  
The famine that eventually unfolded was not triggered by any massive drought or 
natural catastrophe. As observed by De Waal (1997: 122-120), rains had been overall 
normal in the previous years, with the exception of Tigray. By early 1983, however, 
signs of starvation started to appear, with destitute people reaching feeding centres for 
relief. At that point, the RRC – no longer the independent agency it once was – revised 
its previous statistics, claiming there had been a shortfall in production. This way, the 
government was able to claim that the crisis was a natural disaster due to drought. 
Ultimately, rains did fail in 1984, further aggravating an already severe situation, and 
giving credibility to the apolitical narrative of famine as a natural disaster. Yet, as de 
Waal points out, 
The principal cause of the famine was the counter-insurgency 
campaign of the Ethiopian army and air force in Tigray and north 
Wollo during 1980-1985. The zone of severe famine coincided with the 
war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with 
the major military actions (De Waal 1997: 115).  
Counter-insurgency techniques included restrictions on grain trade in Tigray, which 
led to heightened food prices, as well as the forced relocation of people, known as 
“villagisation”. The latter, whose implementation was entrusted to the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission, was justified as an attempt to provide rural populations 
with “modern” services. In practice, it consisted in forcing people to abandon their 
lands and settle in specifically created villages alongside the road, which would make 
for a much easily controllable population (Marcus 1994: 209).  
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In a move that tragically resembled the behaviour of the emperor and his court, the 
government initially refused to acknowledge the famine, and organised instead the 
celebrations of the ten years anniversary of the revolution. To prevent foreign 
dignitaries from viewing the effects of famine, groups of starving people who were – as 
usual – trying to reach the capital to obtain relief were intercepted before they could 
enter Addis Ababa. Foreign journalists were banned from visiting the northern 
provinces until about a month after the end of the celebrations (Kumar 1990; Gill 
2010). Yet there is evidence that despite the government efforts in covering up the 
famine, foreign governments and international humanitarian agencies knew what was 
happening. Indeed, the RRC itself had been issuing appeals for food aid all along, but 
these were usually downplayed by the FAO on the grounds of the lack of logistical 
capacities to deliver it (Kumar 1990). Similarly to what had happened in 1973-74, it 
was once again a documentary that would finally catch worldwide attention and 
unleash the outpour of relief money (see also section 3.1.2.2 above).  
The delivery of humanitarian assistance fell short of meeting the principles of 
impartiality and neutrality. Initially skeptical of foreign attention, the government soon 
turned international relief to its own advantage, diverting supplies to enforce its 
villagisation programme, rather than using it to feed the starving in Tigray (De Waal 
1997). On their side, insurgent groups in Eritrea and Tigray became the interlocutors 
for foreign agencies that actually wanted to deliver relief to these areas, although their 
primary objective was military and not humanitarian (Gill 2010). Eventually, the 
insurgents would have their victory, overthrowing the government in 1991. It is 
commonly accepted that, in this case as with the downfall of the emperor, the famine 
had played a major role in the mobilisation of forces against the government (Lautze 
and Maxwell 2007).  
4.1.5 Food crises in the 1990s and beyond 
The very fact that famines had contributed to the fall of two regimes within less than 
thirty years has made famine prevention – or better, famine avoidance – a key concern 
of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the party in power 
since 1991. To a certain extent, this anti-famine political contract has proven 
successful, for there has been no instance of famine in Ethiopia since then, despite the 
occurrence of several localised crises. In the 1990s, the main measures undertaken 
have been the strengthening of early warning systems and of an emergency reserve of 
food stocks. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was rebranded as Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Commission, signalling the shift from a predominantly 
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response mode to one of prevention (Lautze and Maxwell 2007). Furthermore, a range 
of policies were adopted, most notably the 1993 National Policy on Disaster Prevention 
and Management (NPDPM) (Lautze et al. 2009). However, Lautze and Maxwell (2007) 
observe that these efforts have been overwhelmingly oriented to the prevention of the 
famine as an isolated event, rather than to significantly improving the situation of the 
rural poor.  
Amidst the optimism that famine vulnerability could be reversed, an alarm bell was set 
off by the occurrence of a major crisis in 1999-2000, which affected pastoral areas of 
Somali region. The crisis had been triggered by erratic rainfall, which early warning 
systems, by and large set to detect changes in agricultural highlands, failed to 
anticipate. Furthermore, the emergency food stocks had not been replenished, which 
prevented the mobilisation of adequate food supplies in the first months into the crisis. 
As a result, malnutrition and mortality had a peak, as well as cattle deaths (Lautze and 
Maxwell 2007). It appeared that the government was more concerned with a war it was 
waging against Eritrea than with the plight of Somali pastoralists. On its side, 
international donors were also hesitant to intervene in support of a country at war, and 
did not trust the government. Indeed, international relief only took off after the end of 
the war in 2000 (Lautze et al 2009). The response was overwhelmingly food-based, 
with 10 million people across Ethiopia are reported to have received food assistance 
during 1990-2000 (Kiros 2006: 20).  
Contrary to an inaccurate narrative according to which famine strikes Ethiopia once 
every decade, new signs of distress have become evident as soon as mid-2002, 
following the failure of the belg rains in Afar and other pastoral regions. This time 
early warning systems worked better, but with hiccups particularly in politically 
marginalised areas such as the SNNPR regional state. Donor response was faster, 
possibly due to two foreign policy changes, the first being the end of the war with 
Eritrea, and the second the post-2001 positioning of Ethiopia as a key Western ally in 
the “war on terror”. The humanitarian response, however, was once again largely based 
on food aid, neglecting other needs, such as health care and access to water. 
Furthermore, once the crisis was over, aid agencies quickly returned to “development-
mode” as if nothing had happened in the previous couple of years (Lautze and Maxwell 
2007: 227-232).  
Internally, the crises led to a rethinking of the food security strategies, with the aim of 
tackling chronic food insecurity and decoupling it from emergency response. These 
efforts resulted in the ambitious Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) launched 
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in 2005. The PSNP aimed at providing a predictable supply of food assistance (either 
in kind or cash) to millions of chronically insecure, which would otherwise be counted 
as eligible for humanitarian food assistance year in and year out (Lautze et al 2009). 
The PSNP, which is still active, has received overall praise, despite reported 
shortcomings in its targeting system and in the predictability and of payments. 
Another weakness remains the low rate of people that successfully “graduate” from the 
programme, achieving food security (Berhane et al 2013). To date, these policies have 
successfully managed to avoid the occurrence of famine, even during the crisis of 2011-
12, which caused much less suffering in Ethiopia than it did in Somalia (where it 
reached the level of famine).  
4.2 Current understandings of famine 
Before delving into the details of the 2011-2012 crisis, which constitutes the case study 
for this research, it is worth clarifying the current understandings of famine, as well as 
its causation processes and larger implications.  
4.2.1 When is a famine a famine? 
Famine is a word that evokes biblical disasters, and in a broad sense indicates large-
scale starvation. But this word has also political implication, and its use is influenced 
by political considerations. Defining a situation as a famine, in fact, points at the 
failure of a government to protect its citizens, and it is not surprising that famines have 
been followed by the fall of a regime unwilling or unable to prevent the famine, as it 
was the case of Ethiopia in 1974 and in after the mid-eighties famine. Hence, it should 
not be surprising that governments, even if unable to prevent the famine-event, tend to 
be sensitive regarding the use of the famine-word. It is telling that the only recent 
instance of a famine that has been internationally and unambiguously recognised as 
such has taken place in Somalia, the quintessential failed state.  
The potential ambiguity of the word and the need to prioritise among different crises, 
as well as a general tendency towards standardisation, has prompted the need of 
defining clear thresholds. The United Nations and most humanitarian agencies 
adopted the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), which identifies five 
levels for the severity of the food security status, ranging from “generally food secure” 
to “famine / humanitarian catastrophe” based on various indicators. In this 
classification, a famine – or phase 5 – is described as a situation where: 
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• The mortality rate is more than four times “normal” levels, that is a crude mortality 
rate of two people per day out of a population of 10,000 (whereas the “normal” 
should not surpass 0,5 deaths), alternatively measured as a mortality of four of 
more children under five years of age per day in a population of 10,000; and 
• The prevalence of global acute malnutrition surpasses 30%, whereas in a food 
secure situation the value should remain below 5%; and 
• Over 20% of the households in the surveyed area are experiencing an extreme lack 
of food and other basic needs.  
While the current understanding is that all three criteria should be present for a 
situation to be defined a famine (IPC Global Partners 2012), there remains some 
leeway, particularly in case of localised pockets of starvation, which could meet the 
definition of famine if taken in isolation, but not if considered as part of a broader 
region. For instance, a few aid workers confidentially indicated that famine thresholds 
were being surpassed in some refugee camps hosting people who had escaped from 
Somalia; however, average values in the region were lower and thus not qualifying as 
such. Other factors that can play a role are the accuracy and representativity of the 
data. Ultimately, the decision of calling a famine a famine is taken on a case-by-case 
basis.  
4.2.2 Famine causation 
Until the 1970s, the dominant paradigm for understanding famine causation drew 
upon the work of Thomas Malthus, published at the end of the eighteenth century. He 
argued that since food production growth is slower than demographic growth, there 
will be a moment in which the food globally available will be not enough to feed all the 
human beings. Mass deaths by starvation will then bring back their number to a level 
compatible with food production. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
number of deaths by starvation during famines is less than it would be required to fulfil 
Malthus' prophecy (De Waal 1997). Nevertheless, the idea that famines are essentially 
inevitable, and that they are characterised by a general lack of food remained 
mainstream for a long time. After World War II, this approach provided the formal 
justification for North American (and in general western) agricultural surplus disposal 
in the form of food aid, although the real, “hard” reasons are to be found in donors' 
political interests, such as keeping the farmers’ lobby content (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005). 
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Even though the Malthusian approach was not (yet) formally challenged as a general 
theory, root causes of famine other than food scarcity were sometimes recognised and, 
in a certain number of cases, addressed. A significant example is provided by famine 
responses in India already under British rule. Along with provision of food rations, the 
Famine Codes and the Scarcity Manuals listed measures intended to protect the ability 
of purchasing food, like interventions in the grain market to cool down food prices, and 
public employment schemes (Drèze and Sen 1990). It is also relevant to mention the 
accurate analysis published by the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 
the immediate aftermath of the famine that hit the country in the mid-seventies 
(Hussein 1976), which showed that drought-induced harvest failure had been limited 
to certain areas of the country, while in others food production had been more than 
average. Other factors, such as land tenure systems and speculation were to be blamed 
for the disaster.  
There is now solid evidence base proving that mass starvation does happen when and 
where human action has created vulnerabilities, either by the deliberate denial of food, 
water or land to some groups (Edkins 2007), or as a consequence of unfair socio-
economic systems and relations which result in some people not having sufficient 
resources (Sen 1981). In other words, vulnerability to famine is man-made. In the early 
eighties, Amartya Sen – who would later be awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on 
welfare economics – developed a radically new theory understanding famine 
causation. His work “Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation” is opened by the following statement: 
Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food 
to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. 
While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many 
possible causes. Whether and how starvation is related to food supply 
is a matter for actual investigation (Sen 1981).  
Sen explained why some people sometimes go hungry (and why others do not) using a 
new concept, the “entitlement” to command food, i.e. the (legitimate) possibilities that 
an individual has to obtain food in a given society and in a given situation. Farmers 
who grow maize in their fields are normally entitled to eat at least a part of what they 
produce, wage labourers are entitled to get food in the markets in exchange for the 
money they earn, other individuals are entitled to the food voluntarily given to them by 
someone else (for example, young children or elderly people). Sen calls “entitlement 
failures” those situations, when one's ability or right to command sufficient food is 
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compromised. This is not only the case of the (subsistence) farmers losing their crops 
due to natural or man-made disasters, but it can also result from a change in the terms 
of trade (for instance, higher food prices, not accompanied by increase in wage levels), 
or by regulations limiting employment possibilities for some groups of people 
(restrictions to work-related migration, ban of female employment, etc.).  
Sen himself recognises that there are cases in which his entitlement approach is not 
(fully) applicable. The first exception is deliberate starvation, as it may be the case in 
protracted hunger strikes, when one has the entitlement to command food, but decides 
not to use it. Sen also considers the case of those who do not fully exercise their 
existing right to command food, due to a variety of reasons, which may go from 
ignorance to fixed food habits, to laziness. Another limitation to the entitlement 
approach results from the vagueness of property rights, which can result in unclear 
definition of each one's individual entitlements. A much more relevant exception, since 
it is quite frequent in times of war, is the existence of substantial misappropriation of 
food (or extra-entitlement transfers, as put by Sen), which implies that people without 
the legal “right” to that food, end up eating it, while “entitled” people go hungry (Sen 
1981; Devereux 2007b). 
Although Sen's approach was not exempt from criticism, it laid the foundation upon 
which current famine understanding still relies. However, the word “entitlements” has 
more or less disappeared by academics' and practitioners' vocabulary, usually replaced 
by the broader and less normative concept of “access to food”. Since then, other famine 
causation theories have been developed, but normally they complement, rather than 
radically challenge, Sen's entitlements' approach._  
It is also noteworthy to mention the resurgence of “neo-Malthusian” theories, which 
blame climate change, environmental-unfriendly practices (like overgrazing) and 
(again) overpopulation as the main causes of food availability decrease and then 
possibly famines. It is certainly true that these factors contribute to increased 
vulnerability, but Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theories fail to address the political 
aspects of famines and more generally the social construction of vulnerability of 
specific groups, or more simply put, why some groups go hungry and others have 
plenty of food. 
4.3 Concepts of famine and famine response 
Despite the academic findings on famine causation, journalistic and operational 
reports from the Horn of Africa (as well as other crises) tend to emphasise the 
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“natural” causes – such as the drought – over man made ones. If in the case of mass 
media this oversimplification may be explained as an attempt to catch the public's 
attention, the fact that a number of reports published by specialised agencies share the 
same approach requires careful consideration. This may be related with the general 
problem of politicisation of famines, or with more operational considerations in the 
humanitarian world, or a combination of the two.  
As already explained above, famine is a politically sensitive issue, and NGOs or 
journalists publicly accusing local authorities or other institutions of having caused or 
not averted the catastrophe can undermining their relationship with them, and in 
many cases risk expulsion. Moreover, admitting that more could have been done to 
prevent the escalation of the famine may even turn against such an NGO, jeopardising 
its reputation and complicating fund-raising activities. Blaming the weather, instead, 
does not imply anyone's responsibility, and therefore encounters less resistance. 
At the same time, the “famine as natural hazard” narrative is functional to the 
continuation of a well-established pattern of humanitarian response: Food aid. As long 
as the problem is conceptualised as a lack of food deriving from a sudden shock, with 
limited or no influence of other political considerations, massive shipping of food aid 
will be justified to the general public. The concern here is that response is often served 
with the needs analysis: “10 millions of people are in need of food aid”, a common 
statement in emergency appeals, leaves little space for discussing other interventions, 
or debating if it is the most appropriate response or not. Many donors tend to privilege 
food aid over alternative aid modalities because it gives massive visibility (everyone 
remembers pictures of cereal bags with the donor's logo), but also because it is 
perceived to be functional to their own economies.  
In reality, Barrett and Maxwell (2005) demonstrate that an economy as a whole does 
not benefit too much from food aid, but that small, powerful elites do. Leaving aside 
the local purchase of food to be distributed – a growing practice, but still marginal – 
the availability of commodities to be distributed as food aid depends upon the 
existence of an agricultural surplus. Such surplus is artificially created by subsidising 
national farmers in order to maintain high production levels and keep market prices 
low. Market distortions create barriers for foreign agricultural products, possibly 
hampering their agricultural development, and therefore, in a certain way, the 
mechanisms that enable the existence of stocks to be deployed in an emergency may 
well be one of the root causes of that same emergency. Moreover, if food aid has to be 
inter-continentally transported, it involves high costs, which only benefit shipping 
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companies. Nevertheless, food aid remains a major element of emergency response 
and even development cooperation44, although its pertinence, especially in the latter 
case, is in many cases questionable.  
In the case of famines, acknowledging that aggregate food availability is not necessarily 
the main problem, and analysing the root causes for each case, could lead to choosing 
different responses. Clearly, once a situation has reached the scale of a famine, any 
humanitarian action worth its name should focus on immediate life-saving measures, 
including (but not limited to) providing food to undernourished people. This food does 
not need necessarily to come from Europe or North America; when food stocks are 
present in the country or in the region, best practices recommend to buy and distribute 
those commodities, thus helping also local producers. Other interventions that brought 
about positive results, but are still far from becoming the norm in the provision of aid, 
are the distribution of cash or vouchers to purchase food and other basic items on local 
markets (provided that they are functioning), or livestock interventions aimed at 
protecting the most valuable assets for pastoral communities (for example, providing 
fodder and veterinary services, or buying animals to reduce herd sizes in times of 
drought).  
In addition, since malnutrition is closely related to health and water-related issues, it is 
crucial to intervene in those sectors as soon as possible. Unfortunately, non-food 
responses generally not only constitute a limited part of the planned response (see for 
instance Lautze and Maxwell 2007), but they are also the first to suffer from lack of 
funding. Addressing underlying causes, for example with agrarian reform, would 
probably not be appropriate at the peak of a crisis, when people are too destitute to 
work, or move away from home in search of better conditions. Nevertheless, famine 
may – and actually should – induce thinking about the measures to prevent the 
occurrence of similar crises, and lay the foundation for their implementation.  
The way in which famines are understood contributes to shape responses, and insisting 
that there is a food availability deficit serves the purpose of advocating for in-kind food 
transfers. Admitting that food is available, but that some groups have not access to it in 
reasonable quantities, or cannot fully benefit from its nutrients, calls for finding a 
                                                
44 WFP, which is the largest food aid agency worldwide reported using about 70% of its food aid for 
emergency response purposes in the year 2012 (the latest year for which the report is available), which 
means that the remaining 30% has been used in development or transitional contexts, such as school 
feeding programmes or food-for-assets schemes (WFP  2013)  
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different response, which could entail, depending on the specific case, land reform, 
protection of human rights (for instance, removing barriers to employment of women 
or of discriminated ethnic/social group members), improving primary health care and 
access to markets, and so on. It is self-evident that these types of intervention are far 
more complex than delivering items. Their adoption requires in fact the political will, 
both on the international community's (donors and implementing agencies) and on the 
local government's side, to change the current situation, and by doing so taking a clear 
stance against those who may benefit from the status quo, often politically crucial 
constituencies (De Waal 1997).  
4.4 The 2011-12 food crisis in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian food crisis in 2011-12 was part of a broader regional event that affected 
13 million people across the Horn of Africa. Triggered by drought – following erratic 
rains in 2010 and early 2011 – the crisis exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. Even 
though rainfall patterns were similar in south-eastern Ethiopia and Somalia, for 
instance, only the latter experienced a full-blown famine. This difference in outcomes 
has been explained by the fact that Ethiopia could count on its large PSNP safety-net 
programme, functioning early warning systems, and on the availability of 
humanitarian relief. In contrast, vulnerability in Somalia was higher to begin with, 
early warning data was not accurate, and humanitarian operations were hindered in 
area controlled by the islamist group al-Shabaab45, resulting in unnecessary deaths 
and suffering (Slim 2012).  
In Ethiopia, the crisis hit 4.8 million people, of which about 240,000 were refugees 
from neighbouring Somalia (Slim 2012). The most affected areas werelate and 
insufficient rains in the south-eastern part of the country resulted in poor (and 
delayed) harvests in agricultural areas, whereas the water shortage put the 
predominant pastoralist livelihoods under heightened stress. As a consequence, the 
nutritional situation rapidly deteriorated, with increasing rates of admissions to 
therapeutic feeding programmes across SNNPR, Oromyia and Somali regions, with a 
                                                
45 The effect of al-Shabaab presence on humanitarian assistance is twofold. On the one hand, al Shabaab 
evicted foreign humanitarian agencies perceived as bringing an unwanted “Western influence”. On the 
other, some large donor countries, such as the US, have anti-terrorist policies in place, which forbid forbid 
implementing agencies from letting aid money reach, even indirectly and unwillingly, groups listed as 
terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabaab. Given the difficulty of ensuring that level of control, as well as 
the safety risks posed by al-Shabaab itself, some aid agencies chose not to work there at all.  
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Figure 5: Humanitarian Hotspot Map of Ethiopia as of 21 November 2011. Source: 
OCHA (2011) 
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peak of up to 90% more cases of acute malnutrition between March and April 2011 in 
SNNPR (Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners 2011). The most affected areas 
are showed in figure 5 above, which indicates in red the areas of critical humanitarian 
concern, and in yellow stands those of medium concern as of late 2011. Overall, the 
crisis hit 4.8 million people, of which about 240,000 were refugees from neighbouring 
Somalia (Slim 2012).  
One crucial issue have been restrictions in mobility – and particular cross-border 
mobility – which hamper opportunities for maximising range management and access 
to water (Levine et al 2011). Despite the availability of early-warning reports months in 
advance of the crisis, response did not immediately follow, which Levine et al. (2011) 
have attributed to poor planning and late decision-making. As a result, windows of 
opportunity for undertaking measures to prevent the loss of pastoral livelihoods were 
missed.46 Indeed, one informant observed that once the situation further deteriorated 
and money arrived, the pattern of humanitarian response were not much different 
than in rapid-onset emergencies. One NGO staff member observed: 
“[W]e started our emergency drought response in February, but even by 
then […] it was very difficult to get interest and funding by donors, 
because often donors wait for numbers, a crisis. This is what they want to 
see because they can fund us, it’s their mandate, which I totally 
understand. But what it means is that the crisis built and built and built, 
and then in July it […] got the attention of media, and this is when 
everything started (snaps fingers, n.d.A.): and then it was a rapid-onset, 
everyone was coming in, [asking to] submit proposals in two-three days. 
A lot could have been done sooner, to prevent loss of lives, loss of 
livelihoods” (interview NGO_12_A_002) 
The progression of donations is indeed interesting to look at, particularly if one notes 
that Ethiopia has long been considered a “donor darling”, which every year receives 
funds from a plethora of institutional and private donors for both humanitarian and 
development assistance. According to OECD statistics, in fact, total ODA flows to 
                                                
46 Levine et al (2011) list a number of possible interventions, which, if undertaken within a certain window 
of opportunity, can prevent the loss of livelihoods in pastoral areas. These include, for instance, the 
provision of veterinary services, fodder and water to maintain healthy herds and improve their value in 
case of sale, which can only be possible as long as the conditions of the animals have not deteriorated 
beyond a certain level. Once the opportunity has been missed, that type of activity becomes useless. 
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Ethiopia in the period 2008-2012 have averaged 1.9 billion dollars per year (OECD 
2014). Of these, humanitarian assistance represents a portion fluctuating between 
about 500 million and one billion U.S. dollars per year (FTS 2014). While allocations of 
development aid are normally programmed over multi-year cycles, humanitarian 
assistance can be expected to fluctuate according to the situation on the ground.  
 
Figure 6: Cumulative Donations Towards Ethiopia Humanitarian Appeals in 2011. 
Source: author's elaboration, based on FTS data 
 
 
The donors’ humanitarian response to needs arising from the 2011 food crisis in 
Ethiopia was relatively positive, with about 80% (FTS 2014) of the money required to 
provide relief eventually raised.47 Yet, and despite well-functioning early warning 
systems, the bulk of the money was only mobilised when the scale of the emergency 
had become clear (Slim 2012). In fact, forecasts of a forthcoming La Niña-related 
drought were made public as early as as August 2010, but aid money started to flow in 
only months later. Some NGOs were able to secure funds by early 2011, but the turning 
point was reached around July 2011. By that time the Horn of Africa was already in the 
                                                
47 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the humanitarian response for Somali refugees in Ethiopia was 
substantially underfunded. 
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midst of an emergency, and the drought was dubbed as “the worst in sixty years” (UN 
News Centre 2011; BBC 2011), although it was not possible to go back to the original 
source of this quote, let alone find out the methods and data used for this calculation. 
While mass media largely ignored the situation in the Horn of Africa until June 2011,48 
donor attention picked up earlier, with some USD 200 million coming in around 
March, which however includes a single USD 106 million donation from USAID to the 
World Food Programme. As shown in figure 6 above, which presents the cumulative 
funds donated in response to the 2011 crisis in Ethiopia, at the peak of the crisis in 
July, over half of the money that would eventually be raised had already been secured. 
The pattern of donations rapidly increased between July and September, but it can 
certainly be said that some donors were responding to the crisis already in the first 
months of the year, before media started reporting about it. 
The humanitarian response to the food crisis continued into 2012 and the first 
evaluation reports were getting published (see for instance Slim 2012; Sandison 2012; 
Humanitarian Coalition 2012). Overall, the response to the crisis in Ethiopia was 
judged to have positively responded relatively well to the crisis, and it was credited 
with saving thousands of lives. Major shortcomings were highlighted in the response to 
the needs of Somali refugees, as mortality rates in refugee camps remained worringly 
high, with a peak of seven times the emergency threshold in the month of August 2011 
(Slim 2012). Furthermore, there was room for improvement in areas such as early 
response and strategic planning.   
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a comprehensive historical backgroundoverview of 
food crises in Ethiopia, starting from an historical overview of those that took place in 
the past until the most recent one. These crises have deeply impacted on Ethiopian 
society through the ages. Although the available data only gives and incomplete 
overview of the loss of life, displacement and other forms of suffering, the crises clearly 
disrupted economic and social development processes. The interrelations between 
chronic poverty and vulnerability to shocks are of particular relevance in a study that 
                                                
48 The database LexisNexis returned less than twenty newspaper articles mentioning the ongoing drought 
in the entire Horn of Africa between August 2010 and May 2011. On the contrary, there are about two 
thousand entries from June to December 2011. 
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sets to examine the issue of LRD, as they make it particularly difficult to define with 
precision when does an emergency starts and when does it end.  
Furthermore, this historical overview also shows that it is not only the inconsistent 
weather patterns that cause famines. These are actually grounded in a complex 
interaction of structural factors – such as inadequate agricultural techniques or heavy 
taxation – which lead to increased vulnerability, and human agency, in the form of 
speculative actions (hoarding) or intentional denial of relief. By highlighting the 
multidimensionality of the causes of famine, I have sought to counter the narrative of 
“natural disasters” that all too often is used to describe these crises, and which 
effectively hides their political nature. 
Politics also play a role in disaster response. Until the XIX century, emperors took 
pride in distributing food to the hungry in what can be seen as early local forms of 
humanitarianism, and Menilik’s court austerity policies during the “evil days” of famine 
were the subject of propaganda. In more recent years, inadequate response to famines 
has sometimes even led to regime change, as happened with the deposition of Haile 
Selassie in 1974, and contributed to the the defeat of the Derg. Arguably, avoiding a 
new famine has been a key concern of the EPRDF for the past quarter century, as noted 
by Lautze and Maxwell (2007). It is interesting to note that it is not necessarily the 
famine itself that can lead to political crisis, but its symbolism, strategically employed 
by revolutionary forces. Furthermore, the overthrow of regimes is a key example of 
how agency can change existing structures, whereas the fact that the Derg repeated 
some key mistakes made by the imperial regime is a testimony to the power of 
structures.   
Finally, I have presented the context of the 2011-12 food crisis, and outlined the 
pattern of humanitarian response. This constitutes the background of the empirical 
research, whose findings will be detailed in the next chapters, starting with the 
experience of the NGO MERLIN in chapter 5, and moving on to the analysis of LRD 
across the three institutional pillars in chapter 6.   
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Chapter 5. MERLIN’s response to the 
crisis 
 
To further understand the context in which humanitarian action takes place, and aid 
workers’ identity as humanitarians is construed, this chapter explains how a 
humanitarian NGO, MERLIN, which originally stood for Medical Emergency Relief 
International, responded to the 2011-2012 food crisis in Ethiopia. This chapter is based 
upon my participant observation at MERLIN in early 2012. 
5.1 Overview of the NGO 
MERLIN was49 a medium-sized international NGO based in the UK and specialised in 
the provision of healthcare, including nutrition services. As opposed to other medical 
relief organisations such as Doctors Without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) which can be counted among the dunantist or emergency humanitarians, 
MERLIN’s mission explicitly referred to a commitment to provide support during and 
after an emergency — “we stay for as long as it takes […] to help rebuild the health 
infrastructure” (MERLIN website). Some visibility material even included the tagline 
“medical relief, lasting healthcare” under the organisation’s logo. Its broader mandate 
convinced me that it would offer a productive environment to study LRD. The 
organisation had been present in Ethiopia since 2003, mostly delivering primary 
health care, water, sanitation and health (WASH) interventions, as well as emergency 
preparedness and response. In early 2012, the organisation had a staff about one 
hundred people, of which a dozen were based in the country office in Addis Ababa, and 
the remaining deployed to the field. Most of the personnel was Ethiopian, with the 
exception of five people, in part because of restrictions posed by Ethiopian authorities 
on the recruitment of foreign personnel. From a functional perspective, staff was 
organised in the following areas: programme, administration, health workers, and 
support staff. Programme staff could further be split into two categories, programme 
management staff on the one hand, and health advisers on the other. The former, 
                                                
49. In 2014, MERLIN was absorbed by the larger Save The Children federation. 
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headed by the Country Director, would mostly take care of all the tasks related to 
planning, proposal writing, supervision of project activities, reporting, and 
coordination with other agencies as well as with the government. The latter, under the 
supervision of the health director (reporting directly to an health advisor in the 
headquarters), would monitor epidemiological and nutritional data, advise on 
therapies and protocols to be followed in any operation, supervise the procurement of 
drugs, and train health workers. These workers — mostly nurses, all of them national 
staff — were based in the health facilities supported by the projects, or roaming among 
a few of them, and were tasked with assisting in scaling up screening and treatment of 
malnutrition. Administration staff, also all Ethiopian, would deal with accounting, 
logistics, procurement, human resources, and office administration. In February 2012, 
MERLIN was operating in two states of Ethiopia: Oromyia regional state, more 
specifically in its Borena and Bale zones, and the Somali regional state, in the Eastern 
part of the country, bordering Somalia. As shown in the map above, these regions had 
been among the most affected by the 2011 crisis, showing critical rates of malnutrition. 
MERLIN was implementing nutritional interventions in both states, supporting health 
facilities in the screening and treatment of malnutrition. In Somali region, the NGO 
was also providing basic health services (mobile clinics), in consideration of the fact 
that the health system in the area was judged to be almost non-existent. The situation 
in Somali regional state was further complicated by the on-going conflict between the 
Ethiopian Government and the insurgent movement Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF).50 
5.2 MERLIN’s setup in Ethiopia 
MERLIN’s organisational presence in Ethiopia consisted of a country office in Addis 
Ababa, even though no projects were on-going in the capital city, and three field offices 
in the areas of intervention. Such a structure is indeed quite common in large countries 
such as Ethiopia, and was adopted by all the organisations contacted for this research. 
As mentioned earlier, I was able to conduct my participant observation at both the 
Addis Ababa country office and at the Borena field office. In this section, I will be 
presenting how the two offices were structured, how the workload was shared, and 
which role each played in the planning of new interventions. Having only visited one of 
                                                
50 The insecurity in the Somali region was behind my decision of only visiting the Borena zone, which is 
relatively safer, although cross-border clashes do happen occasionally.  
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the field offices, the description may not entirely apply to all of them, as the context of 
operation and the human resources available were different.  
5.2.1 The Country Office 
The country office had a role of planning interventions and ensuring overall 
coordination and support of the activities of the organisation in the country. The 
country director would normally meet with the most senior staff, the country health 
director and the operations manager, on a daily basis, to discuss priorities and organise 
the work. In particular, the operations manager was in charge of dealing with any issue 
arising from the field offices, as well as of liaising with the different departments to 
make sure that plans are being followed, that supplies are arriving on time, and so on. 
Support services such as general administration, procurement, logistics, bookkeeping 
and financial reporting, were in fact coordinated at country office level, although some 
tasks were decentralised to the field level. Staff meetings were held on a weekly basis, 
giving an opportunity to all employees to provide brief updates on progress or 
difficulties in their respective areas of responsibility. Duty trips to field offices, 
involving either management or more technical staff, were quite frequent, about twice 
a month. The country office played a pivotal role in the development of new project 
proposals. In addition to planning and supporting operations, the country office was 
responsible for ensuring coordination with authorities at the federal level, and with 
other humanitarian and development actors, including donor representatives, as well 
as with liaising with the headquarters of the organisation.  
The allocation of working time was not much based on routines, but rather re-defined 
on an almost daily basis in order to address issues as they arose — such as a delay in 
customs clearance, a request to share epidemiological data, a car accident involving 
staff members, or the approaching deadline for sending out a report. “It’s different 
most of the days. When I come to work on a typical day, first of all I check the email, 
because sometimes there are urgent issues that I need to respond to”, said one 
employee. Such ad-hocness is by no means a unique characteristic of MERLIN, but is a 
frequent feature in crisis management (Johannisson and Olaison 2008: 257); and it 
can be regarded as another example of humanitarian agencies adopting an “emergency 
work style even in non-emergency situations” (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002: 497).  
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5.2.2 The Borena field office 
To supervise its activities in the Borena region, MERLIN had opened its base in the 
town of Yabello, where a handful of international NGOs were also based. Other 
organisations had set up their offices in the larger town of Moyale, located along the 
border with Kenya, a few hundred kilometres away from Yabello, where they were also 
responding to distress migration of people across the border. At the peak of the 2011 
crisis, other humanitarian NGOs had established a presence in the Borena zone, but by 
March 2012 they had already shut down their operations and closed their offices. One 
informant bitterly remarked that some of these organisations only came for a quick 
assessment and gave money to local implementing partners. Six months later, their 
projects were closed, sometimes even without anyone coming back to see what had 
been done with their money. MERLIN, on the contrary, was launching a new initiative 
in the area.  
At the time of the visit, MERLIN’s facilities were reasonably good for a remote town. 
The base was in a fenced compound, with some rooms used as offices and others for 
storing relief items; cars could be safely parked for the night in the internal courtyard. 
The organisation had also rented a house for the project manager, which doubled as 
guesthouse for the occasional visitors. The office had a generator that guaranteed 
reliable electricity supply, and access to Internet was ensured by USB mobile sticks, 
which allowed for regular exchanges of documents and information with the country 
office.  
MERLIN’s activities in the Borena region were coordinated by an expatriate project 
manager, the sole foreigner employed by the NGO in the area, and one of the few 
expatriates still based in Yabello. Among the personnel based in the office, there was a 
national health advisor, as well as a few administrative staff members. The majority of 
the people employed for the project were nurses and other health workers assigned to 
provide support to a total of about seventy health facilities across the Borena zone, 
sometimes in very remote areas, and who would only visit Yabello office occasionally. 
Their daily routine would see them monitoring the health facilities under their 
responsibility.51 
                                                
51 The number of health centres and health posts under a nurse’s responsibility would vary according to 
the area and distance to be traveled. In towns such as Moyale, one nurse could be allocated up to 3-4 
different facilities, but not too far from one another, so that a daily visit (or even two if necessary) could be 
possible. It shall be highlighted that this description only refers to the setup of one field office at a 
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5.3 MERLIN’s activities in the Borena zone 
As mentioned above, my participant observation included a four-week stay in the 
MERLIN office located in the Borena52 zone, in the southern part of Oromyia state, 
along the border with Kenya. The Borena zone takes its name from the Borena people, 
pastoralist communities that were historically based in the southern lowlands of 
Ethiopia all the way through northern Kenya (Markakis 2011:66). The zone now known 
as Borena, administratively split into eight woredas or districts, does not cover the 
entirety of the lands originally inhabited by Borena peoples, and yet it remains the 
largest zone in Oromyia (Markakis 2011:66). The administrative centre of the zone, 
Yabello53, is located about 600km from Addis Ababa, and about 200km away from the 
larger border-town of Moyale, which is split into an Ethiopian and a Kenyan part. The 
Borena zone is a predominantly semi-arid area characterised by the absence of 
perennial rivers and by irregular rainfall, which results in the area being subject to 
frequent droughts. There are two rainy seasons, Gaana54 or long rains between March 
and May, and Hagaya or short rains between September and November, but 
precipitations have been erratic, with rains sometimes not occurring at the expected 
time, or with abnormal intensity, either far above or far below average (Lasage et al. 
2010: 9-11). The Borena zone had been one of areas stricken by the 2011 crisis, with 
worrying rates of acute malnutrition. One MERLIN employee of Ethiopian nationality 
described the context by saying: 
“[E]ven if there is rain they would still need humanitarian assistance […] 
They have critical water shortages, which is also a problem for the pasture, 
[and] most of them, about 70%, are pastoralists, so completely dependent 
on water” (interview, March 2012). 
MERLIN had launched a first nutritional intervention in the Borena zone in 2010, with 
funding from ECHO, and had obtained a grant from the same donor to respond to the 
worsening situation in 2011. The main difference between the two projects, and among 
                                                                                                                                         
particular point in time, and that arrangements in other MERLIN field offices were not necessarily similar, 
considering the different operational contexts 
52. Also spelled “Borana” 
53. Also spelled “Yabelo” 
54. Which roughly corresponds to the Belg rains in other parts of the country 
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these and another proposal that at the time was being considered by the donor, lied 
mostly in the progressive shift from direct implementation towards supervising and 
supporting local health systems. In terms of main objectives and beneficiary 
population, however, differences were minimal, which led one staff member to 
describe the different projects as “more or less the same […] actually a continuation of 
the same thing” (interview NGO_12_B_002). Another informant within the 
organisation explained that the main difference between the old projects and the new 
ECHO proposal was in the targeted areas, which had to be reduced because two 
districts were no longer considered eligible for funding by the donor. Despite the 
efforts in moving towards capacity building of local health services, however, 
MERLIN’s then country director expected that external support would still be needed, 
even in the absence of major crises, because of the magnitude of needs as well as the 
absence of actors active in the nutrition sector in the zone. He was positive about the 
chances of the project to realistically improve health staff capacities, but expected that 
issues like health staffing, or procurement of essential drugs would still require longer 
term support. He suggested that with two more years of continuous support, the 
governments' staff would have greater capacities to handle even a nutritional 
emergency, although they would probably still experience difficulties in managing 
stocks and procurement. 
5.4 Funding sources 
At the time of my participant observation, MERLIN was running operations in the 
Borena and Somali regions with funding from ECHO. Both projects were set to end by 
mid-2012, but in consideration of the fact that the local health systems would not be 
able to take over all responsibilities that early, the NGO was actively looking for 
additional resources. By April 2012, they had secured funds from UNICEF to carry out 
a two-year project to support the local health system in the diagnosis and treatment of 
malnutrition in the Borena zone. While it could be questioned whether the project 
would manage to bring about a substantial improvement in local capacities, one 
positive aspect was that it would enable MERLIN to keep monitoring closely 
nutritional and epidemiological data, allowing the organisation to be ready to scale up 
its intervention if needed. In addition, MERLIN was applying for a 4-year grant from 
DFID to continue operations in Somali region, all this while also awaiting decisions 
from ECHO regarding follow-up proposals to their current interventions. Furthermore, 
they were negotiating with ECHO another proposal focused specifically on Disaster 
Risk Reduction (DRR) in the Borena and Bale zones.  
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In addition to institutional funds, MERLIN could also use some private donations, but 
these were rather limited, averaging 10-12% of their total funding. MERLIN had also 
considered a contingency plan to carry on some activities in case the proposal 
submitted to ECHO would end up being rejected, namely accessing the United Nations’ 
Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF). Being a facility for short-term interventions of 
usually no more than six months’ project duration, the HRF would not allow the NGO 
to complete all the activities in the ECHO proposal, but would at least ensure some 
continuity in service provision. On a positive note, being the HRF a “fast-track” system, 
MERLIN would be able to obtain funds within two months, compared to the six 
months usually necessary with ECHO between submission of the proposal and 
availability of funds. Another option to fill in smaller gaps would be applying for 
contributions from the United Kingdom’s Disaster Emergency Commitee (DEC). The 
strategy of seeking development funding to go alongside emergency projects was 
coherent with the double mandate of the organisation and responded also to the need 
to avoid that its permission of operating in Ethiopia would be revoked. Yet, getting 
development funding to try to stay longer after emergencies was easier said than done:  
“[We try] to design programmes in such a way to facilitate transition to 
development [but] sometimes we have a bit of difficulties in trying to raise 
resources for some of the long term programming, and it is not only us: it 
is quite across, because of the way the donor environment is structured. 
[…] It is much much easier to raise funds for acute emergencies than for 
long term development” (interview NGO_12_B_006) 
The “diversification” strategy of working with different donors and different budget 
lines in order to always have cash flow implied that MERLIN had to constantly apply 
for funding, sometimes with very short windows of opportunity, even just a couple of 
weeks. This resulted in poorly written documents, and subsequent requests from the 
donor for integrations and clarifications, all of which could have been limited if more 
time had been granted in the first place.  
5.5 Relations with local authorities 
A characteristic of Ethiopia was that there was a strong engagement from the 
Government, with clear strategies outlined at national level, and with a system 
requiring formal approval of each and any aid project.  
As a rule, MERLIN carefully followed the general rules, as well as the strategies defined 
by the Ministry of Health. Ensuring compliance helped maintaining positive relations 
  114 
with the authorities, as all proposed interventions would be in line with their own 
policies. In this respect, MERLIN was already adopting a behaviour that is typically 
associated with that of a development organisation, as ensuring local ownership of 
projects is also one of the main tenets of contemporary development discourse. The 
problem of working in a setting where the government has such a strong involvement 
with aid projects was that occasionally the NGO would be caught between conflicting 
policies promoted by the local administration and the donors, respectively. They 
therefore would have to negotiate which parts of the locally approved strategies could 
be implemented taking into account donors’ limitations. Sometimes reconciling the 
different views would prove difficult, but “we are obliged to discuss it and to [operate] 
according to the rules of the game which are given to us” (interview NGO_12_B_004). 
MERLIN staff also lamented that turnover within their counterparts in the Ethiopian 
bureaucracy often meant that due to institutional memory loss, they would have to 
renegotiate their projects multiple times, as the new person would not necessarily be 
aware of what their predecessor had agreed upon. The problem was exacerbated by the 
lengthy procedures of proposal assessment and approval typical of some donors. 
Furthermore, some MERLIN staff members reported difficulties in complying with the 
Ethiopian rules of devoting no more than 30% of the budget dedicated to 
administrative costs, particularly if training of health personnel had to be considered 
as “overhead”. In fact, one of the key elements of MERLIN interventions was capacity-
building of local health staff.  
5.6 Staff turnover 
Due to the relatively short-term nature of its projects, as many other humanitarian 
agencies MERLIN also had to deal with staff turnover. In discussions with 
management, the issue was split into two separate points: expatriate and local staff. As 
for the former group, turnover was taken almost as a given — “Turnover for expats will 
not change, because they don't want to spend their life in very remote areas” (interview 
NGO_12_B_004). At the same time, the presence of some expatriates, even if just a 
handful of them, was deemed necessary to ensure “neutrality of judgement”. The key 
would then be to have some expatriates, and not necessarily to retain the same people 
in the same position or office for longer than their initial contract. Managers would 
normally be contracted for a period of two years, even when that duration exceeded the 
time remaining to completion of all the projects. The organisation in fact had no plans 
on leaving Ethiopia in the short term, and these positions would be needed anyway. 
According to an informant the turnover rates had declined in the past eighteen 
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months, following the appointment of a new country director, which may lead to think 
that the change might have been related to the management style of the country 
director himself, although the increased availability of funds following the 2011 crisis 
might have also played a role. Nevertheless, four out of the five expatriates serving for 
MERLIN Ethiopia at the time of my participant observation would eventually leave the 
country in the following year, and at least one of them remained within MERLIN a 
different country. One of the four people was the country director himself, who had 
completed his two-year contract. As for the fifth expatriate, he stayed within MERLIN 
Ethiopia, although in a different capacity, for about one year and a half, when he also 
left for a new assignment.  
As for local staff, MERLIN was faced with the structural problem of only having short-
term funds. Usually they would not offer contracts for periods exceeding the duration 
of the projects their salary was charged to. For country office staff, who provided 
support to more than one project at a time, money from different projects would often 
be pooled to fund a single position. Yet, the duration of a contract could not exceed the 
time left on the project(s) that would end last. At the time of my visit, that implied that 
the maximum duration of a contract could be the two years of the recently approved 
UNICEF-funded project. One employee in the country office recounted having been 
hired for a short-term contract in late 2011, and subsequently getting reappointed for 
an additional year, with a clause allowing for earlier contract termination with three 
months’ notice. Because her role was not directly linked to a single project’s lifetime, 
she was unable to make predictions regarding her prospects after the end of her 
assignment. Yet, she judged this working arrangement as more stable compared to her 
previous experience in a larger international NGO. There, she had worked for almost 
one year on three-month contracts, never knowing for sure whether she was going to 
get an extension or not.  
Back to MERLIN’s way of addressing staff turnover, the country director explained 
that he made sure key people in finance, logistics, and human resources in the country 
office were aware that the NGO intended to remain in the country, and that their 
contract would be renewed for several years, as long as funds were available. In the 
field offices, the strategy would be of empowering some of the supervisors in the hope 
they would be satisfied of their work and remain within the organisation, maintaining 
some degree of institutional memory. Even so, there were instances of people leaving 
their jobs before the end of their contract, possibly due to the hardship of working in 
rural areas when their families remained in Addis Ababa.  
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Figure 7: Simplified proposal development flowchart within MERLIN. Source: 
Author’s own elaboration.  
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5.7 Proposal writing and decision-making 
The development of new project proposals for activities in Ethiopia was usually dealt 
with in country, with the participation of both country and field office staff, rather than 
at headquarters level. Usually, after having received notice of an open call for 
proposals, the first step would be for the country office (CO) – in the person of the 
country health director – to liaise with the relevant field office(s), sharing with them 
the key ideas and instructions for them to develop a first draft. This document would 
normally only contain the logframe and the technical aspects of the proposed 
intervention, such as number of beneficiaries and location of the health facilities to be 
included in the project. Sometimes, FOs would have to undertake surveys and 
assessments specifically geared towards collecting data for a given proposal, or they 
might use information already in their possession. The CO would then add the 
“narrative” parts of the proposal, such as the context analysis or the description of the 
activities of the organisation in the country – “All the crosscutting issues, monitoring 
and evaluation, those things that need a lot of writing [and] no technical background” 
(interview NGO_12_B_002).  
Programme staff at CO level would also be responsible for editing and reviewing the 
parts of the proposal written in the field, so to ensure consistency and readability, as 
well as compliance with the donor’s criteria. Sometimes the CO would require 
additional inputs from the FO before finalising the proposal. The CO would then share 
the draft proposal with the headquarters (HQ) for additional rounds of reviews before 
final submission to the donor. Reviews would focus particularly on the strategy, 
indicators, and internal coherence, and they would be particularly thorough in case of 
activities in new geographical or thematic areas. Proposals could go back and forth 
several times between London and Addis Ababa, in the search for consensus.  
In case of unresolved disputes between the CO and the HQ, the latter, and more 
precisely the Head of Region, had in principle the power of imposing their own view. 
However, informants stated that the COs would normally have the final say, in the 
belief that they should only run operations they were willing and able to implement, as 
they would ultimately be responsible for their success. Yet, one source within the 
organisation hinted at a less inclusive decision-making process, explaining that 
mismatches between the views of the management as opposed to those of field staff 
were frequent, and that the former would usually end up prevailing over the latter: 
“sometimes they don't care if it matches with the needs at field level or not. Sometimes 
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they need to fit: field people just modify the thing so that they get some funding at least 
to continue the operation. 
The proposal development process described, and whose main steps are detailed in 
figure 7 above, was not necessarily followed step-by-step, but it could be adapted 
according to necessity. For instance, in case of particularly complex proposals or very 
tight deadlines, the first draft could be developed in its entirety by the country office, 
and only sent to the field for comments and validation. In other occasions, staff based 
in the field might outline “concept notes” based on locally assessed needs on their own 
initiative, “in case there is any other funding available” (interview NGO_12_B_003). 
Of course the concept note would still have to be reviewed, expanded and adapted to 
the format required by the specific donor, but “it would make no sense to develop a 
[full] proposal” (interview NGO_12_B_003) without any sense of the specificities of 
the donor requirements. The informant went on to explain that in essence, all donors 
required more or less the same information, although the template would be different. 
Particularly in case of templates with a strict word or page limit, more work would be 
necessary to decide what really needs to be said and what can be left out. Furthermore, 
because of the absence of donor representation in the field, all the information related 
to upcoming calls for proposals and other funding opportunities was normally not 
directly available to field-based staff, but handled at headquarters and country office 
level. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an example of humanitarian response drawn from my 
participant observation at MERLIN in early 2012, and shows that how the organisation 
managed to combine humanitarian with development work, despite the former being 
its predominant mode (at least at that specific point in time). The description of its 
organisational settings, while not necessarily representative of all humanitarian actors, 
can nevertheless provide insights on the challenges faced by foreign humanitarian 
NGOs in Ethiopia.  The example of MERLIN is particularly significant to highlight the 
interplay of structural factors, such as laws, rules and procedures that need to be 
followed, and the organisational agency, expressed for instance in the diversification of 
the donor base, aimed at allowing the NGO to pursue its own objectives. 
This review will serve as a background for the next chapter, where I will focus on 
presenting empirical data to illustrate the persistence – or not – of the humanitarian-
development gap in the three institutional pillars.  
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Chapter 6. Bridging the gap? 
 
In this chapter, I will be presenting the empirical data collected in Ethiopia on what 
hinders and what enables LRD approaches. I will first describe several way in which 
development and humanitarian activities have been linked in the response to the 2011-
12 food crisis. The empricial material will then be described along the three 
institutional pillars discussed in chapter 2: i) regulative, or the (binding) rules that 
define how humanitarian and development aid is provided; ii) normative, which 
includes the (non-binding) norms and values that shape aid practices; iii) cultural-
cognitive, referring to what aid workers know and define as desirable.  
6.1 Practices of LRD 
In this introductory section, I will present a few examples of how aid organisations 
active in Ethiopia in the period under observation were integrating their humanitarian 
and development efforts. From the responses provided during interviews and informal 
conversations, three main avenues for aid organisations to implement LRD have 
emerged: i) ensure continued presence by diversifying their donor base; ii) invest in 
capacity building (including during emergency response); and iii) integrating 
livelihoods and disaster risk management perspectives in their approaches.  
6.1.1 Long term plans and diversification of the donor base 
None of the organisations contacted for this study shared with me any plans of 
voluntarily closing their operations in Ethiopia anytime soon. On the contrary, some 
organisations reported having a multi-year framework that included some form of 
engagement with development or disaster preparedness. Faced with the fragmentation 
of funding opportunities, a common strategy to ensure continued presence was that of 
seeking to diversify their donor base, reaching out to different institutional and private 
donors, and accessing both humanitarian and development funding lines.  
For instance, as seen in chapter 5, MERLIN intended to stay in Ethiopia for as long as 
necessary to achieve their goals of lasting healthcare, and had already secured both 
humanitarian and development funding to do so. Apart from enabling longer-term 
capacity building, continued presence was also seen as a way to be ready for scaling up 
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interventions in case of a new crisis, avoiding the need to re-apply for a permission of 
working in the country (see section 6.2 below). These concerns had led some NGOs to 
continue carrying out activities after the end of a project and pending the donor 
approval of a follow-up proposal, using other funds available to the organisation. Other 
NGOs had more formal plans for longer-term involvement, as in the case of Action Aid:  
Once it is decided [to open a field office], it will stay there for a 
minimum of twelve years […] It is not a short term intervention, it is 
not a 1-year or 2-year project. In most cases, the amount of money 
coming from individual supporters is not enough to address the gaps, 
so […] we write a proposal and ask [...] institutional donors [for 
funding] (interview NGO_13_D_001) 
The informant, whose role was Food Security and Emergency Coordinator, later 
pointed out that the decisions on where to intervene and how were not donor-driven, 
but rather based on their own internal analysis and plans.  
The country director of another NGO reported having a five-year plan for Ethiopia, 
which was itself part of a larger five-year global strategy, including both development 
and emergency components. Funding would come from a plethora of different 
institutional and, to a lesser extent, private donors.55 The NGO would constantly be on 
the lookout for funding opportunities with a whole team dedicated to proposal writing. 
Nevertheless, they would only accept funding in line with their overall strategy and 
mandate. For instance, the NGO did not engage in food aid and nutrition projects, and 
thus they would not apply for funding that had to be employed in one of those sectors.  
Sometimes it's a perfect fit, we write the proposal, we get the funding, 
we implement a great project. Sometimes it's not a great fit, because 
maybe the donor wants to fund something we don't actually do [...] It 
could be we don't know the donor, or there is a lot of reporting 
requirement, it could be very labour-intensive […] Sometimes we write 
the proposal and we don't get the funding (interview NGO_13_E_001) 
By their own admission, other NGOs would instead work on a more donor-driven 
agenda, planning their interventions based on the available budget and priorities. 
                                                
55 The informant noted that they would sometimes turn down small private funding opportunities, if they 
came with excessive reporting requirements, as they would not be worth the additional work required.  
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“When we know there’s an opportunity [we convene staff from] all the sectors that the 
donor is willing to fund” (interview NGO_13_H_001), explained the head of Food 
Security of a major NGO. The same NGO was also involved in the ECHO “cluster” 
approach, in a few cases with the role of cluster lead – and thus the relative certainty of 
steady funding for the next three years at the very least. Despite the differences among 
them, none of the organisations involved in the study was reliant on a single donor. 
This is indeed consistent with Ohanyian (2009, 2012) finding that NGOs with a larger 
donor base are able to exercise a greater degree of agency, and are less pressured to 
follow priorities set by any donor.  
6.1.2 Capacity building 
One possible way of making relief more “developmental” is focusing, whenever 
possible, on capacity-building. This is a mode of action that, while not inherently 
developmental nor in contrast with humanitarian principles, is mostly associated with 
development programmes. Nevertheless, supporting local capacities can also be done 
in humanitarian setting.  
An example of humanitarian capacity-building is that of MERLIN in Borena. First of 
all, and this even during the initial phase of more direct involvement, MERLIN had not 
set up separate health facilities, but provided nutritional interventions through existing 
structures responding to the ministry of Health. This way they avoided duplication and 
started familiarising local staff with treatment protocols. By early 2012, thus still 
formally in “emergency mode”, the NGO had abandoned direct implementation and 
focused on supervision. For instance, a nurse hired by MERLIN would not be the one 
to directly screen the children for malnutrition, nor engage in the distribution of the 
appropriate nutritional supplements, but would carry out daily supervision visits in 
each facility, sitting next to the local nurse to verify that protocols were being followed 
and only stepping in when necessary. In other words, at that point implementation 
modalities did not differ much from the typical development project. Within MERLIN, 
it was recognised that the national health service staff would eventually be able to 
independently recognise and treat malnutrition, but that they would likely still need 
external support in the procurement, transportation and storage of drugs and other 
supplies, which are crucial for effective recovery. Considering that LRD does not 
necessarily means transition from a situation of humanitarian concern to full self-
sufficiency, and also taking into account the fact that the NGO planned to maintain its 
support from a more “developmental” point of view, it could be argued that MERLIN 
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was indeed trying to bridging the gap. Nevertheless, the topic of LRD as such was 
notably absent in the day-to-day of most of MERLIN’s personnel, as in other NGOs.  
Examples of capacity-building activities carried out by other NGOs reportedly included 
teaching pastoralist communities innovative rangeland management techniques, 
which would then turn useful in times of drought, such as how to prepare pasture and 
ponds which can be filled up with rain. Another example was that of teaching how to 
build latrines with locally available materials. The latter initiative, for instance, has the 
immediate effect of providing adequate sanitation and avoiding the spread of diseases, 
just like any other type of latrine regardless of the constructor, but with the added 
advantage that communities would then be able to fix them in case of malfunctioning, 
or build additional ones in case of demographic increase or migration to other areas. 
An NGO employee found that community involvement helped “protect” the gains of 
the project, compared to initiatives perceived to be imposed from above.  
Another NGO had instead launched a humanitarian programme that would transition 
its beneficiaries to a livelihoods project. The humanitarian “phase” included cash 
distributions aimed at addressing immediate needs. Similarly to a cash-for-work 
scheme, such distributions would be conditional upon attendance of training courses – 
from basic literacy and numeracy to vocational training. The newly acquired skills 
would then ideally be put to use in the second phase, under a livelihoods project where 
beneficiaries would develop their own small businesses. The idea, remarked the NGO 
adviser, was not just to serve the same communities, but also to track people and 
accompany them over a longer period of time.  
6.1.3 Livelihoods and disaster risk management 
For organisations working in the area of food security, LRD often translated in 
heightened attention to livelihoods and income-generating activities, or disaster risk 
reduction activities more in general.  
For one NGO, a way of integrating disaster risk management was planning each 
activity in drought-prone areas, such as the Somali region, with the issue of water 
scarcity in mind. In other contexts, for instance in Amhara region, the approach would 
be that of facilitating information exchange related to early warning, ensuring that 
such messages could reach farmers in the villages. This would be done within a 
development project aimed at addressing food security by promoting production and 
marketing of vegetables. Disaster risk management, explained a food security officer 
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“is cross-cutting for all interventions” and that in practice “it is a mix of activities” 
(interview NGO_13_C_001).  
In other cases, disaster risk reduction was the primary objective of a project, but again, 
what it entailed in practice would vary across geographical areas and thematic sectors. 
In the Borena region, there were a few interventions focusing on rangeland 
management and in particular on best practices of bush clearing.56 I interviewed staff 
from two different organisations carrying out this type of project. In both cases, it all 
boiled down to explaining the most appropriate techniques and providing training if 
necessary. The actual work would be carried out by the local communities themselves, 
which, being mostly pastoralists, had a clear interest in how to address a problem that 
had a critical impact on the survival of their animals. In such cases, NGO staff expected 
that, once adopted the innovative rangeland management practices, communities 
would likely continue carrying out the activities by themselves with no additional 
inputs from outside, because they would directly benefit from the preservation of 
grazing lands. But the reverse also applied: in case of activities not clearly addressing a 
need felt by the community, there were little chances for continuation beyond the 
project’s timeframe.  
Finally, on the UN front, it is worth mentioning a scheme being piloted by WFP, known 
as “Purchase for Progress”, in which the agency would buy cereals from local small 
farmers, in addition to more established overseas suppliers. Cereals acquired locally 
would then be used for humanitarian purposes, and could constitute a link between 
relief and development – or to be more precise, from development to relief. On the 
development side, the programme included capacity-building on aspects such as 
quality control, which was expected to improve marketability of local produce. On the 
humanitarian side, the source of food should not influence the way activities were 
planned and beneficiaries targeted. As locally sourced cereals were complemented by 
produce shipped from abroad, using WFP regular channels, the ability to feed the 
needy was not dependent on the output of the development activities. Such a scheme 
demonstrated that there are cases in which it is possible to link humanitarian activities 
and development ones, without neither side having necessarily to compromise on key 
                                                
56 Bush clearing and bush thinning aim at limiting bush encroaching, or the presence of invasive species in 
lands used for animal grazing. Experts consider the occurrence of an ecosystem dominated by woody 
vegetation, rather than grass, as one of the major forms of degradation in rangelands in arid and semi-arid 
regions (Lukomska, Quaas and Baumgärtner 2010) 
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objectives and values. Support to small farmers would aim to promote economic 
growth at household level, while humanitarian relief could remain needs-based; 
targeting of beneficiaries would follow different criteria and would not interfere with 
each other. 
6.2 The rules of the game 
The first of the three pillars examined is the regulative one. Before delving into the 
rules governing the provision of humanitarian and development aid, it is worth noting 
that these fields, and more in general the domain of international relations, are 
characterised by the obvious lack of a global government (Weiss 2013: 1). As a 
consequence, enforcement becomes problematic even in case of “hard” rules, which are 
supposed to be binding. Indeed, Weiss argues that “compliance gaps” reduce 
institutionalisation. Nevertheless, and regardless of compliance, various sets of rules 
applicable to the humanitarian and development aid chains do exist.  
Traditional international humanitarian law (IHL) is one most obvious source, but 
being only applicable to situation of armed conflict, it not relevant to a case study on a 
food crisis in peaceful times. Even though, as mentioned in chapter 2, there is a 
growing body of regulations going under the label of “International Disasters Response 
Law” (IDRL), it is more a “rather scattered and heterogeneous collection of 
instruments” (Fisher 2007:353). These regulations, notes Fisher (ibid), establish that 
affected governments can receive assistance, but there is no corresponding duty for 
humanitarian agencies to intervene, nor affected governments are obliged in any way 
to accept such assistance. As of now, IDLR deals mostly with procedures for the 
delivery of assistance (provided that the affected government requires it), such as 
establishing special procedures for custom clearance, or waiving custom duties (Fisher 
2007: 358).  
Apart from international law, the main sources of binding rules for both humanitarian 
and development organisations are, on the one hand, the applicable laws of the 
recipient country and, on the other hand, contractual stipulation on the use of funding 
determined by (or at best negotiated with) donors. The former apply to all aid 
organisations in the country indistinctly, whereas the latter are defined on an ad hoc 
basis for each grant. Taken together, these two sources, more than international law, 
establish the regulative framework that defines day-to-day practices of humanitarian 
and development assistance, and have come up frequently in my interviews and during 
my participant observations.  
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6.2.1 Ethiopian rules on the provision of aid 
Ethiopia is quite unique insofar it has developed a rather strong governmental 
presence in the domain of disaster prevention and response, as well as development. 
The Ethiopian state was involved in various forms of disaster relief since imperial 
times, and since the 1974 famine, a series of national institutions dealing with disaster 
prevention, response, and development have been established (Lautze et al. 2009). As 
one informant noted, “the government is driving the train. And we are not even in the 
train: we are in the back, pushing the train. They make the decisions: it's their country, 
it's their government, it's their people, and they take the issue of sovereignty very 
seriously” (interview UN_13_006, May 2013).  
The most relevant pieces of legislation in terms of humanitarian and development 
assistance are: 
- The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution which, in its article 89§3, states that the 
“Government shall take measures to avert any natural and man-made disasters, and, 
in the event of disasters, to provide timely assistance to the victims”. 
- The “Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009” (henceforth CSP), which 
regulate the various aspects of the establishment, registration, and functioning of 
NGOs and other charitable organisations. 
- The 1993 “National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management” (NPDPM),57 
which outlines the basic principles that have to be followed in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the country. 
Furthermore, and not surprisingly, aid agencies are bound to respect any other 
applicable laws, such as those related to employment, as well as regulations relevant 
for their sector of intervention, even though not necessarily developed for use by 
external agencies. As far as nutrition is concerned, one informant explained that the 
Ministry of Health has a “very strong nutrition unit that has to approve all proposals, 
all protocols for nutrition services, they have to revise and approve any [nutritional] 
surveys that has already been done before it gets published” (interview 
                                                
57 After the 2011-2012 crisis, the NPDPM has been replaced by a National Policy And Strategy on Disaster 
Risk Management, approved in July 2013 and therefore not relevant to the present study.  
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NGO_12_B_006), commenting that it would almost impossible to start a programme 
without local authorities giving it a blessing.  
An important element of the Ethiopian regulations on charitable activities is that they 
do not differentiate between humanitarian relief and developmental activities. In terms 
of LRD, this means that NGOs can carry out both types of projects as they deem 
appropriate. Indeed, the 1993 NPDPM explicitly encouraged linkages between disaster 
relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention, and development objectives. 
CSP is the single piece of regulation that impacts most on NGO practice. The 
proclamation, in fact, regulates in detail the procedures required to constitute and run 
an NGO (sections V and VI). In particular, all charities are expected to submit every 
year a statement of accounts (art.78) and an annual report (art.80) to the Charities and 
Societies Agency (CSA). The CSA is mandated with supervising charity work, and it has 
the authority to issue, renew, or revoke the licence to operate, which in any case has a 
maximum duration of three years (art. 76). 
Moreover, in its art. 14, the CSP defines the sole admissible purposes of charitable 
action. It is worth noting that the most sensitive (such as the advancement of human 
rights, conflict resolution, and the promotion of justice) are reserved to Ethiopian 
charities, which in turn are defined in art.2§2 as those that: 
“are formed under the laws of Ethiopia, all of whose members are 
Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia and wholly controlled by 
Ethiopians. However, they may be deemed as Ethiopian Charities or 
Ethiopian Societies if they use not more than ten percent of their funds 
which is received from foreign sources” 
The obvious aim of this provision is to prevent any foreign influence, even if indirect, 
on controversial themes, particularly considering that it was included in the draft law 
after post-electoral turmoil in 2005 (Lautze, et al. 2009). This provision has created 
difficulties particularly to alchemical humanitarian NGOs and human rights groups. 
This has not necessarily stopped NGOs from getting involved on these issues. For 
instance, an NGO employee noted that they had a project on “Civil Society 
Development – which would be called Governance and Human Rights if we were not 
in Ethiopia”.  
Furthermore, the Charities and Societies Proclamation stipulates that all NGOs – 
regardless of their sector of work – cannot use more than 30% of their funding for 
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“administrative” costs (art. 88§1). While 30% might seem a fair amount of money, this 
depends on what gets to be labelled as “administrative”. I was informed that in some 
cases, training costs had been counted as “administrative costs”, even though it was 
apparently no longer the case.58 Such an interpretation, based on the fact that training 
(in the case in point, of health workers) was not considered to bring a direct benefit to 
the affected populations, would make it impossible for any NGO to focus solely on 
capacity-building. Overall, the “70-30 rule”, as it is usually known, was cited often 
times by NGO staff as a major obstacle in project design.  
6.2.1.1 What it takes to play by the rules 
All projects have to be approved by the relevant authorities at federal, regional, and 
zonal level. The authorisation can only be granted once an NGO has secured funding, 
but earlier talks are encouraged, which should minimise the risk of incompatibilities 
between local authorities and donor requirements. Ethiopian authorities have their 
own proposal format, which differs from the ones used by institutional donors, and 
requires all expenses to be converted in local currency (birr). Some informants 
reported that the three levels of administration do not necessarily communicate among 
each other, which can be become a problem during audit. In fact, if an NGO is found to 
have spent money in ways other than what agreed upon in the project document – 
even if acting on the request of zonal or regional authorities –, their licence can be 
revoked. An NGO country director reported that sometimes “If we continue, we might 
have the Government telling us ‘You don't have the right to work on this aspect 
because (the agreement) it is not signed', while if we don't continue […] another office 
will say 'You are doing nothing, malnutrition has a peak’” (interview 
NGO_12_B_004). Yet, another informant – a country director with twenty years of 
experience in the country – dismissed the latter problem, claiming that they enjoy 
good relations with Ethiopian authorities precisely because of their “can-do attitude”: 
My experience in Ethiopia is that mostly the government would be 
flexible; they do want an agreement, which is right and correct, but they 
are flexible on the timing. It is rare that people insist that you cannot 
respond until you have the agreement signed […] Some organisations 
themselves can over-emphasise the bureaucracy and [...] would insist 
                                                
58 Only in 2015 the Charities and Societies Agency would specify that costs incurred for salaries, transport 
fees, and training can be considered as “project” rather than “administrative” costs.  
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they cannot operate without an agreement, but we rarely had that 
experience (interview NGO_13_F_001, April 2012). 
Nevertheless, even if his personal experience was that authorities are not actually 
interested in NGOs following the rules, others were not willing to take the chances. In 
doing so, however, they might as well establish a self-fulfilling prophecy, as argued by 
the same country director. Having good relations with the authorities, in his view, was 
a consequence of being always ready to intervene, which at every turn reinforced the 
mutual trust and gave his NGO the option to conduct activities even if agreements were 
still pending. On the contrary, he observed, 
a lot of NGOs are caught in the paradigm, trying to get a government 
agreement, and trying to get funding to come in, and then, sometimes 
the government guys at woreda level can get upset, annoyed that 
response is delayed, and that can cause problems in the relationship 
(interview NGO_13_F_001). 
NGO employees were usually ambivalent on the role exercised by the Ethiopian 
government. Some informants praised the industriousness of the national authorities 
in coordinating relief and development efforts, often noting that this stood in contrast 
with their experience in other countries. One informant commented that the fact that 
with the authorities being in the know, they manage to avoid duplication, which is “is a 
win-win situation” (interview NGO_12_A_001). More frequent, however, was criticism 
towards the excessive control on proposals exercised by authorities. Other informants 
also lamented the long waiting times before a project is approved, and the fact that 
high turnover in the Ethiopian bureaucracy often results in institutional memory loss, 
meaning that an officer would often not be aware of what had been agreed by their 
predecessor(s), unnecessarily lengthening the negotiations. Furthermore, there can be 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the rules, particularly if different regions are 
compared with one another. According to an NGO project assistant, for instance, 
regional authorities in Oromyia authorities are tougher and more meticulous in 
checking proposals than those in Somali region. Furthermore, some were skeptical 
about the authorities’ not being impartial in the definition of needs and of priority 
areas, noting that in SNNPR region state, known for political antagonism to the 
government, the number of eligible beneficiaries had been cut down dramatically, and 
that “if a village where you want to operate is not on the list, you can’t do anything” 
(interview NGO_12_D_001). 
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Recruitment of expatriates is allowed only if there are no suitable candidates from 
Ethiopia (local authorities do check and may not issue work permits if they do not 
agree). The problem is that in some cases it is hard to demonstrate the lack of skilled 
workers in Ethiopia. The country director of an NGO recalled that he had been unable 
to demonstrate the need for an expatriate senior humanitarian logistician, as 
authorities pointed out that there are Ethiopian nationals with multi-year experience 
in logistics. His argument that experience in organising the logistics of non-perishable 
goods does not necessarily build the capacity to oversee appropriate transportation and 
storage of drugs and other medical equipment was not considered relevant.  
6.2.2 Donors and contractual clauses 
Contractual clauses on the use of project grants complete the landscape of binding 
rules that NGOs and other aid organisations are required to follow. These rules are 
particularly relevant insofar public funding constitute the biggest source of funding for 
humanitarian and development assistance.59 Of the people interviewed during my 
fieldwork in 2012 and 2013, no one worked for an organisation that was entirely 
funded through private donations; and barely two reported that their organisations 
received less than half of their funding from government donors. While the detailed 
contractual provisions vary from case to case (and according to the donor), they 
normally include, at the very least, some criteria to determine the eligibility of 
expenses, the timeframe for project implementation, and reporting requirements.  
As stated in chapter 3 above, there is a major distinction between humanitarian and 
development budget lines in terms of timeframes for project implementation. Indeed, 
the contrast between humanitarian funds which have to be spent within 12-18 months 
and multi-year development programmes was frequently cited as an element that 
perpetuates the institutionalisation of the divide.  
“Part of our problem now is that donors are very siloed, [...] so 
emergency donors [only want] short-term interventions, not longer-
term. The development donors, again, they have their own agenda, it's 
more of a long-term agenda” (Interview NGO_13_E_001, April 2013) 
                                                
59 In comparison with public funding, private donations can be spent more freely, even though, in an effort 
to improve transparency, most NGOs allow private donors to earmark their donations for a project or 
sector of intervention of their choice, thus limiting flexibility on how to use such funds. 
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All the organisations involved in this study used a combination of grants from different 
donors, and in most cases were benefiting from both humanitarian and development 
budget lines, or were planning to do so in the future. To illustrate the differences 
between the different rules that apply to humanitarian and development grants, I will 
illustrate the example of the European Commission, one of the major players in 
Ethiopia for both types of assistance.60 While these are by no means representative of 
the requirements set by other donors, they are proposed here with the intent of 
clarifying how detailed such provisions can be, and in which ways they contribute to 
the institutionalisation of the humanitarian-development divide. I will then close this 
section by discussing options for increase flexibility, which according to informants is a 
key element of any successful LRD strategy. 
6.2.2.1 Humanitarian grants: ECHO 
The European Commission provides aid to Ethiopia through both its humanitarian 
arm, ECHO, and its development one, EuropeAid. The two are not just separate budget 
lines, but two different Directorate Generals – roughly equivalent to ministries – with 
different managers. In Ethiopia, the distinction is exacerbated by the fact that ECHO 
has its own office, whereas the focal point for development grants sits within the 
European Delegation compound, that is the institution that represents European 
foreign policy interests in the same way embassies do for States. The separation 
between the two directorates is such, that some NGO staff fail to appreciate that they 
are actually part of the same organisation. Some of the informants incorrectly referred 
to EuropeAid as “the European Commission” or even “the European Union” (interview 
NGO_13_H_001); whereas ECHO was never equated with the Commission as a whole.  
ECHO provides humanitarian funding, which according to Council Regulation (EC) 
1257/96 of 20 June 1996 encompasses not only emergency relief and humanitarian 
protection, but “may also include an element of short-term rehabilitation” as well as 
disaster preparedness”. ECHO grants can be disbursed to NGOs, UN agencies, and the 
ICRC, provided that a preliminary framework agreement has been signed. The process 
leading to the framework partnership agreement involves a screening of the applicant 
organisation, which assesses its overall administrative, financial, and technical 
capacities, as well as its humanitarian credentials (Council Regulation (EC) 1257/96). 
The process is meant to speed up grant negotiations in times of the emergency, as 
                                                
60 Furthermore, also due to the selection criteria, the majority of respondents were familiar with EC 
funding lines. 
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partners do not need to be re-assessed before a grant can be awarded. Nevertheless, 
according to some sources, it still takes about four to six months to get ECHO’s 
approval,61 to which one must add the time necessary to get the green light from the 
Ethiopian authorities. In total, it can sometimes take almost a year between the 
outbreak of the crisis and the start of the activities, and in the meantime the situation 
may have changed significantly (either in positive or in negative terms).  
As a general rule, ECHO provides only partial financing of a proposed project, meaning 
that the remaining costs must be borne by the implementing organisation through 
other funds, which can be private donations or grants from other institutions. ECHO 
can consider 100% funding only in urgent cases – when a delay could lead to loss of 
lives – if no other contributions are available. It is crucial to note that even when 
ECHO’s contribution covers only a portion of the total costs of a project, it still requires 
that the entire project budget fulfil its own eligibility conditions.62 In order to be 
considered eligible under ECHO rules, expenses must be: i) actually incurred during 
the established period of eligibility specified in the grant agreement; ii) “essential for 
the performance of the operation”, whereas the operation has to be humanitarian in 
nature. Proposals must fit within the general priorities outlined in the relevant 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP), a document outlining ECHO’s operational 
priorities and budget allocations per each crisis. HIPs normally cover a two-years 
timeframe, but are subject to periodic revisions.  
For 2011, single-country HIPs were used, whereas in 2012 a regional HIP for the entire 
Horn of Africa was launched. The HIPs also define the earliest possible date starting 
from which expenses can be eligible, and the maximum duration of the projects. As the 
starting date can be prior to the publication of the HIP, it can also precede the 
signature of the contract. Such retroactivity has the purpose of enabling 
reimbursement of (appropriate) humanitarian activities carried out by partners prior 
                                                
61 This estimate applies to projects in response to slow-onset crises such as the one that hit Ethiopia in 
2011-2012. Different rules apply for the provision of relief after sudden disasters (such as earthquakes), in 
which case ECHO can release funds almost immediately, but these types of projects are limited to a 3-6 
months duration (depending on the type of decision) without possibility for an extension.  
62 As a consequence, an organisation that wishes to use private (or otherwise non-earmarked) funds to 
carry out activities that do not fit within ECHO’s guidelines would not be able to include them in a single 
project. Instead, they would have to prepare two separate projects: one that follows ECHO’s eligibility 
criteria; and a second one including the activities that ECHO would not fund.  
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to securing the grant. Project proposals can be submitted on a rolling basis during the 
period of validity of the HIP, provided that there are unallocated funds. All project 
proposals have to be presented using ECHO’s own template, called “Single Form”. 
Subsequent amendments to the project are allowed, but have to follow specific 
procedures. ECHO requires its partners to submit an interim report for any project of 
duration exceeding ten months. Final narrative and reports are due within three 
months from the end of the Action; without them, ECHO would not proceed to 
disburse the final instalment, usually 20% of its contribution. A wealth of additional 
prescriptions regulates the various aspects of project implementation, including 
obligations related to donor visibility. 
As for the length of the projects, ECHO can set the maximum duration between three 
and eighteen months. Implementation timeframes of 3-6 months (without the 
possibility for an extension) are normally reserved for sudden-onset emergencies; 
whereas 12-18 months are typical maximum durations for other humanitarian crises. 
In the case of Ethiopia, different rounds of funding allocations had different 
timeframes. The 2011 Ethiopia HIP established that food aid and other humanitarian 
aid initiatives could start as early as 01 January 2011, and last for up to 15 months 
(with the possibility of a further extension of up to nine additional months); whereas 
assistance to refugees and IDPs was eligible could not start earlier than 01 December 
2011, and had a maximum duration of twelve months (except in case of an extension). 
The 2012 Horn of Africa HIP, with an earliest eligibility date of 01 January 2012, could 
last as long as eighteen months, with the possibility of a further six months extension.  
6.2.2.2 Development grants: EuropeAid 
The procedures for being awarded a EuropeAid development grant differ from those 
described above in many respects. First of all, applicants do not have to be necessarily 
organisations devoted to development action, but in principle any natural or legal 
person can apply (with some restrictions based on nationality). Secondly, there is no 
preliminary screening of applicants,63 but administrative and technical capacities are 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, grants are usually awarded on a multi-
year basis. Different development funding lines were activated in Ethiopia, the largest 
of which was the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), running from 2008 to 
                                                
63 Applicants are encouraged to register some basic data (such as statutes or financial statements) in an 
online system, but this only serves the purpose of avoiding the need to submit multiple times the same 
pieces of information (EuropeAid website).  
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2013. It must be noted that the large majority of the EDF is allocated to infrastructural 
works, support to the Ethiopian government’s budget, and financial contributions 
towards the PSNP safety net programme (ECO Consult et al. 2012), which leaves a 
relatively small amount of money open to subcontracting for smaller development 
initiatives such as those run by NGOs. Furthermore, a small part of the EDF, called 
“envelope B”, is usually left unallocated so that it can be used to supplement 
humanitarian response.  
The timing of the 2011-2012 crisis was particularly unfavourable in terms of 
integration of humanitarian and development budget lines, as it happened towards the 
end of the period of validity of the 10th EDF. As explained by an EC official, the EDF 
“is a program that is designed and runs for the next five-six years, and then when you 
have decided priority sectors and the things you need to do, there is no other money 
[available]” (interview EC_12_001). As a matter of fact, some EUR 15 million from 
envelope B were allocated to humanitarian response in June 2011. Another interesting 
funding line activated in Ethiopia during the period under consideration was the “food 
facility” adopted in response to the 2007-2008 food prices crisis, and which was used 
to fund projects in support of small agriculture between 2009 and 2011. The food 
facility aimed explicitly at bridging the gap between humanitarian relief and longer 
term development (European Commission 2010), and it had a short-term timeframe 
reminiscent of the humanitarian budget lines; yet it was administered by the 
development “arm” of the commission independently from ECHO. However, the 
relatively short timeframe for implementation of a “development” project, 18 months 
extended to 24, implied a trade-off between the complex responses that some NGOs 
felt were needed, and what was achievable without risking to infringe the contractual 
terms. Contract management procedures, in fact, are reportedly cumbersome, 
particularly as far as procurement regulations are concerned, which according to the 
amount might require the contract holder to organise an international tender. “We 
have a full-time staff member, an international staff member, just on contract 
compliance for the office”. It’s not just [for] the EU, it’s also others, but I think we 
would not have [this position] if we hadn’t substantial EU contracts”, revealed one 
interviewee (interview NGO_13_I_001). 
Proposals can only be submitted in response to a call, and sometimes with very tight 
deadlines. Once a contract is signed, project changes are permitted, but in case of 
significant alterations of the original project (more than 10% variation on any of the 
budget lines, or modification of any of the objective), permission (“raider”) must be 
obtained from the European Commission, which might take long. The NGO source 
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quoted above recalled having requested such raiders in past projects, and that it took 
them “between six to nine months” to get the approval, on a project whose initial 
duration was of 18 months (interview NGO_13_I_001).  
6.2.2.3 Options for flexibility 
In spite of the differences highlighted in the sections above, there was growing 
openness towards better integration between funding lines, something that was 
indicated by virtually all informants as a key element of any successful LRD strategy.  
The EC itself embarked in a three-layered approach aimed at increasing collaboration 
between its two branches. The first layer was entirely funded by ECHO, and looked at 
increasing intersectoral collaboration in eight “clusters”,64 identified as priority areas 
together with the government. In each cluster, one NGO would take the lead for the 
implementation of a multiagency and multi-sectoral programme based on a common 
logframe. Such programmes would have duration of three years, although formally 
would be made up of two separate contracts of 18 months each, as this is the maximum 
upper limit for funding decisions taken by ECHO. The second layer would be the joint 
ECHO-EuropeAid SHARE initiative for drought response in the Horn of Africa. The 
details of this initiative – also known as RESET within Ethiopia – were not yet clear 
during my fieldwork, and only in late 2014 some draft concept notes have been 
circulated to start clarifying the process. The underlying idea would be to continue 
focusing on the geographical clusters identified by ECHO. Finally, the third layer 
should be ensured by earmarking part of the 11th EDF, running from 2014 to 2020, to 
development activities in those same clusters, so to reduce vulnerability. At the time of 
writing, details on the allocation of the 11th EDF were not yet known, and therefore it is 
not possible to assess how those areas will be targeted. 
An example of programme flexibility that was often brought up by informants was the 
“crisis modifier” mechanism introduced by United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in its Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative, one of the several 
development programmes running in Ethiopia during the period under observation. 
The crisis modifier enabled the implementing agencies to respond to external shocks 
intervening during the course of their projects, by authorising them to access 
additional emergency funds and to alter the planned activity according to the new 
                                                
64 These clusters bear no relation or similarity to the humanitarian clusters often set up in the wake of 
emergencies. A senior EC officer admitted that this was poor naming choice that could generate confusion. 
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situation. The activities enabled through the crisis modifier would be geared towards 
protecting pastoral livelihoods under stress, such as for instance commercial or 
slaughter de-stocking, or provision of veterinary services and fodder.  
According to the website of the US Embassy in Ethiopia, in 2011 USAID provided over 
2 million USD through this crisis modifier, equivalent to two-three medium sized 
projects. The crisis modifier mechanism did not require the formulation of a new 
concept paper, let alone a full proposal, but allowed NGOs to request changes simply 
by informing USAID of the proposed new activities and related expenses. According to 
a source within an NGO that had used the mechanism, USAID would release the 
additional funding within two weeks, an impressive speed if compared to the normal 
process of approval of a funding request. The flexibility of the mechanism also implied 
that the emergency activities allowed with the help of the crisis modifier could be 
stopped at any moment (and money returned to USAID) if the situation improved.  
“If an emergency happens, you have a mechanism to access funds quickly, 
and then you can respond in a much more efficient manner than if you 
have to do the whole thing again, proposal writing, discussing with the 
donor. This is done in advance”. (interview NGO_12_A_003) 
[With] USAID, we [...] were able to build on some flexibility within our 
programming, we would say 'We think that in year two we will do 
restocking, and farmer's production, livestock growth', but there is a 
drought, so instead of that we actually have to do emergency de-stocking 
[…] We were allowed to have flexibility based on changing conditions”. 
(interview NGO_13_D_001) 
In this respect, USAID was a unique case, as no other institutional donor had a 
mechanism comparable to the crisis modifier, although others were reportedly looking 
into possibilities for allowing more flexibility. An EC officer stated that his dream 
“would be to have the possibility to co-fund the same project between humanitarian 
and development EC funding, with crisis modifier rules embedded, and the same 
reporting, but so far it doesn’t exist yet” (interview EC 13_002). 
This appreciation for crisis modifier mechanisms contrasted with the difficult reality of 
getting changes approved. NGOs are often wary of requesting them because of the time 
necessary for approval, as well as the perceived risk that it could jeopardise their 
relationship with a donor. The willingness to submit a budget modification request 
depends in part on the perceived legitimacy and acceptability of the request. The 
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process was reportedly rather straightforward if activities are disrupted by an 
unpredictable disaster, in which case contingency funds – which are a fixed percentage 
of all grant contracts – could be accessed. Things could get more problematic in case of 
predictable disasters, such as droughts, which are normally anticipated about a year 
ahead. Declaring that something that was one year in the making has disrupted 
activities, explained a programme manager, could be easily read as a failure in 
appropriately planning activities or monitoring the situation: “So, do we admit bad 
programming and get the change, or we continue as we are and hope for the best?” 
(interview NGO_13_I_001). Furthermore, even if the decision to apply for a change is 
taken, one should consider the time needed for having it approved, which can easily 
amount to six months or more. Legally, the NGO should continue with the original 
project until the change is either approved or rejected, but, as the same programme 
manager noted, 
you cannot stop your activities in that period, so you are submitting a 
budget that is already false. So we predict what we need in the next six 
months, build that in the raider request, and hope that it does not take 
any longer, but also hope that no other big change happens in the 
meantime. […] And then, if they refuse, you’re in trouble. (interview 
NGO_13_I_001) 
 
6.3 The normative framework 
As discussed in chapter 3, the different mandates of humanitarian and development 
action have been one of the main arguments of LRD critics. Discourses emphasising 
the different objectives and guiding principles, or contrasting norms and procedures, 
might contribute to perpetuating the humanitarian/development divide. At the same 
time, however, discourses of resilience and “bridging the gap” could push in the 
opposite direction. In this part of the chapter, I will examine the normative narratives 
used to justify humanitarian and development action produced by three different types 
of actors: Ethiopian government, donors, and implementing organisations.  
6.3.1 A political contract against famine 
In a country were famine has precipitated the fall of two regimes in less than two 
decades, ensuring that people do not starve has become a key function of the state, as 
demonstrated also by the detailed regulative framework referred to above. Such an 
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“anti-famine political contract” (De Waal 1997) is pursued not just for the good of the 
population, but also for the government’s own survival. From this perspective, famine 
is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but also a political one, which has to be avoided 
at all costs (Lautze and Maxwell 2007). A major consequence is that that Ethiopian 
governments have taken ownership of setting up early warning systems and 
maintained a relatively strong disaster risk management agency (Lautze et al. 2009). 
The insistence on weather-based early warning system is also related with a tendency 
to rationalise famines as inherently natural disasters (see for example the 2013 
National Strategy on Disaster Risk Management), which tries to take politics out of the 
equation. 
Furthermore, as noted by Lautze et al. (2009:8) if “the very existence of government’s 
disaster management institutions represents a failure of the state” by some Ethiopian 
authorities, this is even more blatant of foreign international humanitarian 
organisations distributing emergency relief in the country. This has contributed to an 
ambivalent relationship with humanitarian organisations, frequently considered to be 
– not entirely without reason – acting in a patronising and unaccountable way.65 The 
Government remains adamant in its preference of disaster prevention and overall 
development over disaster relief. 
In addition to proper disaster prevention and risk reduction policies, the Government 
also took shortcuts to demonstrate progress towards reducing the number of people 
reliant on humanitarian food aid. An example cited by several informants66 was the 
decision to change the basis for calculating yearly humanitarian needs, switching from 
the number of people below the “livelihoods threshold” (i.e. those who do not have 
sufficient income to meet nutritional and other basic needs such as medicines or 
clothing) to the number of people below the “survival threshold” (i.e. people unable to 
meet their nutritional needs). This change has implied a reduction in the number of 
humanitarian beneficiaries of about one million, without proof of any material 
improvement in their lives.  
                                                
65 Lautze et al. (2009) suggest that the diffidence toward international humanitarian organisations is 
partially grounded in the fact that the forces that are now part of the ruling party, the EPRDF, know all too 
well how opposition movements can benefit from special relations with foreign NGOs, having benefited of 
this kind of assistance themselves in the 1980s, when they were the rebels fighting against the government 
of the time.  
66 Among others, interviewees NGO_12_C_001 and UN_13_006. 
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“[W]e all know that the government clustering system and hotspot 
woredas is politically motivated. They lost 1 million hungry people in 
SNNPR [regional state] in one day: the survey was done, the 
government took it, the figures went out and one million people went 
off the list. We know it’s political. If you look at how many people 
receive aid in places like Tigray, and look how many people are 
receiving [it] in somewhere like SNNPR, there is no similarity, even 
though in some of those areas, malnutrition rates would be similar” 
(interview NGO_13_E_001).  
In terms of development policies, Ethiopia is undertaking an ambitious development 
programme centred on massive economic growth as the key to reduce poverty. The 
Growth and Transformation Plan, which outlines the government’s development 
strategy for the period 2010-2015, set the staggering target of an average GDP growth 
in real terms of 11% per year (Government of Ethiopia, 2010). The vision set by the 
Government is that Ethiopia should become a “Middle Income Country” as early as 
2025. Apart from its efforts in terms of promoting macroeconomic growth, the 
Government of Ethiopia is also tackling chronic poverty at household level, with a 
short-medium term timeframe. The key instrument is the massive Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP). Launched in 2005, the PSNP targets chronically food 
insecure people, providing them with cash or in kind assistance to close their food 
consumption gap. The majority of its beneficiaries are required to take part in public 
works; whereas more vulnerable households that cannot count on able-bodied 
members receive their assistance unconditionally.  
Policy guidance and supervision of relief, rehabilitation, and development activities are 
entrusted to different bodies. Broader humanitarian response falls under the Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA), which depends upon the Ministry of 
Agriculture. As the name itself says, the DPPA oversees preparedness and prevention; 
the fact that relief, which is also one of its responsibilities, is not even mentioned in the 
official name might be telling of the attitude of denial towards this aspect. The absence 
of any reference to relief is even more striking if one notes that the DPPA is an 
evolution of what was formerly known as “Relief and Rehabilitation Commission” 
(RRC). Compared to the DPPA, the RRC had also an higher status (reporting directly 
to the Council of Ministers rather to a Ministry), and was larger in size (Lautze et al. 
2009). DPPA has no oversight on activities related to refugees, which must instead be 
coordinated with the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), part of 
the larger Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority, which reports directly 
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to the prime minister. Rural development initiatives, including the PSNP, are 
supervised by the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB), which similarly to the 
DPPA falls under the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, relevant line ministries can 
be involved in the supervision of humanitarian and development projects falling under 
their area of competence (for instance, the Ministry of Health in case of health-related 
activities). Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development has an 
overall responsibility in defining the country’s economic development strategies. 
If this fragmentation might reinforce divisions – and indeed I was informed of 
problems arising from conflicting priorities among different agencies –, it is also worth 
noting that the refusal to treat emergency relief as a standalone entity appears to be 
conducive to a more integrated treatment of disaster prevention, response, and early 
rehabilitation, not dissimilar to some views of “bridging the gap”. And indeed, 
interviewees never referred to the governmental structures as hindering LRD efforts;67 
if anything, complaints rather focused on the difficulty of remaining impartial when it 
is the Government that decides who is eligible for humanitarian aid, and who is not.   
6.3.2 Donors and the perpetuation of the divide 
In a context where the boundaries between humanitarian and development action 
were rather blurred, the main outlier were international donors. Most had separate 
organisational units in charge of humanitarian and development action respectively, of 
which the European Commission is one blatant example. While sharing the same 
management and accountability lines might contribute to better integration – in the 
words of one interviewee, it would help to have “the humanitarian and the 
development side of the house physically in the same place” (interview UN_13_006), 
even more relevant under a normative point of view is the fact that donors exacerbate 
the division by legitimating contrasting discourses.  
Several informants referred to the distinction between situations of humanitarian or 
development concern as a donor construct. Donors had very clear mandates, whereas 
                                                
67 Only in one case, one source who worked for a dual mandate organisation that has been subcontracted 
the delivery of PSNP assistance in some areas, alongside their own humanitarian projects, referred of 
difficulties in reconciling the two approaches. Their point, however, was that PSNP and humanitarian 
assistance are mutually exclusive, but considering that the value of humanitarian assistance was higher 
than what PSNP beneficiaries received, they were uneasy with the resulting disparities (Interview 
NGO_12_A_002).  
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implementing agencies tended to perceive a more nuanced situation, one that does not 
allow for answering questions on the boundaries between the types of action: When do 
emergencies begin? When do they end? When does development start? One 
interviewee went as far as labelling the way the donor environment is structured a 
“forced dichotomy”, explaining: 
While there may be some clear-cut situations (an earthquake for 
example), in others [including Ethiopia] you have sort of resilient 
crises: they’re almost always there, and then you have peaks coming 
over. If you go to the people, they don’t have a distinction between 
humanitarian [and development], they would always have issues, 
whether it is water, whether it is their livestock, whether severe or 
acute food shortages. The dichotomy exists only at donor level, for 
funding issues. You cannot blame ECHO, because their mandate is 
purely humanitarian, that what’s their name says. When you put in a 
programme design that has a strong long term development issue, they 
tend to discuss that with you and say ‘maybe in that case you should 
actually apply to [EuropeAid] funding’, because they have this division 
(interview NGO_12_B_006).  
Another interviewee highlighted the issue of the different narratives of humanitarian 
and development response typical of some donors:  
There are two very distinct sets of languages that separate 
development and emergency. So if you make a development proposal, 
everything is brilliant [...] we talk about the strengths of communities, 
their ability to cope, their ability to manage, the opportunity that 
working together will bring. If you read an emergency proposal, the 
community is weak and vulnerable.[…] because we can't go to ECHO 
and be talking about the wellbeing and success of these communities in 
solving their own problems, 'cause ECHO won't fund us” (interview 
NGO_13_F_001).  
This long comment unveils a powerful example of how discourses can contribute to 
shaping reality. Regardless of the actual nature of the situation, choosing a narrative of 
“crisis” instead of one of “poverty” could determine whether the NGO would get 
funding for a project from a certain donor, and as a result, what might the project be 
about – as there needs to be a logic in the intervention. Surely, this was also a reminder 
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of the intertwining of structure and agency: despite donors being polarised, NGOs 
could instrumentally choose to adapt narratives to pursue their own objectives.  
Other informants focused more on the fact that they had difficulties in raising longer-
term funding to complement their emergency response projects, attributing their 
struggle to “the way the donor environment is structured” (NGO_12_B_006). What 
donors are open to finance becomes crucial when NGOs themselves structure their 
priorities around “the available budget, on the priorities to fund” (Interview 
NGO_13_H_001). 
Sources at ECHO, however, maintained that humanitarian action differs from 
development action not just for how it is described, to the point that often they would 
often take place in geographically different areas. And, even when working in the same 
community, 
development actors would use a growth objective [and] the 
humanitarians would look at those who are at the bottom of the 
society. That means for example we will look not only at pastoralists, 
but we are obliged to look at ex-pastoralists, [...] whereas the 
development side would say: ‘If we invest in those who have lost 
everything, we won't get any result’. It is two ways of thinking that are 
not always coherent, and that definitely causes a lot of problems. 
(interview EC_13_001) 
Rather than rejecting the possibility of collaboration on the grounds of conflicting 
principles and operating modalities, the informant suggested that humanitarian and 
development actors should as much as possible collaborate with joint planning of 
several different interventions targeting different groups, resulting in one integrated 
framework. 
Interestingly, the three interviewees in European Commission institutions (two at 
ECHO and one at EuropeAid), agreed on the fact that humanitarian and development 
action should be better integrated. This should not necessarily mean making 
humanitarian action more “development-like”, but perhaps the reverse, as suggested 
by an ECHO officer, who defended the humanitarian character of the organisation 
(“We are here, we follow our mandate, we 'repair' the emergency needs, immediate 
needs, we save lives”), and then expressed the need for someone else to come after and 
“address these structural problems, in order to avoid that we have to continue coming 
every single year when there is a particular shock (interview EC_12_001). Despite 
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having defended the importance of the two mandates, he also admitted that NGOs that 
have a double mandate are better prepared for LRRD than those that stick to 
emergency response only.  
6.2.3 Mandates and identities among implementing 
organisations 
Most NGO employees interviewed for this research were working in dual-mandate 
organisations, and so did some of the UN officers. Perhaps it is for this reason that the 
issue of different mandates was rarely used during the interviews, and mostly 
dismissed as a something relevant at donor level, but less so in the field.  
Not a single interviewee expressed the preoccupation that working on development 
could negatively affect the delivery of humanitarian relief on the grounds of their 
different mandates or guiding principles. Actually, references to an ontological 
difference between humanitarian and development actors were completely absent. The 
humanitarian-development distinction was mostly ascribed to different contexts (the 
“emergency” versus the “normal” year), rather than to incompatible values.  
Occasionally, some respondents would mention the fact that they mostly operated as 
humanitarian actors, referring to such things as having a humanitarian “first mandate” 
(interview UN_13_001). Another UN officer, while rejecting the either-or 
juxtaposition, maintained that in his view, humanitarian concerns should be 
prioritised over development ones: 
We have to address the child who needs therapeutic feeding because of 
acute malnutrition first, before we address the child who graduated 
from therapeutic feeding centre. […] No matter what, you can't take 
the food from the baby who's acutely malnourished, and give it to the 
baby who just graduated from the therapeutic feeding centre. No 
matter what, the humanitarian component needs to be funded, if 
resilience is going to have any chance, because it's the same baby, 
entering or exiting the feeding centre. And if it doesn't get the food to 
start out with, there will be no recovery, no resilience, no livelihoods 
improvement (UN_13_006) 
The disaster risk management and food security advisor of a large NGO even lamented 
the fact that since the organisation he worked for was mostly known for its 
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humanitarian efforts, it was difficult to prove to donors that they were well placed to 
carry out development activities as well.  
Apart from the distinctions resulting from the funding sources, interviewees mostly 
recognised that humanitarian and development action operate in different contexts 
and with different objectives and implementation modalities. The issue of different 
principles, however, was rarely brought up. Only one person used the word 
“humanitarian” to describe herself and the mandate of the NGO in which she held a 
managerial position. She also added that she did not really believe in development, 
whereas she maintained that humanitarian relief had proven to be effective at its main 
objective, saving lives. Ironically, her NGO had been carrying out development projects 
alongside relief interventions.68  
The country director of a large NGO talked of humanitarian “settings”, situations in 
which response had to be provided according to needs, as opposed to development 
projects, where other considerations would take priority, possibly resulting in targeting 
different groups. A similar position was expressed by a food security officer of another 
NGO, who explained that in agricultural development projects they target “producers, 
and also those farmers who can potentially produce”, while those who don’t have any 
potential — but perhaps greater humanitarian needs — have to be left out.  
Other informants, however, totally rejected the humanitarian/development divide, 
pointing to the fact that for affected people, there is rarely a clear-cut divide between 
what is an emergency situation, and what is poverty-as-usual, except in cases of 
sudden shocks. “They don’t have a distinction between humanitarian [and 
development], they would always have issues, whether it is water, whether it is their 
livestock, whether severe or acute food shortages”, affirmed NGO officer (interview 
NGO_12_B_002), who also defined Ethiopia as a place of “resilient crises”, crises that 
remain latent, with “peaks coming over” from time to time. Another aid worker 
provided a very poignant example of why the distinction could not be applied on the 
ground: ”if you're working with the community and [they] say 'You know, this water 
point development is all good, but do you know that the crops just failed?', [you cannot 
answer] 'Yes but we only do development, so... sorry’” (interview NGO_13_F_001).  
                                                
68 Reached for a follow-up conversation one year later, in April 2013, the same informant further 
elaborated that she was not actually skeptical of development per se, but that she did not believe that 
Ethiopia would be able to reach the development objectives set by its government, let alone in the short 
timeframe proposed — that is, she added, unless statistics were manipulated. 
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The humanitarian-development distinction, when explicitly acknowledged, was mostly 
dismissed as a donor feature, related to the situation on the field only to a limited 
extent. 
Interestingly, then, the “back-to-basics” argument that LRD approaches would put 
humanitarian principles in jeopardy was not much relevant in this case, not because it 
had been proven that there is no such effect, but because humanitarians themselves 
were seemingly not recognising the principles as their main guiding values.      
6.4 Cultural-cognitive aspects 
In this section, I will examine the cultural-cognitive elements that emerged from 
participant observation and interviews to aid workers. Considering that the majority of 
the informants worked for implementing organisations, in this section I will only focus 
on their own views of what is culturally appropriate and legitimate. The key point of 
interest here is to understand whether discourses based on cultural norms or scientific 
knowledge of the separation between humanitarian and development assistance, or of 
bridging the gap are shaping the views and actions of aid workers in the field, and how 
this contributes to or hinders linkages between humanitarian relief and development. 
As anticipated above, the humanitarian-development divide was rarely acknowledged 
as something inherent to the situation, and was instead viewed as a donor-driven 
concern. A consequence of donors’ polarisation, however, was that NGOs sometimes 
resorted to instrumentally adopting different different narratives when interacting 
with different donors. However, as one NGO country director lucidly noted, this 
brought risks of unconsciously perpetuating the views that are supported by those 
narratives.  
Even internally at [our NGO] this is something we have to manage. We 
have a set of staff that they think everything is nighttime, and then 
another set of staff that think everything is daytime. We endeavour 
within [the NGO] to have staff that understand the economic sense of 
describing communities separately for a donor, [but we] have to be 
extremely careful on how we describe communities internally with 
staff, 'cause it can compound a disaster-based prejudice, and it can 
cause even more problems with the disconnects between emergency 
and development, because like I said communities are described 
fundamentally different” (NGO_13_F_001) 
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Although findings tended to differ according the interviewees (and their roles), three 
main topics emerged: the neglect of the “linking” debate by most of the field workers; 
(as of 2013) a growing popularity of the concept of resilience; and the almost 
unanimous support for better integration of humanitarian and development efforts. 
6.4.1 The debate in the “field” 
One of the first observations that I could make after the first batch of interviews in 
2012 was that the people I spoke with were seemingly oblivious to the debate about 
bridging the gap. Almost no one, with the notable exception of EC officials, would use 
expressions such as LRRD, or Early Recovery for that matter. Some of them would not 
even know what this jargon was supposed to refer to, which among other things led me 
to use longer explanations in my interview questions. Even the existence of a divide 
between humanitarian and development work itself was rarely explicitly brought up.  
Quite understandably, given the fact that the European Commission had coined the 
acronym LRRD, the expression would still be used by its staff. Support went beyond 
the adoption of the LRRD narrative, although it was recognised that implementation of 
the approach was rife with obstacles: “LRRD is a concept, which is a very interesting 
concept in theory, but sometimes very difficult to put in practice […] Despite we all 
agree that we need to do it, it is not always possible. We push a lot for this” (interview 
EC_12_001). ECHO was also requiring all its partners to indicate an LRRD strategy in 
their project proposals; yet, in the 2011 version of their project proposals, there was no 
instance of the acronym. Instead, applicants had to outline a “Continuum strategy 
(Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development)” under section “5. Cross-cutting 
issues” (ECHO 2011)69. Whether this was a consequence of the fact that the acronym 
was not particularly known among partner NGOs, or instead one of its causes, it is 
interesting to note the reference to the problematic notion of a linear continuum. In 
the following year, the word LRRD appeared in a slightly revised version of ECHO’s 
project proposal format. The title of section 5 became “Transition (LRRD) and cross-
cutting issues”, but in the relevant subheading – re-christened as “Transition and/or 
exit strategies (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development)” – it was again spelled 
out. More importantly, the notion of “Continuum” was abandoned, although its 
                                                
69  The remaining cross-cutting issues being: “Describe the expected level of sustainability and/or 
connectedness”, and “Mainstreaming (e.g. Disaster Risk Reduction, Children, Human rights, Gender, 
Environmental impacts, others to be specified)”. 
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replacement stood out for its vagueness and for failing to clearly indicate, for instance, 
whether not-developmental exit strategies would be considered acceptable.  
An NGO source explained that in her experience, the donor would not seemingly be 
interested in what had been written under the cross-cutting section of the proposal – 
to her own relief, she added, as she maintained that some effective humanitarian 
interventions would have never been funded, had donors been serious about 
integrating relief and development. In most cases, she explained, the actual exit 
strategy was more on the line of “funds are over, goodbye” (interview 
NGO_12_C_001). In some cases the difficulty would be finding someone – local 
authorities, or maybe the community themselves – who can take over the project, if 
resources are not provided. In other cases, the exit strategy would happen without any 
action from the NGO: such as when refugees decide to leave the camps and go back 
home. Sometimes, she added, the situation was just too unforeseeable to allow for 
making plans. This account is corroborated by my own experience at ECHO, where I 
saw several project proposals getting approved, despite not sufficiently elaborating on 
LRRD.70 This scarcity of details does not necessarily denote unwillingness of bridging 
the gap, but might also be related to lack of attention or understanding of the LRD 
issue. For instance, a few project proposals that I could examine at MERLIN were not 
very specific nor realistic about LRD. A proposal written in 2011 – thus possibly in a 
rush due to the urgency of starting the activities – only mentioned that the NGO would 
shift from direct implementation to supervision, thereby hinting at the possibility that 
the local health facilities could be able to function independently within the 12 month 
duration of the project, something that was unrealistic. The second proposal I 
examined was a follow-up of the previous project, which quite understandably had not 
yet managed to build “lasting health care” in the project area. In this, the LRD strategy 
was more holistic and focused on the continuity of MERLIN’s presence in the area, 
including mentions of projects that the NGO intended to carry out in parallel. 
Nevertheless, it also remains notably vague on how the links with rehabilitation and 
development were to take place. Overall, neither of the two proposals detailed an 
actual, realistic action plan, as if whoever wrote that section did not know exactly what 
was expected from them. 
                                                
70 In 2010, a major humanitarian organization, when applying for ECHO funding for a project in Somalia, 
indicated in the “Continuum/LRRD” section of the project proposal that there was no need of a continuum 
strategy, as that was only a “one-off food distribution”. This notwithstanding, the project had been 
approved.  
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Among NGO staff, the few who demonstrated some familiarity with concepts of 
“bridging the gap” were invariably senior expatriate staff or people working in the 
headquarters. Even during my participant observation at MERLIN, which had a clear 
LRD-inspired mandate – “medical relief, lasting healthcare” – concepts of bridging the 
gap were notably absent from everyday discourse at country and field office level, 
despite the widespread use of jargon. The fact that the debate had been going on for 
decades was explicitly mentioned by only one NGO staff member, who responded to 
one of my questions saying: “This [how to link relief and development] is the perennial 
question, you'll be asking it in 20 years […] If anybody had the magic bullet on this 
question, it would have been answered at least 20 years ago, but everybody still 
struggles” (interview NGO_12_A_001). As for staff members of Ethiopian nationality 
– the majority of the staff – they normally had not had any exposure to the debate. 
This was consistent to a general attitude within NGOs, where only a handful of people 
in the country office (as well as those in the headquarters) were expected to have a 
strategic view. Everyone else, including people in positions such as programme 
manager or field coordinator, were not required to think strategically or know the big 
picture, but only had responsibilities related to implementation (interview 
NGO_12_C_001). Another informant also expressed her disappointment over the fact 
that – possibly related to high turnover and lack of capacity-building – finding people 
with a strategic view was rare.  
In one case, a local project assistant mentioned that she had written some parts of a 
proposal recently submitted to ECHO, including the section on “cross-cutting issues”. 
Knowing that ECHO required listing an LRRD strategy under that section, I inquired 
about it, only to find out that the informant was clueless about the acronym. Even after 
some further clarifications, she could not recall having written anything related to a 
“transition” or an “exit strategy”. Considering that writing a proposal was, by her own 
admission, the product of collating inputs from various sources from within (and 
sometimes outside) of the NGO, it is actually possible that she wrote the paragraph on 
LRRD, and then forgot about the contents. Furthermore, she gave an indication that 
cross-cutting issues were not particularly important by commenting that, as a recently 
recruited person lacking any experience on nutrition or food security, she would be in 
charge of the sections “that need a lot of writing [and] no technical background” 
(interview NGO_12_B_002), whereas more experienced colleagues would define the 
logframe, the number of beneficiaries, and the details of the activities – that, is, the 
parts that everyone considered to be the most relevant.  
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Such obliviousness was by no means limited to the debate on “bridging the gap”, but 
touched also upon the very notion of humanitarianism. In one case, in particular, I 
used the word “humanitarian” in a question directed to an otherwise very 
knowledgeable food security advisor working for a major humanitarian organisation, 71 
only to have him staring at me blankly, and then asking back: “Hmm… Humanitarian… 
You mean, emergency?” (interview NGO_13_C_001). His reaction came totally 
unexpected to me, as I had previously met an expatriate worker of the same NGO, who 
had struck me for her passionate defence of the importance of humanitarian 
principles. And yet, she had perhaps failed to convey the same beliefs to her colleagues. 
Other informants also conflated of humanitarian action and emergency response72, 
seemingly equating the humanitarian identity of an NGO with “responding primarily 
to crises” or “having emergencies as entry points”, without reference to the principles. 
Emergency response certainly constitute a major element of humanitarian action, and 
the “emergency” branch has been hegemonic in shaping humanitarianism (see chapter 
3), but this does not mean that humanitarian action only happens in emergency 
context, nor that such action is always based on the principles. 
Overall, the closer to the field, the more NGO workers were concerned with day-to-day 
implementation issues, and less to more theoretical and strategical thinking. Identity, 
if at all mentioned, was more likely to be related to the personal background – being a 
medical doctor, or an agronomist – or to the sector of intervention of the organisation.    
6.4.2 The emergence of resilience 
Countering the experience with the neglect of LRD and of broader “identity” issues, in 
the interviews held in 2013, I noticed that more and more people – including local, 
“technical” staff – were increasingly referring to the concept of resilience, something 
that had been rarely mentioned only a year before, and only by senior, expatriate aid 
workers. It must be noted that 2013 I was not able to conduct interviews in remote 
                                                
71 I was rephrasing a previous statement by the interviewee, who had explained that his NGO had 
difficulties in accessing development funds because of its reputation of being a major player in emergency 
settings, and I asked: “You mentioned earlier that [your NGO] here in Ethiopia is considered to be more of 
a humanitarian organisation; is this the case also in other parts of the world?” 
72 Such confusion is quite frequent and by no means limited to Ethiopia. I myself have attended a masters 
on “International Cooperation” where each student could focus in either “Development” or “Emergencies”, 
the latter being used as a synonym to “Humanitarian Action”. 
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field offices as I had done one year before, and therefore I am not in the position of 
assessing the spread of the resilience buzzword at the more grassroots level. However, 
by talking to country office staff, I noticed that even local NGO staff who would have 
never referred to “LRRD”, were seemingly at ease in discussing how their projects were 
aiming at building resilience.   
“Resilience is becoming more attractive than response” (interview NGO_13_D_001), 
stated an Ethiopian food security officer who referred to “resilience” six times over the 
course of a forty-minutes interview. He explained enthusiastically that the NGO he 
worked for was advocating for resilient programming “at household level, at 
community level, at regional level, and at country level as well”. The country director of 
a different NGO, too, affirmed proudly that “resilience is also one of our strategies” 
(interview NGO_13_E_001). Similarly, UN staff claimed that with their interventions 
they wanted to “allow people to build their resilience against any calamity that may 
come” (interview UN_13_001). Another NGO country director even regarded as 
positive the plain fact that resilience was high on the agenda “We talk a lot about 
resilience, and that is good. We prepare, we work towards this goal”, even though, he 
admitted “We still are in a phase where we need to work quite a lot” (interview 
NGO_13_B_001).  
The European Commission was also quite proactive on resilience, as it was launching 
the SHARE initiative in the Horn of Africa – which had the word “resilience” rather 
than “LRRD” in its name. Nevertheless, EC staff would put resilience in relation with 
their own LRRD concept. According to an ECHO officer, “Resilience is a beautiful 
laboratory in which the issue of LRRD is now getting a further chance to be developed, 
and I think that the integrating power of the concept of resilience is helping a lot” 
(interview EC_13_001). He further explained how in his view the concept of resilience 
would help overcome the old-fashioned continuum idea, stating:  
In my opinion, resilience building is something that is on the 
humanitarian side as well as on the development side. It's not We start 
and they pick it up, it's something that really goes in parallel together. 
There are aspects in the resilience building, which I think will always 
be on the side of the humanitarians, and there will be definitely aspects 
– even more aspects – that belong to the development side. We have to 
find a way to make those two articulate, to make those two reinforce 
each other and be complementary (interview EC_13_001) 
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Among the more humanitarian aspects of resilience, he counted the aspects of disaster 
risk management and disaster response, whereas safety nets, assets protection and 
social protection programmes would fall more into the areas of responsibility of 
development actors.  
As far as the actual implementation of resilience programming was concerned, most 
descriptions could easily fit into pre-existing categories, such as “livelihoods 
programming”, or more in general looking at the drivers of vulnerability and trying to 
address them. The examples ranged from the provision of less water demanding seeds 
to communities living in drought-prone areas73, to fixing water systems to avoid the 
need for expensive water trucking, to train community health workers or build local 
veterinary capacities. Another informant, assuming a gender perspective, maintained 
that “for most women” a resilient household could not be reduced to assets – herds, or 
access to rangeland – but had to include such things as having basic literacy (interview 
NGO_13_I_001).  
While all of these interventions might indeed contribute to the wellbeing of 
communities over the long term more than one-off interventions, none of them could 
possibly strike as particularly innovative. In fact, some of these initiatives would have 
been launched before the resilience-frenzy, and they were not much dissimilar from 
activities that just one year before were presented under the “livelihoods” banner. 
Indeed, a UN officer, who had contributed to drafting a resilience strategy paper, 
admitted that the novelty of resilience was not in its contents (“frankly it's not a new 
thought, anything new”; interview UN_13_006), but in the fact that it was drawing a 
lot of attention. He also noted, however, that resilience programming still made up a 
very small component of the myriad of programmes and projects on-going in Ethiopia, 
and that in any case it could not be thought as a magic bullet that would solve all 
issues.  
Furthermore, another argument that frequently emerged in relation to resilience, and 
which echoes a claim often made about disaster risk reduction more specifically, is that 
it would be more cost-effective than “traditional” response. On this respect, some 
assumed that resilience would be more cost-effective by default, whereas others argued 
                                                
73 The actual degree of “resilience” built through this project remains unclear. The informant, in fact, 
reported that these seeds led to an increased agricultural production in dry years, but admitted that crops 
failed after above average rains, noting that the type of seeds “is not something we can change overnight” 
(interview NGO_13_D_001) 
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that it would only become mainstream after having proven its comparative advantages. 
As discussed in chapter 2, aid effectiveness, of which cost-effectiveness is a key 
element, has recently reached the status of a key principle of development action. From 
a humanitarian standpoint, however, a line of reasoning that priorities saving money 
over saving lives remains problematic. This concern, however, was never aired by any 
of the informants.  
6.4.3 Willingness to “bridge the gap” 
Despite the fact that most of the people I interviewed were not particularly informed 
about the debate on bridging the gap, nor about the discourses of emergency versus 
alchemical humanitarianism, for that matter, most of them would advocate for better 
integration of the emergency response with more longer term efforts of development. 
Indeed, as described above, many quickly embraced the idea of resilience. The gap, 
which would rarely be described as such, was mostly framed in terms of difficulty to 
access funds to further the engagement with a specific community after the conclusion 
of an emergency response project.  
Of all the people interviewed, only one openly criticised the idea that humanitarian 
relief should become more “developmental”. In our first conversation, she maintained 
that, whereas humanitarian action can be effective reaching its primary goal of saving 
lives, she had doubts about development action. Furthermore, she feared that putting 
too much attention on the aspects of sustainability and connectedness to development 
could be detrimental to hardcore humanitarian initiatives. In a second interview one 
year later, she expressed a more nuanced position, even presenting herself as a 
supporter of the idea of resilience. Her position about development had shifted from 
being skeptical of development action per se, to not being convinced about 
development strategies pursued by the Ethiopian Government74. Regardless of her 
(initial) views on bridging the gap, the NGO she worked for was not only carrying out 
“standard” relief activities such as delivering food and nutritional supplements to 
refugees, but also projects with a component of disaster risk reduction, and this even 
before the 2011 crisis. This included, for instance, activities related to improved 
                                                
74 She justified her change of mind explaining that at the time of the first interview in 2012 she was under 
a lot of stress and still recovering from the overwork related to the emergency response, which perhaps led 
her to being overly pessimistic about development prospects.  
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rangeland management and animal health in pastoral areas, or access to water and 
sanitation systems. 
Most interviewees were positive about carrying out developmental initiatives, and 
agreed on the fact that longer-term involvement in Ethiopia would be crucial to both 
strengthen local capacities and maintain an operational presence that can enable quick 
response in the (quite likely) case of another crisis. For instance, one informant 
presented a new four-year project proposal as a good opportunity “to be positioned in a 
strategical point [...] to be ready to scale up again” (interview NGO_12_B_004). Many 
complained about the short timeframes of humanitarian projects, explaining that even 
if project extensions are granted, a couple of years would not suffice to tackle all the 
recovery needs (interview NGO_13_C_001), nor to strengthen local response 
capacities to a level in which they can be fully in charge in case of crisis (interviews 
NGO_12_B_003; NGO_12_B_004). In the context of nutritional interventions, 
according to a programme manager, two years could be enough to ensure all health 
workers in the targeted facilities knows the appropriate protocols and is able to put 
them in practice without supervision, but problems related to staffing levels or 
procurement of necessary supplies will likely remain, requiring external support 
(interview NGO_12_B_003).  
Talking about Borena zone, one Ethiopian project assistant explained that it “needs 
more of a sustainable response than just a one year [project] or a very short term 
response” (interview NGO_12_002). One of her colleagues, in a separate session, 
explained that pastoral communities such as those in Borena zone would have to face 
some kind of difficulties every year, which required a longer-term involvement of the 
NGO. The ultimate goal, however, would be for aid organisation to become redundant: 
“NGOs at one point should not be needed” (interview NGO_12_B_004). However, 
none of the organisations reached during this study – some of which had been in 
Ethiopia since 1984 – had any actual plan of leaving the country anytime soon. On the 
contrary, some had even developed longer term frameworks for their involvement in 
Ethiopia, reportedly ranging from five to ten years. Another NGO staff member 
admitted: “Emergency is good, you have to save lives, but if you have the resources [...] 
it's better to have a longer term approach” (interview NGO_13_C_001).  
When discussing some of the mechanisms that donors were offering for increased 
flexibility reactions were usually very positive. USAID crisis modifier, for instance, was 
appreciated because it allowed for adapting programmes to changing conditions on the 
ground. “We think that in year two we will do restocking, and farmers’ production, 
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livestock growth, but [then] there is a drought, so instead of that we actually have to do 
emergency de-stocking” (interview NGO_13_E_001). Another person noted that a key 
feature of the crisis modifier mechanism is that the emergency response activities 
would be not constitute a separate intervention, but, being part of the same larger 
programme, they would be carried out in parallel with more developmental activities if 
appropriate (interview NGO_12_A_003). 
A further element that has raised by attention has been the general acceptance of the 
“famine as natural disaster” narrative, both among national and expatriate staff. 
References to drought and erratic rains were frequent, and other facts frequently 
mentioned were overpopulation and overgrazing. Some interviewees also indicated 
progressively decreasing size of agricultural lots as one cause of vulnerability, even 
though the recent crisis (and several of the previous ones) had mostly affected 
pastoralist populations. The narrative of climate change, while dramatically real in 
Ethiopia, might have inadvertently provided arguments to depoliticise the root causes 
of disasters. From a perspective of linking relief and development, this can contribute 
to finding a common ground, but it also bears the risk of underplaying the necessity of 
impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action. Finally, a key difference between 
staff of Ethiopian nationality and expatriate workers was related to the actual capacity 
of the Ethiopian government to deliver on its development promises. The former 
would often express the belief that the country would be able to meet its ambitious 
goals of economic development and reduction of dependency on food aid. On the 
contrary, expatriate aid workers were much more skeptical, pointing out that targets 
and timeframes were unrealistic, and that statistics could not be always trusted. “If 
they admit that [benchmarks will not be reached on time], and maybe extend the 
Growth and Transformation Plan from its 2015 deadline, that's one way of doing it. 
The other way is manufacturing statistics” (UN_13_006).    
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided an account of the elements that are relevant to the 
institutional perpetuation or the eventual obsolescence of the “gap” between 
humanitarian and development action. First, I have examined a few instances of how, 
despite remaining constraints, LRD seems to be actually possible. In many cases, 
implementing organisations were actually linking their humanitarian and development 
programme; only, this was mostly done without explicitly referring to concepts of 
bridging the gap.  
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Secondly, I have taken into consideration regulative, normative, and cultural cognitive 
frameworks, highlighting how sometimes these forces operate with mutually opposing 
tendencies. In particular, while I certainly noticed that the aid architecture, most of 
which is determined by donors, accentuates the differences between what is 
humanitarian and everything else, I did not find substantial evidence of a strong 
cultural clash between humanitarian and development actors on the ground. On the 
contrary, most actors were already involved in both types of action. When the 
humanitarian-development gap was acknowledged, it was usually in terms of different 
funding lines, rather than of different missions. However, the gap existed and was 
reproduced, for instance through the discursive schizophrenia – talking humanitarian 
with humanitarians, development with development donors – sometimes used by 
NGOs when addressing different donor organizations. All in all, differences between 
the two realms did not seem to be much larger than the differences that exist among 
interventions in different sectors. For instance, the treatment of acute malnutrition, 
which falls into the humanitarian realm, is likely to have more points of contact with 
interventions aimed at addressing chronic malnutrition (normally ascribed under 
“development”), rather than with a humanitarian shelter programme.  
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Chapter 7. Discussion and 
conclusions 
 
This thesis was set up with the purpose of understanding which institutional forces 
hinder, and which ones encourage, establishing linkages between humanitarian relief 
and development cooperation in Ethiopia. In this final chapter, I will discuss the 
evidence presented in the previous chapters, and most notably in chapter 5, and 
present the key contributions of this study, as well as its limitations and issues that 
remain open for further research.  
7.1 The research question unwrapped 
In setting out the study of LRD in Ethiopia, I had taken as working hypothesis that 
there are institutional forces pushing for maintaining the separation of humanitarian 
and development action, while at the same time recognising that other forces might be 
pushing in the opposite direction (see section 2.4 above). Following the 
operationalisation of this research, I will be discussing the findings in each of the three 
institutional pillars: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.  
7.1.1 Regulative Pillar 
From the evidence presented in this study, it appears that some regulative frameworks, 
and most notably those set by donors for the management of grants, can constitute 
powerful forces that work against the integration of humanitarian relief and 
development action. By setting different rules that implementers have to follow in their 
humanitarian and development projects – for instance related to the timeframe of the 
implementation or the eligibility of beneficiaries – these rules contribute to the 
institutionalisation of two separate modes of action. It is crucial to note here that the 
two modes may or may not reflect substantial differences in the situation on the 
ground. Particularly in case of slow-onset disasters as the one experienced in Ethiopia 
in 2011-12, it is difficult to draw a line between deteriorating conditions of chronic 
poverty, and a situation of humanitarian concern. Indeed, if sometimes humanitarian 
activities are carried out in the same communities were development projects are on-
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going, it is clear that, at least to some extent, boundaries are defined by the aid 
community and for the aid community. 
It would nevertheless be misguided to dismiss the humanitarian-development 
distinction as something created by donors and necessarily determined by empirically 
observable differences on the ground. Following a critical realist approach, in fact, 
whatever is capable of transforming structures and events, and to reproduce them, is 
real (Clegg 2010:10). And indeed, the application of different rules has consequences at 
many levels. The type of activities that can be undertaken within the framework of a 
humanitarian project are usually different from the ones that are admissible in a 
development project; and this applies even more for their duration. The impact of 
donor rules is such, that some aid agencies reported planning their interventions in 
order to fit into donors’ schemes.  
Following Ohanyan (2009, 2012) it can be argued that organisations not relying on a 
single donor (or a limited number of donors, for that matter) can enjoy greater 
independence, and thus more easily escape the humanitarian-development divide if 
they feel it is not beneficial to a given situation on the ground. This is confirmed by 
evidence that NGOs considered expanding their funding base as a key element for 
maintaining their presence in the country, which is a key example of their agency. 
Furthermore, a few organisations that were reportedly receiving a substantial part of 
their funding from private sources were more confident in planning activities over a 
longer period of time, or piloting approaches that may or may not be readily accepted 
by donors. At the same time, the emergence of some flexible funding schemes – of 
which the USAID crisis modifier and the joint ECHO-EuropeAid SHARE initiative 
were two key examples – signalled that donors might be increasingly open to change 
some of the rules, allowing for easier integration of humanitarian and development 
efforts.  
As far as the Ethiopian rules and regulations are concerned, some, such as the need of 
having every project approved by different entities, certainly contributed to an 
additional layer of complexity for the management of aid projects. However, Ethiopian 
rules did not foster the institutionalisation and perpetuation of the humanitarian-
development gap and, if anything, they contribute to establishing a common platform. 
In fact, the same rules apply to all non-profit organisations, regardless of the type of 
intervention, which contributes to reducing the distinctions between development and 
humanitarian activities. This is particularly relevant when, as some aid workers 
pointed out, the complex bureaucratic procedures result in delaying the start of 
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humanitarian activities, inadvertently further dismantling the juxtaposition of rapid 
(and short-term) humanitarian relief versus more carefully planned, longer-term 
development. At the same time, some rules could affect the viability of some 
development actions, considering that foreign-funded organisations are not allowed to 
work on human rights and other politically sensitive issues that would otherwise be 
part of the domain of development action. Similarly, some capacity-building activities 
– itself a mode of action that is particularly suited to development – might be barred 
on the grounds that their costs are entirely “administrative” and thus violate the 70-30 
rule on budgets. Whether Ethiopian authorities were actually willing to enforce all 
their rules to the point of discouraging the implementation of aid initiatives is beyond 
the scope of this work. From a critical realist standpoint, what matters, as noted also 
with reference to donor rules, is whether the existence of such rules might induce aid 
organisations to change their plans. For instance, even if one of the interviewees 
reported that it is sometimes possible to start activities without waiting for formal 
approval, other informants would not do so for fear of breaking the rules and being 
revoked the permission to operate in the country. In this sense, the mere existence of 
the rule was having an impact on aid practices, delaying the start of emergency 
response. However, Ethiopian laws do not seem to actually contribute to the 
institutionalisation of the humanitarian-development divide. All things considered, I 
conclude that Ethiopian rules are compatible with “bridging the gap” approaches.  
7.1.2 Normative Pillar 
In the normative pillar, the focus has been on the non-binding norms and values that 
can reinforce the institutionalisation of the two-pronged system, or instead promote 
LRD. In particular, the hegemonic discourse of emergency humanitarianism, despite 
having long represented a minority of the actors that identify as humanitarian, appears 
to be one of the main obstacles to “bridging the gap”, as it could be difficult to 
conciliate respect for the humanitarian principles when carrying out more 
developmental tasks. And indeed, the strongest opposition to the very idea of LRD has 
come from emergency humanitarians asking for a return to “basics”, i.e. principled 
emergency response. On the other hand, the various discourses of “bridging the gap” 
could be employed to promote and justify integrated approaches.  
By analysing policies and official narratives of Ethiopian authorities, donors, and 
implementing organisations, I have found strong indications of the relevance of the 
mandate only among donors. This finding was possibly influenced by the fact that most 
of the informants were receiving funds from the European Commission, and that the 
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only donor representatives interviewed were also from that organisation. In fact, and 
despite having been the creator of the “LRRD” approach, the European Commission is 
also one of the organisations where the divide is the most pronounced. Specificities of 
the EC aside, those who openly discussed the different narratives of humanitarian and 
development action tended to ascribe them to something that exist “at donor level”, 
without referring to anyone in particular. Other than people from within the EC, only 
one UN officer and one NGO representative ever openly adopted narratives of 
humanitarian mandate, or identity. Otherwise, adopting a “humanitarian” language 
rather than a “development” one was merely a tool instrumentally adopted to further 
one organisation’s chances of getting funded.  
As far as the Ethiopian authorities were concerned, while I could not find any explicit 
reference to bridging the gap as such, their policies and official narratives all went in 
the direction of preventing famine rather than addressing its symptoms. This has led to 
the development of policies and narrative that, while sometimes poorly connected with 
each other, all contribute to foster a culture of prevention, risk reduction, and 
development – all elements that are key to LRD approaches.  
7.1.3 Cultural-cognitive Pillar 
In the cultural-cognitive pillar, the dichotomy between humanitarian and development 
action is less pronounced than in the normative one. There was relatively little 
convergence between normative discourses and frames of reference of aid 
organisations on the ground. Discourses might have been instrumentally used to 
pursue practical objectives, such as getting funded, but were not necessarily shared by 
– or sometimes, not even known to – aid workers on the field. 
In most of the cases, the humanitarian-development divide was not referred to as a 
problem of different mandates, but either dismissed as a donor concern – with the 
contrasting narratives used as tools to please different donors – or framed as an issue 
of different contexts, not particularly relevant to the situation on the ground. In other 
words, they did not share the same frames of reference and meanings that are 
produced by polarised discourses of humanitarianism and development. In some 
cases, aid workers explicitly admitted to have instrumentally used development 
discourse to appeal to development donors, and humanitarian discourse to 
humanitarians. Overall, the aid workers’ notions of what is appropriate and legitimate 
rarely referred to “values” of any kind, and were instead more pragmatical and flexible 
than the broader narratives. 
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A significant finding related to the cultural-cognitive elements is actually that their 
humanitarian (or development) identity is of relatively little relevance for aid workers 
focused on (and perhaps obsessed by) the practical details and challenges of day-to-day 
project implementation. These aid workers rarely question the broader logic of their 
intervention. Indeed, the very ideas of humanitarianism and of principled action 
appeared to be foreign to some interviewees, and they almost never referred to them. It 
emerged instead a conflation of the idea of humanitarianism with that of emergency 
response, where the defining element of humanitarianism was not the way it is carried 
out (the principles), but the context (the emergency). In other words, rather than 
“being” humanitarian, some organisations “do” emergency response, alongside 
development action.  Yet, not all emergency response is necessarily humanitarian, 
whereas it is possible to act according to humanitarian principles in situations that do 
not constitute an acute crisis. Furthermore, it was somehow surprising to almost never 
hear any reference to humanitarian principles when discussing with staff members of 
organisations signatories of the 1994 Code of Conduct. Perhaps neglect constitutes a 
greater threat to the integrity of the principles than their voluntary abandonment. The 
paradox is that confining humanitarianism to emergency response has not necessarily 
translated in a systematic application of humanitarian principles in the framework of 
humanitarian projects. 
Similarly, references to concepts of “bridging the gap”, such as LRRD or Early 
Recovery, were rare, particularly among people occupying non-managerial roles. These 
concepts did not have much influence in shaping aid workers’ views, as only few were 
aware of their meaning, and even less referred to them spontaneously. Conversely, I 
brought evidence of an increasingly frequent use of the concept of “resilience”, 
signalling that they were exposed to discourses of resilience, at the very least in 
interactions with donors and other elements of the international community, if not 
also in their programmes. Overall, and despite their choice of words, interviewees were 
supportive of the idea of integrating humanitarian and development action. The 
desirability of bridging the gap would usually be linked to the difficulty of drawing a 
line between the two when working at the community level in the field.  
Overall, I gathered the impression that the word resilience was merely a catch-all term 
with little meaning – that is, one of the definitions of buzzwords according to Cornwall 
and Brock (2005) – or, at best, a rebranding of existing ideas. However, for some aid 
workers it was perhaps the first concept for them to refer comprehensively to every 
action that did not fit neatly in either the “emergency response” box nor in the 
“development one”. Resilience, in a way, could bring together a range of different ideas 
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about holistic programming that had remained confined to their own domains. It 
might, for instance, help different sectors develop their own versions of what is known 
as “livelihoods programming” in the realm of food assistance, or “building back better” 
for shelter (particularly in natural disasters settings).  
Through this research, I brought evidence of how the integration between 
humanitarian and development assistance in Ethiopia is most strongly hindered by 
institutional forces that operate in the regulative and, to a certain extent, the normative 
pillar. As far as the cultural-cognitive pillar is concerned, there seem to be little trickle-
down of the very idea of humanitarianism as principled action, which has always been 
the main argument against LRD.   
7.2 Originality and relevance 
The main element of originality of this research lies in the approach taken in 
examining the issue of linking relief and development, which differs from previous 
scholarship. Rather than taking a normative stance as to whether the humanitarian-
development divide should (or should not) be overcome, I have sought to examine the 
institutional factors that contribute to the perpetuation of the gap, as well as those that 
promote its reduction, by using original empirical material from my case study in 
Ethiopia. To the best of my knowledge, this is a unique attempt that could potentially 
contribute to scholarly reflections on the boundaries between humanitarian and 
development action in 2015. We are in fact at a critical juncture, when negotiation of 
both the Sustainable Development Goals – the objectives that will replace the 
Millennium Development Goals after 2015 – and of a new humanitarian agenda to be 
adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit are taking place almost in parallel. 
Considering that a number of actors, such as dual-mandate organisations and several 
recipient countries, are stakeholders in both processes, the theme of bridging the gap 
could potentially be relevant.  
In addition, this study contributes to shedding a light on practices of aid to Ethiopia, 
emphasising the constraints and incentives that shape the day-to-day implementation 
of humanitarian work at the meso level of aid organisations based in-country. These 
concerns, in fact, are usually absent from both academic research and project 
documentation, both mostly focused on assessing the results (or lack thereof) rather 
than the processes with which the former are attained. A notable exception is the work 
of Lautze et al. (2009) on humanitarian governance, which coincidentally has also 
taken Ethiopia as a case study. Their work, however, focused more on the regulative 
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and normative aspects set by the government, whereas my research has taken aid 
organisations as the main point of reference. With Ethiopia being a prominent stage 
for humanitarian and development action, I feel that research on how these are – and 
can be – carried out fills a critical gap in literature.  
Furthermore, the findings of this study are also expected to be of interest to policy-
makers and aid organisations seeking to promote better integration of humanitarian 
and development efforts. Finally, by bringing to the surface the widespread lack of 
awareness about humanitarian principles, particularly among field-level aid officers, 
this study could also be employed by both emergency and alchemical humanitarians to 
justify the need for improving their dissemination efforts.  
 
7.3 Generalisability, limitations, and issues for further 
research 
The issue of generalisability of the findings of a single case study has been satisfactorily 
addressed by Flyvbjerg (2006, 2011), who, despite arguing that generalisability should 
not be the primary aim of scientific research, nevertheless demonstrates that some case 
studies can satisfactorily produce results that are relevant to different contexts. This is 
true in particular of critical case studies, where the case examined presents some 
prominent features. In this dissertation, I have argued that Ethiopia is a critical case 
for LRD, because it is characterised by an exacerbated vulnerability to food crises, by 
the simultaneous and longstanding presence of both humanitarian and development 
actors. In addition, it has been demonstrated that the government is not hostile 
towards bridging the gap, but it is rather in favour of a more developmental approach 
to crisis response, provided that it fits into its own policies. As a result of these factors, 
Ethiopia appears to be unusually suited for LRD; and any difficulties experienced here 
are likely to be even more pronounced elsewhere. While it will be impossible to 
extrapolate from this case study detailed predictions on the feasibility of LRD 
approaches elsewhere, some elements can be nevertheless relevant, particularly if one 
considers the transnational dimension of the humanitarian and development 
“industries”. 
The empirical findings of this study have shown that LRD approaches are possible in 
Ethiopia, and they have indeed been implemented during the recent food crises – even 
though often they were not necessarily labelled as such. Donors appear to be the key 
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obstacle, for they hinder integration by imposing different regulations to their 
humanitarian and development grants respectively, as well as by having different 
policies for each type of action, and different accountability lines. Considering that 
donors, with their rules and policies, are more or less the same for all the developing 
world, this specific finding is of the utmost importance for any discussion about LRD, 
regardless of the country of implementation. Conversely, implementing organisations 
rarely posed issues of “identity” as humanitarians, and were instead interested in 
keeping a presence in the country, to both try to reduce vulnerability and prevent, to 
the extent possible, the worst effects of crises, as well as to be present and ready to 
scale up their activities to respond to the next emergency. In order to do so, they were 
open to pragmatically exploit the features of the current donor system. Given the fact 
that aid organisations have also a transnational presence, and that most of the 
decision-makers at local level are expatriate staff members who would usually rotate 
among different duty stations, it would not be surprising if similar considerations 
could apply elsewhere.  
Indeed, my own professional experience in humanitarian and development actions in 
countries other than Ethiopia is consistent with the findings of this study. Only during 
my time at ECHO I found strong insistence on humanitarian identity; this was not true 
of any the other organisations I worked with. At the Italian Cooperation I was 
personally only involved in development assistance, but emergency relief was also part 
of the office’s portfolio, although managed by a different team and with different 
procedures. There was no juxtaposition of the two identities, and some staff moved 
from humanitarian projects to development ones with ease. The NGO COPE was only 
doing development, and had a stronger development identity, yet it was not 
prejudicially against humanitarian assistance – it was just something outside their 
expertise and, possibly, capacities. The WFP, which has a strong humanitarian 
identity, has also always carried out development projects. Indeed, while most donors 
recognise and praise the humanitarian competence of WFP – particular in terms of 
logistical capacities, rapid deployment, and scale – one of the challenges in terms of 
donor relations is for the organisation to be seen as a valuable player in the 
development domain, particularly during times of spending cuts and added emphasis 
on concepts such as value for money. 
Importantly, Ethiopia constitutes a very peculiar case in terms of the degree of control 
exercised by local authorities over international aid, as well as for their overall 
preference for approaches aimed at crisis prevention and at tackling chronic hunger. 
Furthermore, the local leadership of the government in both the humanitarian and 
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development realm is virtually uncontested, despite timid criticism from some NGOs. 
In the absence of an interventionist government, or in presence of rules that exacerbate 
rather than dilute the differences between emergency response and development 
action, bridging the gap could prove more challenging than it is in Ethiopia. The 
limited awareness of the specificities of humanitarian action (as opposed to 
development) can also be linked to a situation in which natural triggers of disasters are 
emphasised over the political dimension. The same would probably not be true in 
situations of clearly “man-made disasters” such as conflicts, where humanitarians are 
more likely to adhere to principles that were indeed developed for wartime assistance. 
All in all, issues at stake when trying to bridge relief and development in situations of 
conflict, weak state institutions, or following sudden natural disasters, will likely raise 
different concerns than the ones examined here.  
Therefore, a first major limitation of this study is that, while some of its findings can be 
generalised, others are only relevant to Ethiopia. Furthermore, by design this study has 
focused on implementing organisations and, to a limited extent, to donors present in 
country. All other actors along the aid chain – donor headquarters, aid organisations 
headquarters, local authorities, and obviously beneficiaries – have been looked at from 
the standpoint of the implementing organisation. While maintaining the relevance of 
my approach, which has showed some significant results, despite being carried out as 
an individual research project with only limited availability of time and funds, I 
recognise that it i salso useful to listen to other voices along (and outside) the aid 
chain. Finally, as anticipated in the introduction, another limitation is that I have taken 
an agnostic stance as to whether a systematic adoption of LRD would actually be better 
than a two-pronged system. 
Recognising these limitations, I believe that further research could be beneficial in all 
three areas. Two of them would constitute expansions of the present research, either by 
replicating this study in one or more contexts other than Ethiopia and then compare 
the findings, or by adding more “layers” of interviews to actors holding different 
positions in the aid chain. The third issue that could deserve additional research, 
establishing whether LRD is a more desirable approach, would require a completely 
different research design, focused on monitoring and evaluation, as well as active 
collaboration of aid organisations, who should be open to share their internal 
documents and allow for field visits. Furthermore, the involvement of a larger team of 
researchers would be necessary, even more so in case of a comparative study 
undertaken in different countries.  
  164 
7.4 Final remarks and recommendations 
The key finding of this research is that, in the case of Ethiopia and possibly in others, 
there is an interplay of factors, some favouring the perpetuation of the gap, while 
others working in the opposite direction. The factors hindering LRD are most 
significant in the regulative pillars, where donor regulations remain critical to the 
institutionalisation of a humanitarian-development divide. Additionally, regulative 
frameworks at the country level may further deepen the divide, but this effect was not 
significant in the Ethiopian case study. Discourses of humanitarianism as separate 
from development, while much emphasised in literature and policy documents, had 
limited influence at the operational level, where pragmatic and instrumental 
approaches were common, and willingness to link relief and development widespread. 
However, this might be related to the common perception of Ethiopian food crises as 
natural disasters, compounded with the high involvement of the government in both 
humanitarian and development action. In other contexts, the normative and cultural-
cognitive pillars might play a more substantive role in maintaining the gap. 
Nevertheless, this study has demonstrated that LRD is, at least under certain 
conditions, possible, yet still subject to a number of challenges. If aid organisations are 
indeed willing to bridge the gap whenever possible, there are a number of 
recommendations that could make this effort easier.  
First of all, from a regulative point of view, implementing organisations should seek to 
enlarge their donor base, including private funders. The availability of different types 
of funding would likely increase their capability of carrying out different types of 
activities across the humanitarian-development divide and, more broadly, it would 
enhance their capability of exercise agency and pursue their own strategies rather than 
becoming mere executers of donors’ priorities. Donors, on their side, should take steps 
to allow for more flexibility in funding, such as allowing for rapidly switching from 
development-mode to humanitarian-mode, considering extending the maximum 
duration of their humanitarian projects, or creating specific budget lines as “bridges” 
between different projects. Additionally, options for non-earmarked contributions to 
trusted implementing partners could be explored.  
Secondly, from a normative perspective, considering that many implementing 
organisations are already pursuing a dual mandate, it could be time to consider 
whether humanitarian principles can be maintained also in when undertaking 
activities that are not strictly-speaking humanitarian, and whether they could benefit 
from being complemented with aid effectiveness principles. This is in part already 
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happening, for instance with the recent launch of the new Core Humanitarian 
Standard, which integrates previous humanitarian standards, and which is open to use 
also in the context of development operations, or with the recent interest in the 
concepts of resilience and disaster risk reduction. The discussion would benefit from 
pragmatical insights on the extent to which humanitarian principles are actually 
applied in current humanitarian operations. Finally, given the rather limited uptake of 
normative discourses at field level, aid organisations, regardless of their views on the 
specific issue of bridging the gap, might want to invest in dissemination of principles 
and standards for accountability among their staff members.   
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Annex 2 - General Interview Outline 
 
PRESENTATION & ETHICS 
Introduction of the research 
Explain the purpose and modalities of the interview 
Explain that the interviewee can opt out of the interview anytime 
Explain the levels of confidentiality and ask the interviewee to sign the consent form 
(annex 3) 
Ask permission for tape-recording 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS  
Ask the interviewee to introduce themselves and explain their role within their 
organisation.  
Follow up (if/when appropriate): Ask to describe a typical day at work  
Ask to describe the on-going activities of the organisation in Ethiopia 
 
MAIN INTERVIEW TOPICS/QUESTIONS  
(note: modify order or include additional questions based on the interviewee’s 
responses) 
Ask whether their organisation is linking humanitarian activities with development 
ones, or if they are planning to do so in the future. Invite them to elaborate on how they 
do it and/or what hinders such linkages.  
Ask about the organisations’ funding sources 
If appropriate to the role: inquire about how projects are developed and/or about 
relationships with headquarters 
Ask about the organisations’ relationships with Ethiopian authorities 
Ask to elaborate on the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia. Follow up on themes related 
to chronic crisis, underlying vulnerabilities.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Ask about their expectations on their organisation’s work in the country. 
Ask whether they want to add something and/or ask any questions themselves 
Thank the interviewee and remind that they will be sent a copy of the interview 
summary for their reference (they will have the chance to expand or clarify on their 
answers if they wish so.  
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Annex 3 - Consent form template 
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